Smith v. Toney

• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Boehm
• Citation: Smith v. Toney, 862 N.E.2d 656 (Ind. 2007)
• Decision Date: 13 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. 94S00-0602-CQ-48.,94S00-0602-CQ-48.
• Parties: Amy SMITH, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. James M. TONEY and John Christner Trucking Co., Inc., Appellees (Defendants below).

862 N.E.2d 656

Amy SMITH, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. James M. TONEY and John Christner Trucking Co., Inc., Appellees (Defendants below).

No. 94S00-0602-CQ-48.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 13, 2007.

Stephen L. Williams, James Boswell, Terre Haute, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Michael B. Langford, Lynne D. Lidke, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

Donald B. Kite, Sr., Carmel, IN, James D. Johnson, Evansville, IN, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Defense Trial Counsel of Indiana.

On Certified Question

BOEHM, Justice.

Indiana law allows a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under some limited circumstances even if the plaintiff has suffered no physical injury or impact as a result of the defendant's negligence. We hold today that although a spouse may assert such a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress a fiancée may not. We also hold that such a claim requires that the plaintiff have learned of the incident by having witnessed the injury or the immediate gruesome aftermath.

Facts and Procedural History

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana has certified to this Court the following questions:

1. Under the test elaborated in Groves v. Taylor for bringing a bystander claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, are the temporal and relationship determinations regarding whether a plaintiff "actually witnessed or came on the scene soon after the death of a loved one with a relationship to the plaintiff analogous to a spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, or sibling" issues of law or fact, or are they mixed questions of law and fact?

2. If an issue of law, is a fiancée an "analogous" relationship as used in Groves and is "soon after the death of a loved one" a matter of time alone or also of circumstances?

The following facts are derived from the depositions and other evidence submitted to the federal court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. On the evening of June 6, 2003, Eli Welch and his fiancée Amy Smith fell asleep watching television at the Smith home. At approximately 3:30 am, Smith awoke, woke up Welch, and told him he needed to go home. Welch left, telling Smith that he would call her when he reached his house, and Smith fell back to sleep. As Welch was driving westbound on Interstate 70 toward Plainfield, Indiana, his car collided with a tractor-trailer operated by James Toney on behalf of John Christner Trucking Company. An emergency response team was dispatched to the scene of the accident at 3:53 am. Welch was declared a fatality at 4:05 am. According to the deposition of the captain of the response team, Welch's body was extricated from his vehicle between 5:50 and 5:55 am and immediately placed in a body bag. The body bag was then moved to the coroner's vehicle. The response team left the scene of the accident between 6:06 and 6:08 am.

Sometime around 5:30 am, Smith awoke and realized that Welch had not called her. She called Welch's home and cell phone and received no response. Smith left her parents' house at approximately 6:00 am, drove the route Welch normally took to his house, and came upon the scene of the accident. She remembers seeing Welch's "smashed up" vehicle and police officers standing by. She slowed her car as she drove by the scene, but she did not stop or speak to anyone. Smith called Welch's sister's house at 6:14 am and spoke with Welch's brother-in-law. Smith testified that the call was immediately placed after she came upon the accident scene. Smith has no present recollection of seeing any part of Welch's body when she came upon the scene of the accident. She testified that Welch's brother-in-law told her that during their phone conversation she told him that she saw Welch's hand. Smith drove from the scene to Welch's sister house, where she learned of Welch's death before 7:07 am.

On April 22, 2004, Smith sued Toney and John Christner Trucking in Marion Superior Court, alleging severe emotional trauma and distress from the death of her fiancé. After the case was removed to the Southern District of Indiana on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, Toney and John Christner Trucking filed an answer asserting that Smith failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569 (Ind.2000). Both defendants moved in federal court for summary judgment, arguing that as a matter of law Smith could not bring a bystander claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under Groves because Smith's relationship with Welch was not "analogous" to that of a spouse and Smith did not come upon the scene of the accident "soon after the death." The district court denied the motion for summary judgment without prejudice and certified the above questions to this Court.

