Smith v. Titus

• Decision Date: 22 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-633,20-633
• Citation: 141 S.Ct. 982 (Mem)
• Parties: Byron David SMITH v. Jeff TITUS, Warden
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

141 S.Ct. 982 (Mem)

Byron David SMITH

v.Jeff TITUS, Warden

No. 20-633

Supreme Court of the United States.

Decided March 22, 2021

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice SOTOMAYOR, dissenting from denial of certiorari.

Because "the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends beyond the actual proof at trial," courts must meet a high standard "before excluding the public from any stage of a criminal trial." Presley v. Georgia , 558 U.S. 209, 212–213, 130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010) (per curiam ). At Byron Smith's trial, however, the judge cleared all members of the public from the courtroom before issuing a key evidentiary ruling. Even though the judge did not justify the closure in accordance with the dictates of this Court's precedents, the Minnesota Supreme Court found no constitutional error because it concluded that defendants have no public-trial right in so-called administrative proceedings. That ruling was manifestly incorrect. Because the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision contravened clearly established federal law, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit erred in denying Smith's application for a writ of habeas corpus. I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and summarily reverse.¹

I

In the fall of 2012, Smith was the victim of a series of unsolved burglaries, including one that resulted in the theft of two firearms from his home. On Thanksgiving Day, two people again broke into Smith's house. Smith shot them multiple times at close range, killing them both. Although Smith apparently did not know it at the time, one of the intruders, Nicholas Brady, may have participated in the earlier burglaries.

A Minnesota grand jury indicted Smith on two counts of first-degree premeditated murder. The case was scheduled for trial, where Smith planned to argue that he used reasonable force in defending himself. During pretrial proceedings, the court ruled that evidence of Brady's involvement in the prior burglaries would be inadmissible at trial. The court reasoned that because Smith did not know or suspect that Brady had ever burglarized his home, that fact was not relevant to Smith's "state of mind at the time of the shooting." Electronic Case Filing in Smith v. Smith , No. 0:17–cv–00673 (D Minn.), Doc. 2–1, pp. 2, 7 (ECF).

The issue came up again at a pretrial hearing on the parties’ motions in limine , when Smith proposed to call two witnesses, Jesse Kriesel and Cody Kasper, to testify that they were Brady's accomplices in the prior burglaries.² On the first day of Smith's trial, immediately after the deputy court administrator called the case (and before the jury was seated), the court ruled on the admissibility of Kriesel's and Kasper's testimony. Before issuing its ruling, however, the trial judge cleared the courtroom of all public spectators, leaving only the attorneys, court staff, and Smith. See ECF Doc. 12–4, p. 4, Tr. 749. Smith's attorney objected to the courtroom closure, but the court overruled him. See ibid. The court then gave its reasons for precluding the witnesses’ testimony:

"[T]he pretrial ruling of the court was that the defense had given notice that it ... wants to offer testimony from Jesse Kriesel and Cody Kasper about their involvement in prior burglaries which, of course, would have involved Nick Brady as well as a co-perpetrator. And the court has ruled the defendant will not disclose the names of Kriesel, Kasper or Brady involved in prior burglaries .... Disclosure can be made of the relevant facts of prior burglaries, including that they occurred ... and items taken[, but t]he limitation is in effect because ... the court ... finds that the defendant did not know ... the identity of those who had broken into his home on prior occasions; and, therefore, it would be prejudicial." Id. , at 4–5, Tr. 749–750.

The court went on to explain why it had overruled defense counsel's objection to the courtroom closure:

"And for that reason ... the court is not allowing the press in for this ruling, because otherwise it could be printed, ... and then of course it runs the risk of getting to the jury if for some reason they don't adhere to their oath." Id. , at 6, Tr. 751.

Smith's attorney requested clarification, asking whether Smith could "call Cody Kasper as a witness and ask [him] about his involvement ... in these burglaries and who he was with and what he saw." Ibid. The court responded: "[A]t this point, no, Cody Kasper would not be testifying to that." Id., at 7, Tr. 752.

