Smith v. Stiles

• Decision Date: 16 December 1915
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 203
• Citation: 70 So. 905,195 Ala. 107
• Parties: SMITH v. STILES, Probate Judge.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

70 So. 905

195 Ala. 107

SMITH v. STILES, Probate Judge.

6 Div. 203

Supreme Court of Alabama

December 16, 1915

Rehearing Denied Feb. 3, 1916

Appeal from City Court of Birmingham; E.H. Cabaniss, Special Judge.

Mandamus by J.Q. Smith against J.P. Stiles, Judge of Probate of Jefferson County, Ala. From an order denying the writ petitioner appeals. Affirmed.

Sayre J., dissenting.

Gregory L. & H.T. Smith, of Mobile, Smith & Wilkinson, of Birmingham and David H. Riddle, of Talladega, for appellant.

A. Leo Oberdorfer, of Birmingham, for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Chief Justice ANDERSON, this case having been submitted and considered under new rule 46 (65 South. vii).

The title to the act of August 16, 1915 (Laws 1915, p. 279) known as the "Consolidated Court Law," is as follows:

"To provide a circuit court in every county in the state, and for the consolidation of the chancery court and all other courts of record having the jurisdiction of the chancery court or circuit court or either of them into the circuit court, and to remove all pending causes and records into the circuit court, and to provide and regulate the proceedings therein."

The main subject dealt with, purpose sought, or object to be accomplished, as indicated by this title and which has been dealt with in the body of the law, was the establishment of one general circuit court system, to the exclusion of other trial courts having the jurisdiction of the circuit and chancery court; to provide a circuit court in every county in the state and to get rid of the others, whether by merger, consolidation, conversion, or abolition, and for the transfer of all cases pending in the other courts to the circuit court. The title deals with but one general subject, and all things done by the act are germane and cognate to the title, which provides for the establishment or maintenance of a circuit court system throughout the entire state to the exclusion of all other trial courts exercising chancery or circuit jurisdiction. In other words, the law provides for a circuit court in every county in the state and for wiping out all the others, by merging them into the circuit court in counties which have other courts, by merely preserving the circuit court in counties having nothing but a circuit court, and by converting other courts into the circuit court in counties having no circuit court but a law and equity court, to wit, Lee and Marengo. While a garbling of the title and a play upon words capable of different definitions could indicate two or more different subjects or give the title some ambiguity, yet when it is fairly considered in its entirety, and a plain common sense meaning is given the words employed, it plainly evinces a legislative purpose to deal with the one general subject of providing a circuit court in every county in the state, to the exclusion of all others therein mentioned, and everything done or contemplated by the act is germane to this one general object. We are not only not impressed with the contention that the act is repugnant to section 45 of the Constitution, but are at a loss to know how the things accomplished by the act could have been more properly expressed in the title or dealt with in the body. Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 174, 54 So. 283, and cases there cited. Courts will not seize upon garbled expressions or strained definitions for the purpose of striking down a solemn legislative enactment, as it is our duty to uphold, rather than strike down, the acts of the legislative department, unless the same plainly transgresses our organic law.

We think that this legislation was fully authorized by sections 148 and 171 of the Constitution, and that the thing thereby sought did not have to be done by piecemeal or patchwork, but was properly accomplished by one general law applicable to the entire state. Of course, section 148 of the Constitution provides for a consolidation of the courts, only in counties which have two or more courts; but there is nothing in this section preventing the establishing of a single court system throughout the entire state and the consolidation of all others in the counties having two or more into the one court. It may be true that where there is but one court in a county there is nothing to consolidate, but this fact will not prevent the establishment of the circuit court system, throughout the entire state, and the consolidation of other courts into same in the counties where two or more do exist. As to whether or not this would render it a local law will be discussed later on in this opinion. Section 171 of the Constitution gives the Legislature the power to abolish any court, except the Supreme and probate courts, whenever its jurisdiction and functions have been conferred upon some other court. We do not think that it would require two separate and distinct laws to accomplish this result. We think the Legislature could by one law confer the jurisdiction of one court upon the other, and at the same time abolish the court which has been denuded of jurisdiction, as the doing of this would amount to the same thing as a consolidation under section 148 of the Constitution. We think that these two sections of the Constitution must be considered in pari materia, and that the former authorized a consolidation, while the latter was intended as a safeguard authorizing the abolition of a court when its jurisdiction was conferred upon another court, though there had been no actual consolidation, but a mere transfer of jurisdiction, and also to authorize the Legislature to transfer the jurisdiction of one court to another, and to then and there abolish the court, which was deprived of its jurisdiction. This section 171 does not necessarily mean that the Legislature must first by a separate bill transfer all the jurisdiction of the chancery court to the circuit court, and then, in order to abolish the chancery court, pass a separate bill doing so.

We think the law in question is a "general" one as defined by section 110 of the Constitution, as it applies to every county in the state, and fixed for each a single uniform court system, excepting none of them from its operation. The fact that it works no material change of conditions in a few of the counties, which may now have but one court, makes no difference, as it applies to and covers those counties as it does all others. It would be a judicial monstrosity to hold that if one county or other subdivision of the state enjoyed a good law, and the Legislature enacted such a law for the entire state, said law would be a local one because it previously existed in a county or counties, and that the only way to give the state the benefit of said law, the local law must first be repealed by a local act and gotten out of the way before the enactment of a general law on the subject. If the contention that this law is local, because it makes no change in the court system of Winston county, which has only a circuit court, is sound, then we could not by a general law arrange a practice act for the entire state, if it already existed in some of the counties. Nor could we have a general jury law by modeling it after a satisfactory one, which existed in some one county, without first getting rid of said law by a local law before passing a general law on the subject. The framers of our Constitution intended no such a useless performance upon the part of the Legislature as a condition precedent to the passage of a state-wide law. The law in question is plainly a general law, and we do not think that a case can be found holding that such a law is a local one, and trust that the books may never contain such a holding. Moreover, we do not wish to intimate that a law dealing with circuit courts generally, in so far as they existed in the state, would be a local law, simply because a few counties in the state had no circuit court. Any law which deals with a general subject and applies to it throughout the state, that is, wherever it exists in the state, is a "general law," although there is no subject upon which it may operate in some parts of the state. To hold that a law, in order to be a general one, must operate uniformly in every county and precinct in the state, would amount to holding that a general law could not be framed regulating all the cities in the state because there are no cities in some of the counties, or that a law regulating railroads, coal mines, rivers, pine forests, and many other general subjects would be "local" because the subject dealt with did not exist in some of the counties. The former decisions of this court striking down certain judicial circuits, because local laws and not advertised, cannot be so perverted as to pronounce such a law as above mentioned a local one. They dealt with a subject as confined to a few counties in the state, and did not attempt to deal with all circuit courts in the state or with a general subject in so far as it may have existed throughout the state.

As heretofore stated, the act in question provides for a circuit court in every county in the state, and which includes Lee and Marengo; whether by creating the same and destroying the existing one by merger or conversion matters not. These counties were circuits or court divisions of themselves, with but one court each, possessing the jurisdiction of the circuit and chancery courts (just such a court as ...