Smith v. State, No. 3051

• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
• Writing for the Court: ADKINS.
• Citation: 805 A.2d 1108,145 Md. App. 400
• Decision Date: 27 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. 3051
• Parties: Deshawn Lamont SMITH v. STATE of Maryland.

805 A.2d 1108
145 Md. App. 400

Deshawn Lamont SMITH
v.
STATE of Maryland

No. 3051, Sept. Term, 2000.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

August 27, 2002.

805 A.2d 1109

Geraldine K. Sweeney, Assistant Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender on the brief) of Baltimore, for appellant

Gary E. Bair, Assistant Attorney General and Michelle W. Cole, Staff Attorney (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Baltimore

805 A.2d 1110

and Joseph I. Cassily, State's Attorney for Harford County, Bel Air, on the brief) for appellee

Submitted before MURPHY, C.J., and DAVIS, HOLLANDER, SALMON, JAMES R. EYLER, SONNER, KENNEY, DEBORAH S. EYLER, ADKINS, KRAUSER, GREENE and SHARER, JJ.

ADKINS, Judge.

We are asked in this case to make a close call regarding the sufficiency of evidence necessary to support a conviction for knowingly transporting an illegal handgun. The single issue presented turns on whether an inference that a person has knowledge of contraband in his or her vehicle can be drawn from the person's status as a driver and lessee of that vehicle. In resolving this issue, we borrow concepts from the body of law defining the crime of possession of controlled dangerous substances ("CDS") and other contraband. We shall hold that a person's status as both the driver and the owner or lessee of a vehicle supports an inference that the person had knowledge of the presence of contraband in the vehicle that is sufficient to convict, except when there is evidence indicating that a passenger had a greater nexus to the contraband.

Deshawn L. Smith, appellant, was convicted at a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Harford County of transporting a handgun in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2001 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27 section 36B.¹ We reverse that conviction.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Maryland State Trooper Larry Goldstein testified that at around 5:30 on the evening of March 25, 2000, he was working speed enforcement on I-95 in Harford County when he was advised by another trooper to stop a white Buick for speeding. Trooper Goldstein made the stop and parked his vehicle behind the Buick. He approached the vehicle on the drivers side and asked the driver, appellant, for his drivers license and vehicle registration. There were two passengers in the vehicle, Michael Brandon Foster and Dayvon Smith. At trial, Trooper Goldstein did not recall the positions of the passengers in the vehicle, but did remember that one of the passengers had been sitting in the rear seat. According to the trooper, when he approached the Buick, he smelled the odor of burnt marijuana. Goldstein returned to his vehicle and checked appellants drivers license and the registration of the vehicle. After calling for backup, Goldstein returned to the Buick and asked appellant to exit the vehicle. The trooper told appellant that he smelled marijuana. In response, appellant admitted that he had smoked marijuana before he was stopped.

When additional police arrived, the officers arrested appellant and his companions for the marijuana offense. Goldstein then searched the vehicle incident to the arrest of the men.

805 A.2d 1111

Trooper Slide, one of the troopers who had arrived to assist Goldstein, opened the trunk of the vehicle. He lifted a jacket in the trunk and told Goldstein that he had found a handgun under the jacket. Trooper Goldstein looked into the trunk and saw a handgun in the center

At trial, Goldstein testified that the vehicle had a fold-down rear seat so that there was direct access to the trunk from the back seat of the vehicle. He also stated that he had not seen any suspicious movement or attempt to hide anything by the passengers.

Trooper Goldstein removed the handgun from the trunk. The handgun was a silver revolver, a .38 Special with a barrel approximately four inches long. The gun was loaded with five rounds. A subsequent test of the gun determined that it was operable.

None of the men admitted to owning either the gun or the jacket. One of the passengers, Dayvon Smith, however, later admitted to owning the jacket, and the jacket was returned to him.

According to Goldstein, appellant told him that he lived in Essex, Maryland, that he had rented the Buick, that he had had it for a week, and that he was going to New York to return the vehicle.

The trial court found appellant guilty of transporting a handgun. It relied on the fact that appellant had rented the car for a week and was its driver. It reasoned that appellant, as the "driver and occupant of the car, knew of the gun's presence," and "was at least in constructive possession of [it]."

