Smith v. State Of Md.

Decision Date23 July 2010
Docket NumberNo. 105,2009.,105
Citation415 Md. 174,999 A.2d 986
PartiesClavon SMITHv.STATE of Maryland.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

George E. Burns, Jr., Asst. Public Defender (Elizabeth L. Julian, Acting Public Defender, of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for petitioner.

Sharon Stanley Street, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.

HARRELL, J.

Reminiscent of a scene from a Cheech & Chong movie,1 Baltimore City police officers, on 6 December 2006, executed a search warrant on a dwelling at 1932 Lanvale Street where the occupants on one floor were found shrouded in a haze of marijuana smoke. Despite the appearance of the police, Clavon Smith (Petitioner), one of those present, behaved as though everything remained “groovy.” Smith was seated in a chair at a table within arm's reach of a smoldering marijuana blunt and next to another chair over which was draped a jacket with fifteen baggies of marijuana in one of its pockets.2 Although convicted of possession of marijuana in violation of Maryland Code (2002 & Supp.2009), § 5-601(a)(1) of the Criminal Law Article,3 Petitioner claims that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed any of the marijuana. We shall hold that the evidence was sufficient as to the marijuana blunt to support his conviction for a single count of simple possession of marijuana.

I. The Facts (and Nothing but the Facts)

The facts in this case are not in dispute. On 29 November 2006, as a result of his observations of the dwelling (and goings-on in and around the dwelling) at 1932 Lanvale Street in Baltimore City, Detective David Shields of the Baltimore City Police Department, obtained a search warrant for the premises.4, 5 Detective Shields and another detective returned to 1932 Lanvale Street on 6 December 2006. At approximately 7:30 P.M. on that day, they observed groups of people going in and out of the front entrance of 1932 Lanvale Street. Shields observed a “heavy increase in vehicle traffic entering the block. [The vehicles] would stop and congregate with persons at that dwelling or in the front of that dwelling.” 6 The police observed the residence for approximately thirty minutes. At that point, Detective Shields left the area and went back to the police station to alert his sergeant and the rest of the members of his unit to the suspected drug activity so that they could muster further manpower to execute the search warrant. At approximately 8:10 P.M., the police returned to 1932 Lanvale Street to execute the warrant. The police entered the premises, without force, because the door was unlocked.

Upon entering the residence, the police were “immediately engulfed with a heavy cloud of marijuana filtering all through the first floor.” Sergeant Fesser described the marijuana smoke as a “haze.” The police conducted a sweep through the house to secure it. They ascertained that there were approximately 12-14 people present in the house.

When the police entered the middle room,7 they observed Petitioner, along with four other individuals, seated in chairs at a table. A marijuana blunt was burning in an ashtray in the center of the table. The blunt had burned down to a small portion, which the police saved for possible future evidentiary use. All four of the individuals seated at the table, including Petitioner, were within arm's reach of the blunt. According to Detective Shield's testimony, Petitioner “appeared relaxed just going with the program. [He was] not excited at all” at the intrusion of the police.

The police gathered all the occupants into the front room where they read the suspects their Miranda rights.8 The police asked the individuals if they had knowledge of the presence of any additional controlled dangerous substance (“CDS”), large sums of money, or weapons. No one responded. A search of the premises ensued, during which Sergeant Fesser recovered from the pocket of a men's black leather jacket, found on the back of a chair at the table where Petitioner was seated, a black plastic bag containing 15 red Ziploc bags of marijuana. Smith had not been seated in that chair. The person who sat in the chair over which the jacket had been draped pointedly did not claim ownership of the jacket, nor did Smith. The police also recovered the following sums of money in cash from three of the other individuals found in the dwelling: Evette Sterling, $711; Malcolm Rogers, $150; and Emery Jones, $415.