Immediately after making its oral ruling from the bench, the trial court posted a written order on the public docket that "reiterate[d] that evidence of prior bad acts by Nicholas Brady ..., of which [Smith] was unaware at the time of the shooting, shall be inadmissible at trial." ECF Doc. 2–2, p. 1. Because Smith could present evidence that he was the victim of prior burglaries "through the testimony of ... law enforcement agents," the court found "no need to seek its admission through more prejudicial means (i.e., through the testimony of ... a perpetrator of the prior break-ins)." Id., at 3. The public order did not mention Kriesel or Kasper by name, nor did it explain that Smith had sought to present their testimony specifically.

The remainder of the trial was open to the public. The jury found Smith guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. The court sentenced him to life without the possibility of release.

On appeal, Smith argued that the court violated his public-trial right when it closed the courtroom to rule on the admissibility of Kriesel's and Kasper's testimony. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected that argument on the theory that " ‘administrative’ proceedings," including "routine evidentiary rulings," categorically "do not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial." State v. Smith , 876 N.W.2d 310, 329 (2016). The court explained that the trial court's ruling "was administrative in nature" because the discussion covered "an issue of evidentiary boundaries, similar to what would ordinarily and regularly be discussed in chambers or at a sidebar conference." Id., at 330. The court affirmed Smith's convictions. Id., at 336.

Smith applied for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, but the District Court denied relief,³ and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision did not contravene clearly established federal law because this Court has never specifically "addressed whether ... ‘administrative’ proceedings ... implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial." 958 F.3d 687, 692 (2020). It further determined that the Minnesota Supreme Court did not "unreasonably apply" this Court's precedents, concluding that "[i]t was not objectively unreasonable" to allow the trial court "to explain the parameters of an earlier public order on evidentiary issues in a brief nonpublic proceeding." Id ., at 692–693.

II

A

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that criminal defendants "shall enjoy the right to a ... public trial." U. S. Const., Amdt. 6. To the Framers, secret trials "obviously symbolized a menace to liberty," and the public-trial right provided a necessary "safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution." In re Oliver , 333 U.S. 257, 269–270, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). Of course, the vast majority of judges and jurors would strive to uphold constitutional principles even if criminal proceedings were closed to the public. But "the public-trial guarantee embodies a view of human nature, true as a general rule, that judges, lawyers, witnesses, and jurors will perform their respective functions more responsibly in an open court than in secret proceedings." Estes v. Texas , 381 U.S. 532, 588, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Indeed, that is why public-trial violations are among the narrow class of "structural defects" that "defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards." Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).

Despite the importance of the public-trial right, this Court recognized in Waller v. Georgia , 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984), that "the right to an open trial may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the defendant's right to a fair trial or the government's interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information." Id., at 45, 104 S.Ct. 2210. But Waller cautioned that "[s]uch circumstances will be rare, ... and the balance of interests must be struck with special care." Ibid. To that end, Waller announced four requirements that must be satisfied before a trial court may close a courtroom: (1) the closure must "advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced," (2) the closure must "be no broader than necessary to protect that interest," (3) the court must "consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding," and (4) the court must "make findings adequate to support the closure." Id., at 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210.

Any doubt about the reach of Waller ’s rule was dispelled by Presley . There, this Court reiterated Waller ’s holding "that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends beyond the actual proof at trial." 558 U.S., at 212, 130 S.Ct. 721. As such, Waller ’s four-factor test "provide[s] standards for courts to apply before excluding the public from any stage of a criminal trial." 558 U.S., at 213, 130 S.Ct. 721 (emphasis added).

B

Waller and Presley straightforwardly govern the courtroom closure at issue in this case. During Smith's trial, the court removed all members of the public and media from the courtroom. The court then proceeded to issue an evidentiary ruling that precluded several defense witnesses from testifying.⁴ Because the evidentiary ruling issued at what was undoubtedly a "stage of [Smith's] criminal trial," Presley , 558 U.S., at 213, 130 S.Ct. 721, and because the court failed to consider, much less satisfy,...