Smith v. State
| Decision Date | 10 December 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 26405.,26405. |
| Citation | 375 S.C. 507,654 S.E.2d 523 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | James A. SMITH, Petitioner v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent. |
Petitioner was convicted of two counts of murder. After his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, Petitioner brought this action seeking post-conviction relief (PCR) on the grounds both his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective. We granted certiorari to review the PCR judge's denial of relief to Petitioner. We affirm.
On June 1, 1997, Gwen Utsey reported to the Colleton County Sheriff's Department that her sister-in-law, Hattie Mae Yates, and Yates's two-week-old daughter, Moesha, had been missing for one day. On June 5, 1997, deputies discovered Hattie Mae's abandoned car in a wooded area near the home of Petitioner and his girlfriend, Darlene Winningham. On June 16, 1997, Winningham gave a statement to Detective Steve Bazzle in which she claimed Petitioner had killed Hattie Mae and Moesha Yates. Winningham informed Detective Bazzle where the bodies were located, but denied that she had been involved in the murders or the subsequent "cover up." Based on this information, investigators with the sheriff's department recovered the bodies in a make-shift grave.
Upon discovering that Winningham had identified him as the primary suspect, Petitioner gave a lengthy statement to Detective Bazzle. According to Petitioner, Hattie Mae, his crack cocaine supplier, drove to his home in Cottageville on the afternoon of May 31, 1997, to discuss a crack cocaine transaction. As Hattie Mae waited in her car with Moesha, Petitioner went inside the home to retrieve cash for the transaction. Petitioner claimed that Winningham "flipped out" and began shooting when he attempted to pay Hattie Mae with $100 that he had taken from Winningham. Petitioner then stated he attempted to cover up the crime by hiding Hattie Mae's car, burying the bodies, and disposing of the rifle. Following his statement, Petitioner led detectives to a pond where he had hidden the murder weapon.
Both Petitioner and Winningham were charged with the murders. At Petitioner's trial, Winningham testified for the State. Winningham testified that on May 31, 2007, at around 3:00 p.m., her friend drove her and her three children home after taking them to the grocery store. According to Winningham, Petitioner came out of the house and told her to take the children to their grandfather's home. When Winningham returned home, Hattie Mae came to the Petitioner's home and pulled around to the back porch. Winningham stated she heard a "gun go off" and Petitioner yelled for her to check the road to see if there were any cars coming toward the home. Winningham claimed Petitioner then drove off in Hattie Mae's car through the back yard into a field. Petitioner returned and requested Winningham's help after he struck a tree. Winningham stated that she saw Hattie Mae lying dead on the ground and Moesha lying still in the car seat. Winningham testified that over the course of the next three days Petitioner returned to the woods several times and engaged the assistance of Kenneth Dale Bazzle, Jr., Winningham's oldest son, to empty and burn the contents of Hattie Mae's car, to hide the car in the country, and to bury the victims' bodies. Kenneth Dale Bazzle corroborated Winningham's testimony. Additionally, Kenneth Dale stated that Petitioner told him that he had killed Hattie Mae and Moesha.
Petitioner testified in his defense. Although he recounted a similar sequence of events as that described in the State's case, he adamantly denied that he shot Hattie Mae and Moesha. He maintained that Winningham became enraged and fired into Hattie Mae's car after he handed $100 to Hattie Mae for crack cocaine.
The trial court submitted two counts of murder to the jury. The jury found Petitioner guilty of both counts, and the trial court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment without parole and a consecutive thirty-year term.
After his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, Petitioner filed for PCR. In his application, Petitioner asserted he was being held unlawfully because: (1) his convictions and sentences for two counts of murder were unconstitutional in that they constituted a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause; (2) the solicitor made improper comments during his closing argument; (3) after-discovered evidence required reversal of his convictions and sentences; and (4) his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective. Subsequently, Petitioner amended his petition to include an allegation that after-discovered evidence revealed one of the jurors knew him from being incarcerated in the same facility and shared this information with the other members of the jury.
The PCR judge held a hearing on the petition. At the hearing, Petitioner testified and presented the testimony of Juror Floyd Walling as well as John D. Bryan, Petitioner's trial counsel. The PCR judge also permitted Petitioner to supplement the record with the statement and affidavit of Kenneth Dale Bazzle in order to compare the statement with Bazzle's trial testimony.
The PCR judge denied Petitioner relief and dismissed his application with prejudice. The PCR judge held trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to: (1) request specific jury voir dire questions which would have uncovered Juror Walling's prior relationship with Petitioner; (2) object to the solicitor's improper closing argument; and (3) object to a portion of Winningham's testimony. Additionally, the PCR judge found appellate counsel was not ineffective in presenting Petitioner's direct appeal to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner appeals from this order.
A defendant has the right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). "There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment in making all significant decisions in the case." Ard v. Catoe, 372 S.C. 318, 331, 642 S.E.2d 590, 596 (2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 370, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2007).
In a PCR proceeding, the applicant bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief. Caprood v. State, 338 S.C. 103, 109, 525 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2000). In order to prove that counsel was ineffective, the PCR applicant must show that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Id. (citing Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial." Ard, 372 S.C. at 331, 642 S.E.2d at 596. "Furthermore, when a defendant's conviction is challenged, `the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the fact finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.'" Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).
"This Court gives great deference to the post-conviction relief (PCR) court's findings of fact and conclusions of law." Dempsey v. State, 363 S.C. 365, 368, 610 S.E.2d 812, 814 (2005). A PCR court's findings will be upheld on appeal if there is "any evidence of probative value sufficient to support them." Id. "This Court will reverse the PCR court's decision when it is controlled by an error of law." Sheppard v. State, 357 S.C. 646, 651, 594 S.E.2d 462, 465 (2004).
Petitioner first asserts the PCR judge erred in failing to find the presence of Juror Floyd Walling, with whom he had been incarcerated prior to trial, constituted a per se violation of his due process right to a fair and impartial jury.
During voir dire, the trial judge asked the members of the jury pool whether any member was "related by blood or marriage" to Petitioner or was a "close personal friend." Walling did not respond to this question. Before Walling was seated on the jury, his trial counsel had three remaining peremptory challenges.
While serving his sentence for the two counts of murder, Petitioner discovered that he and Juror Walling had been incarcerated together at the Colleton County Detention Center in 1997. Petitioner made the connection when his cellmate noticed that Floyd Walling, the cellmate's cousin, was listed as a juror on Petitioner's trial transcript. Petitioner remembered Walling after the cellmate told him that Walling was also known as "Rum Gully." At the PCR hearing, Petitioner testified he did not recognize Walling as the man he knew in prison because Walling had shaved his beard and was not wearing prison attire. Additionally, Petitioner was not aware of Walling's given name, but rather, knew him as "Rum Gully." Although he was unable to produce documentation, Petitioner claimed that he and Walling had altercations while in jail, which included incidents where Petitioner threw urine on Walling and struck him with a mop.
Petitioner presented Walling as a witness at the PCR hearing. Walling testified he was detained several times for failing to pay child support. While serving this time, Walling was assigned to laundry detail. In this capacity, Walling encountered Petitioner when he delivered clean clothing to him. Despite this interaction, Walling testified that he ...
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