Detective Shields arrested the individuals whom he believed to be in possession of the marijuana, including Petitioner and Sterling, who was the “official” tenant at 1932 Lanvale Street.9 In a search of Petitioner's person, the police did not recover any CDS, CDS paraphernalia, or a large quantity of cash. Smith was charged with possession of marijuana in violation of § 5-601(a)(1).10 He received a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

At the close of the State's case, Smith moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State did not prove that he had knowledge of the contents of the jacket. With regard to the blunt, Smith argued that his presence at the table was not sufficient to prove that he exercised dominion or control over the blunt. The trial court, although expressing some doubt as to whether the State presented enough evidence to establish possession with respect to the marijuana in the jacket,11 ultimately denied the defense motion.

Sterling was the only witness called by the defense. She testified that she returned home from work on 6 December 2006 at approximately 7:10 P.M. She saw Petitioner in the dining room wearing a jacket. She testified that he was at her house that evening to purchase an apparently custom shirt from her son. When she entered the home, she observed Petitioner standing behind her son, watching him “put the finishing touches on the shirt.” She also testified that she saw a chair with a black leather jacket on the back of it. At that time, according to Sterling, no one, including Petitioner, was smoking marijuana. She went upstairs to her bedroom and remained there until the police arrived. She did not smell the marijuana smoke until the police brought her downstairs.

Smith renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the defense's case-in-chief. He argued to the trial court that the State did not establish that he had knowledge of the contents of the jacket or that he exercised dominion or control over the blunt in the ashtray. The State countered that there was sufficient evidence that Smith was in constructive possession of both the marijuana in the jacket and the blunt. Although the relevant portion of the trial transcript is missing from the record, presumably the trial court denied the defense motion because the case went to the jury.

After deliberating for a day, the jury returned a guilty verdict to the single charge of possession of marijuana. The court sentenced Petitioner to one year of imprisonment, with all but sixty days suspended.

Petitioner filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In his brief to the intermediate appellate court, he argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction of possession of marijuana.12 That court affirmed the conviction in an unreported opinion, holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.

We granted Smith's petition for a writ of certiorari, 414 Md. 330, 995 A.2d 296 (2009), to consider the following question:

Is proof of presence in a house where marijuana is being smoked sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession of marijuana?

For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and hold that the evidence was sufficient, as to the blunt, to sustain Smith's conviction.

II. Standard of Review

Petitioner frames the applicable standard of review based on selected language found in Jones v. State, 395 Md. 97, 909 A.2d 650 (2006), and Dukes v. State, 178 Md.App. 38, 940 A.2d 211 (2008). In Jones, it is stated that, although a conviction may rest solely upon circumstantial evidence, ‘a conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone is not to be sustained unless the circumstances, taken together, are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ Id. at 120, 909 A.2d at 663 (emphasis in original) (quoting Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 663, 612 A.2d 258, 275 (1992)). Similar statements are found in Bible v. State, 411 Md. 138, 157, 982 A.2d 348, 359 (2009) (plurality opinion) (quoting Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 458, 697 A.2d 462, 465 (1997)) (“ ‘[W]hen the evidence equally supports two versions of events, and a finding of guilt requires speculation as to which of the two versions is correct, a conviction cannot be sustained.’ ”); Moye v. State, 369 Md. 2, 13, 796 A.2d 821, 827 (2002) (quoting Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 537, 573 A.2d 831, 834 (1990)) (“A conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence should be sustained only where ‘the circumstances, taken together, are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’); and Taylor, 346 Md. at 458, 697 A.2d at 465 (1997) ([W]hen the evidence equally supports two versions of events, and a finding of guilt requires speculation as to which of the two versions is correct, a conviction cannot be sustained.”).

In Jones, the defendant was convicted of second degree burglary. Id. at 101, 909 A.2d at 652. At trial, the State did not present any evidence, direct or circumstantial, that there had been a breaking (a required element of burglary), except for his unauthorized presence in the building and some evidence that the kitchen might have been the entry point. Id. at 118-20, 909 A.2d at 662-63. We held that it would be pure speculation to conclude that there had been a breaking based solely upon his unauthorized presence in the...

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