Smith v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
Decision Date | 01 August 2003 |
Citation | 884 So.2d 861 |
Parties | Rachelle SMITH v. TYSON FOODS, INC. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
John T. Robertson IV of Henslee, Robertson & Strawn, L.L.C., Gadsden, for appellant.
Jack W. Torbert, Jr., of Torbert & Torbert, P.A., Gadsden, for appellee.
Alabama Supreme Court 1021916.
On Application for Rehearing
This court's opinion of May 24, 2002, is withdrawn and the following is substituted therefor.
Rachelle Smith sued Tyson Foods, Inc., on November 3, 1999, seeking to recover benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, for three separate work-related injuries. Tyson Foods answered, asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. Discovery proceeded, and on April 26, 2000, Tyson Foods amended its answer, claiming that it should be permitted a setoff against any recovery based upon Smith's allegedly having refused suitable employment (see § 25-5-57(e), Ala.Code 1975) and alleging additional defenses. On May 25, 2000, upon motion of Tyson Foods, the trial court issued an order directing the parties to mediate the claim before a Department of Industrial Relations ombudsman on or before July 31, 2000. Thereafter, on June 19, the trial court entered an order compelling the parties to mediate the claims on August 4, 2000. Also on June 19, Tyson Foods amended its answer a second time, adding a counterclaim. That counterclaim sought a judgment declaring that it would not incur liability under § 25-5-11.1, Ala.Code 1975, if it terminated Smith's employment pursuant to a company policy addressing excessive absences resulting from non-work-related injuries.
The trial court issued a notice on October 2, 2000, setting the case for trial on December 21, 2000. On October 20, 2000, Smith's attorney filed a motion to withdraw, alleging a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.
On November 28, 2000, the trial court entered the following order: "On motion after hearing, the Court hereby severs [1] the motion for Declaratory Judgment from the [Worker's] Compensation Claim and cases continued for result of mediation." This order was sent to all attorneys of record.
On December 8, 2000, the trial court granted the motion to withdraw filed by Smith's attorney. The trial court called the case for trial on December 21, 2000, and no one responded on Smith's behalf. On December 29, 2000, the trial court dismissed Smith's claims and entered a judgment in favor of Tyson Foods on its counterclaim.
On January 19, 2001, Smith, acting pro se, filed a motion to set aside the judgment dismissing her claims. On January 26, 2001, new counsel representing Smith filed a motion on her behalf seeking to set aside the judgment on her claims and on the counterclaim; that motion was supported by Smith's affidavit, in which Smith averred that she had not been represented by counsel on December 21, 2000, when her case was called for trial and that she had had no knowledge that a trial had been scheduled for that date. On February 12, 2001, the trial court denied the motion, citing as authority Rule 60, Ala. R. Civ. P.
Smith appeals, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to set aside the judgment. We agree.
Although the trial court cited Rule 60, Ala. R. Civ. P., as authority for denying Smith's motion, this court has held that motions seeking to set aside judgments that are filed within 30 days of the date on which the judgment being challenged was entered are properly construed as motions to set aside a default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. Englebert v. Englebert, 791 So.2d 975 (Ala.Civ.App.2000). That portion of the trial court's judgment stating that Tyson Foods will not be liable for a retaliatory discharge if it terminates Smith's employment for excessive absences is properly viewed as a default judgment on Tyson Foods' counterclaim.
Our standard of review with respect a trial court's ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment under Rule 55(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., is whether the court's ruling amounts to an abuse of discretion. The determination of whether the trial court has abused its discretion involves the application of a two-step process. In Sampson v. Cansler, 726 So.2d 632 (Ala.1998), our Supreme Court observed:
A review of the trial court's judgment pertaining to the declaratory-judgment counterclaim of Tyson Foods does not indicate that the trial court considered either part of the two-step process described in Kirtland — particularly in light of the trial court's reference to Rule 60(b) as the basis of its judgment. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment consisting of a declaratory judgment as to Tyson Foods' policy allowing termination for excessive absences resulting from non-work-related injuries. On remand, the parties and the trial court should utilize the Kirtland analysis in addressing the issue whether a declaratory judgment should have been entered in favor of Tyson Foods by default. See Cobb v. Loveless, 807 So.2d 566 (Ala.Civ.App.2001)
; TCI Cablevision of Alabama, Inc. v. Tehranchi, 739 So.2d 519 (Ala.Civ.App.1999); Sawyer v. Perkins, 717 So.2d 432, 433 (Ala.Civ.App.1998).
With regard to the portion of the trial court's judgment dismissing Smith's workers' compensation claims, we construe that part of the trial court's judgment as being a sanction under Rule 41, Ala. R. Civ. P., for Smith's failure to appear at trial. The trial court's judgment was captioned as a "default judgment" and does not specifically refer to Rule 41. However, the text of the judgment reads, in pertinent part:
It is well settled that pleadings and other filings are treated according to their substance, rather than their form or their captions. See Breaux v. Bailey, 789 So.2d 204 (Ala.2000)
. Despite its caption as a "default...
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