Smith v. State, 29490

• Decision Date: 26 June 1957
• Docket Number: No. 29490,29490
• Citation: 237 Ind. 244,143 N.E.2d 408
• Parties: William Henry SMITH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 408

143 N.E.2d 408

237 Ind. 244

William Henry SMITH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 29490.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 26, 1957.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 23, 1957.

Vernon E. St. John, Robert A. Mucker, Lafayette, for appellant.

Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., of Indiana, Owen S. Boling, Merl M. Wall, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellee.

ACHOR, Judge.

The appellant was arrested by the Lafayette City Police on October 1, 1954 upon information that he had committed a misdemeanor by making an indecent exposure of his person in a public place in the City of Lafayette. The alleged crime was not committed in the presence of the officers and they had no warrant for his arrest. He was placed in jail and an affidavit charging him with public indecency was filed in Lafayette city court on October 2, 1954. Appellant was taken into court that same day and entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced.

On October 4, appellant, by attorney, appealed from this judgment to the Tippecanoe Circuit Court under § 9-721, Burns' 1956 Replacement (Acts 1945, ch. 234, § 1, 1081).

Thereafter, in the Tippecanoe Circuit Court, appellant filed a verified petition for leave to withdraw plea of guilty, which motion was overruled. Appellant then took an appeal to this court, which appeal was dismissed as no final judgment had been entered. See: Smith v. State, 1956, 234 Ind. 691, 131 N.E.2d 148.

Thereafter appellant filed in the Tippecanoe Circuit Court a motion for trial by jury, which motion was overruled. Thereupon the court found appellant guilty on his plea of guilty entered in the city court, sentenced him to a fine of $10 and to the Indiana State Farm for a period of 90 days.

Appellant has set out 14 points in his argument which, in substance, embraces but two questions: (1) Did the city court acquire jurisdiction of appellant, and (2) was appellant entitled to trial de novo in the Circuit Court?

First, appellant asserts that the Circuit Court did not acquire jurisdiction greater than that of the inferior court and that the inferior court did not acquire jurisdiction by an illegal arrest. State v. Wenzel, 1881, 77 Ind. 428. We concur in this general rule of law. However, the rule is also well established that by entering a plea of guilty in the city court appellant waived his right to have a warrant served upon him and the court thus, by accused's own act, acquired jurisdiction of his person. Ard v. State, 1887, 114 Ind. 542, 16 N.E. 504.

The law is now well established in this state and in the Federal Courts, as follows:

'* * * the jurisdiction of the court in which an information or indictment is found is not impaired by the manner in which accused is brought before it; courts of criminal jurisdiction not being required to inquire as to how the prisoner came within reach of their mandates, the presence of accused in the court on a proper charge being sufficient to confer jurisdiction of his person thereon, even though he was arrested without a warrant contrary to law * * *.' 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 144, pp. 236-237. Gardner v. State, 1903, 161 Ind. 262, 68 N.E. 163; Pease v. State, 1920, 74 Ind.App. 572, 129 N.E. 337; Leahy v. Kunkel, D.C. 1933, 4 F.Supp.849.

Also in the case of Frisbie v. Collins, 1951, 342 U.S. 519, 522, 72 S.Ct. 509, 511, 96 L.Ed. 541, the Supreme Court through Justice Black stated the rule as follows:

'This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444, 7 S.Ct. 225, 229, 30 L.Ed. 421, that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.' No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases. They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will.'

The city court of Lafayette had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action and acquired jurisdiction over appellant by his personal appearance and plea of guilty. Thereafter it was immaterial whether or not appellant was illegally arrested. Ard v. State, supra.

Secondly, we consider appellant's second contention that he was entitled to a trial de novo in the Tippecanoe Circuit Court and that the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty for that purpose.

Appellant's plea of guilty in the city court is tantamount to a confession of judgment of guilt and there is nothing from which an appeal may be taken except the measure of the punishment to be meted out. State v. Schreiber, 1933, 5 W.W.Harr. 424, 35 Del. 424, 166 A. 669. Therefore, on an appeal from city court, the issues presented to the Circuit Court (of Tippecanoe County) are only those formed and appealed from under the pleadings in the city court.

In Doench v. State, 1929, 89 Ind.App. 52, 165 N.E. 777, 778, defendant pleaded guilty in Huntingburg city court to manufacturing intoxicating liquor and was fined $500 and sentenced to six months on the Indiana State Farm, from which judgment he appealed to the Circuit Court of Debois County, where his application for leave to withdraw his plea of guilty was denied. On appeal to the Indiana Appellate Court it was held that the denial was proper. The Appellate Court set out the law on this point as follows:

'The only question for decision relates to the action of the court in refusing appellant leave to withdraw his plea of guilty entered in the city court. It is the law in this jurisdiction that, where there has been a plea before a justice of the peace [in a prosecution for a misdemeanor], no further plea is required in the circuit court on appeal. Johns v. State (1886), 104 Ind. 557, 4 N.E. 153; Eisenman v. State (1875), 49 Ind. 520; Cline v. State (1900), 25 Ind.App. 331, 58 N.E. 210. * * * such plea cannot be withdrawn without leave of court. Peters v. Koepke (1901), 156 Ind. 35, 59 N.E. 33. Ordinarily the granting of...