I. Temporal and Relationship Determinations Under Groves

The test announced in Groves for bystander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress sets requirements of relationship between the parties and proximity of the plaintiff to the scene. We have not addressed whether these are questions of law or fact or mixed questions of law and fact. For the reasons given below, we conclude that both the relationship and proximity requirements under Groves are issues of law.

For over a century, Indiana law allowed damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress only when the distress was accompanied by and resulted from a physical injury caused by an impact to the person seeking recovery. Shuamber v Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991) (citing N.Y., Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Henderson, 237 Ind. 456, 477, 146 N.E.2d 531, 543 (1957); Boston v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 223 Ind. 425, 428-29, 61 N.E.2d 326, 327 (1945); Indianapolis St. Ry. Co. v. Ray, 167 Ind. 236, 245-46, 78 N.E. 978, 980 (1906)). This requirement of both impact and physical injury is known as the traditional "impact rule." See, e.g., Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (Ind.2000); Lachenman v. Stice, 838 N.E.2d 451, 457 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied, 855 N.E.2d 1008 (Ind. 2006).

Since 1991, this Court has allowed recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress under some circumstances where the traditional "impact rule" is not satisfied. Shuamber, 579 N.E.2d at 456; see also Groves, 729 N.E.2d at 573. In Shuamber, we adopted a "modified impact rule" that required impact but not necessarily physical injury:

[w]hen . . . a plaintiff sustains a direct impact by the negligence of another and, by virtue of that direct involvement sustains an emotional trauma which is serious in nature and of a kind and extent normally expected to occur in a reasonable person, . . . such a plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action to recover for that emotional trauma without regard to whether the emotional trauma arises out of or accompanies any physical injury to the plaintiff.

579 N.E.2d at 456. In Groves, we allowed bystander recovery of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress based on "direct involvement" with the accident:

a bystander may . . . establish "direct involvement" by proving that the plaintiff actually witnessed or came on the scene soon after the death or severe injury of a loved one with a relationship to the plaintiff analogous to a spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, or sibling caused by the defendant's negligent or otherwise tortuous [sic] conduct.

729 N.E.2d at 573. This has been referred to as the "bystander" or "relative bystander" rule. E.g., Lachenman, 838 N.E.2d at 458.

Groves followed Bowen v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 183 Wis.2d 627, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994) in adopting this test. 729 N.E.2d at 572. In Bowen, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's complaint had set forth the requirements for recovery damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress, namely, negligent conduct, causation, and injury. 517 N.W.2d at 443. The court then noted that it did not necessarily follow that the claim must be allowed to go forward. Id. "A court may decide, as a matter of law, that considerations of public policy require dismissal of the claim." Id. The Bowen court pointed out that public policy considerations were "an aspect of legal cause" and that the "application of public policy considerations is a function solely of the court." Id. (emphasis added).

Bowen explained that recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress raised two concerns: "(1) establishing authenticity of the claim and (2) ensuring fairness of the financial burden placed upon a defendant whose conduct was negligent." Id. The court set forth the public policy considerations that underlie these concerns:

(1) whether the injury is too remote from the negligence; (2) whether the injury is wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor; (3) whether in retrospect it appears too extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm; (4) whether allowance of recovery would place an unreasonable burden on the negligent tortfeasor; (5) whether allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the way to fraudulent claims; [and] (6) whether allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.

Id. at 444. Bowen took the view that a court should consider three factors in determining on the basis of public policy whether to preclude liability for bystander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. These were the severity of the victim's injury, the relationship of the plaintiff to the victim, and circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's discovery of the victim's injury. As Bowen explained, "[t]hese factors relate to the underlying principles of the tort; they are relevant to measuring the authenticity of the claim and the limits of liability for emotional harm resulting from a defendant's negligence." Id. at 445-46. We think this approach is consistent with the...