Smith v. State

• Decision Date: 25 April 1966
• Docket Number: No. 5181,5181
• Citation: 240 Ark. 726,401 S.W.2d 749
• Parties: Larry SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 749

401 S.W.2d 749

240 Ark. 726

Larry SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. 5181.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

April 25, 1966.

John Mac Smith, West Memphis, for appellant.

Bruce Bennett, Atty. Gen., by Lance Hanshaw, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

WARD, Justice.

Appellant Larry Smith, a nineteen year old negro, was charged with the killing of Carl Van Young, a white man, on February 29, 1964. Young, who worked as a night watchman near West Memphis, was found fatally wounded close to Highway 70 early in the morning, and his wrecked car was found near Forrest City.

At the trial on September 28, 1965 appellant was found guilty of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death by electrocution.

On appeal appellant seeks a reversal, relying on three separate grounds, which we now proceed to discuss.

One. In appellant's motion for a new trial there appears this statement:

'The insanity of the defendant having been specifically pleaded as a defense and the State of Arkansas having introduced into the record the testimony of two psychiatrists * * * and the defense also having introduced testimony relative to the sanity of the defendant, the court committed error in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction no. 1 * * *.'

The instruction referred to above submitted to the jury the question of the sanity or insanity of appellant. We deem it unnecessary to set out the requested instruction for two reasons. First, it was, in substance, approved in Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530 (p. 553), 180 S.W. 186; Hall v. State, 209 Ark. 180, 189 S.W.2d 917, and, secondly, the State does not deny 'that the requested instruction denied by the court contained the law in Arkansas for the legal test of insanity'. It is the contention of the State, however, that 'there is no testimony calling for such an instruction'. We do not agree.

Appellant was sent to the State Hospital where he was under observation for thirty days. At the end of that period the doctors were not satisfied, and the observation was extended for another thirty days. The final finding was that appellant knew the difference between right and wrong, but that finding was somewhat modified by the examining doctors. It was agreed by the doctors that appellant 'suffered from a schizoid personality, and this means that he had an active psychosis or disease'. One of the examining doctors, on cross-examination, stated: 'Schizoid personality means a certain type of character throughout life which rarely, if ever, is altered and cannot be changed by any form of therapy. The depth of the psychotic pathology allows these persons little room to maneuver under conditions of stress except into the actual psychosis.' Another examining doctor testified 'schizophrenia is a major mental illness and is fairly common'. He also stated that appellant was not a normal person in his opinion. Added to the above medical statements, is the testimony of the deputy sheriff and the parents of appellant that he was not a normal person.

In the Hall case, supra, this Court, after quoting Dr. Kolb as saying the defendant 'knew right from wrong and can refrain from doing wrong if he so desires', made this statement:

'A number of physicians and lay witnesses testified in his behalf which tended to show that he had a psychopathic personality or that there was insanity in his family and that he acted strangely at times, but after all it was a question for the jury and by its verdict he was found to be sane, and being supported by substantial evidence it must be permitted to stand.' (Emphasis added.)

It is our opinion, therefore, that the case must be reversed because of the court's failure to give the instruction as requested.

Since, as above indicated, the case must be reversed and since it must be remanded for another trial, we deem it appropriate to examine briefly the other two assignments of error.

Two. It is our opinion that, upon a retrial, the confession of guilt made by appellant should not be introduced in evidence under the same facts and circumstances revealed by this record. In reaching this conclusion we take into consideration various facts and circumstances; (a) He was arraigned before the municipal court on March 2, 1964 when he pleaded not guilty; (b) He spent over five months in jail, without the aid and advice of counsel before the information was filed against him in circuit court; (c) The deputy sheriff in charge of appellant very properly advised appellant he needed counsel and to secure same, yet it seems no effort was made to help him do so; (d) It was not until September 4,...