DISCUSSION

The Parties' Contentions

Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. He argues that the location of the gun underneath Dayvon Smith's jacket makes it probable that Smith put the gun in the trunk. He urges that "[w]hether Appellant was aware of his doing so is pure conjecture."

The State responds that "the evidence supports a finding that [appellant] knew of the gun's presence." It points to the fact that appellant was the driver and renter of the vehicle, that appellant was driving the vehicle to New York, that the gun was loaded and not in a container, and that Dayvon Smith later admitted ownership of the jacket but not the gun.

Standard Of Review

The standard for our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is "whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see White v. State, 363 Md. 150, 162, 767 A.2d 855 (2001). "Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder." State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750, 720 A.2d 323 (1998). We do not re-weigh the evidence, but "we do determine whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, which could convince a rational trier of fact of the defendants guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt." White, 363 Md. at 162, 767 A.2d 855. "Circumstantial evidence is entirely sufficient to support a conviction, provided the circumstances support rational inferences from which the trier of fact could be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused[.]" Hall v. State, 119 Md.App. 377, 393, 705 A.2d 50 (1998); see Finke v. State, 56 Md.App. 450, 468-69, 468 A.2d 353 (1983), cert. denied, 299 Md. 425, 474 A.2d 218, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1043, 105 S.Ct. 529, 83 L.Ed.2d 416 (1984).

805 A.2d 1112

Cases Cited By The Parties

The State cites Herbert v. State, 136 Md.App. 458, 766 A.2d 190 (2001), and Timmons v. State, 114 Md.App. 410, 690 A.2d 530 (1997), in support of its position. These, as well as the primary cases cited by appellant, involve convictions for possession of CDS. We agree with the parties that CDS possession cases serve as valuable precedent for analysis of this handgun transportation offense.

In CDS possession cases, the State must prove that the defendant had "actual or constructive dominion or control" over the contraband. See Art. 27 § 277(s); White, 363 Md. at 163, 767 A.2d 855. Knowledge is a required element in the proof of dominion and control. See Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 649, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988). Knowledge of someone else's possession of CDS, however, is not alone sufficient to show dominion and control. See White, 363 Md. at 164-165, 767 A.2d 855. Under Art. 27 section 36B(b), unless the handgun is upon or about the defendant's person, in addition to proving transportation, the State must also show the accused's knowledge that it is being transported.² See Art. 27 § 36B(b). In this case, proof of appellant's transportation of the handgun is not disputed, as the handgun was located in the trunk of the car appellant was driving. What this case turns on, and what CDS possession cases often turn on, is whether the evidence is sufficient to allow an inference that the defendant had knowledge of the contraband.

In Herbert, we considered the status of the defendant as a possessor of the premises in which contraband was found as an important factor in sustaining those convictions. We held in Herbert that Herberts status as the primary, if not the exclusive, possessor of the apartment makes him criminally responsible for, inter alia, the contraband found in the kitchen. Herbert, 136 Md.App. at 469, 766 A.2d 190.

In contrast to this case, however, Herbert involved contraband found in plain view. In Herbert, the police found 28.8 grams of marijuana in plain view in a small living room in which the defendant and his companion were seated, and the companion was smoking a marijuana cigar. Contraband was also found in areas of Herbert's residence to which he alone had access.

805 A.2d 1113

Timmons is also distinguishable. In Timmons, a currency bag containing rare coins and two bags of cocaine was found under the hood of the car in which Timmons was a passenger. A handgun was found next to the currency bag. There was testimony that linked Timmons to the coins and to a key that fit the bag's lock. In contrast, the State in this case showed nothing linking appellant to the gun other than appellant's control over the vehicle. Indeed, the location of the gun, in the trunk of a rented car under Dayvon Smith's jacket, suggested that the gun may have belonged to him, rather than appellant.

On the other hand, neither Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 697 A.2d 462 (1997), nor White, cited by appellant, is precisely on point. In Taylor, the marijuana that Taylor was found guilty of possessing was in the bag of another person, and unlike appellant, Taylor did not have a possessory interest in the motel room in which the marijuana was found. In White, the defendant was a passenger, not a driver, in the car...