Smith v. United Mine Workers of America

• Decision Date: 01 April 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-1578.,73-1578.
• Parties: Andrew J. SMITH et al., etc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, and Louis Kosec, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

493 F.2d 1241 (1974)

Andrew J. SMITH et al., etc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, and Louis Kosec, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 73-1578.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

April 1, 1974.

A. Wally Sandack, Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Daniel B. Edelman, Washington, D. C. (Joseph A. Yablonski and Clarice R. Feldman, Washington, D. C., and Ralph R. Tate, Jr., of Henriksen, Fairbourn & Tate, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the brief), for defendants-appellants.

Before BREITENSTEIN, McWILLIAMS and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.

BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.

The district court entered a preliminary injunction forbidding an international union to merge several of its intermediate bodies. We reverse on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction.

Defendant-appellant United Mine Workers of America is an international union representing the employees of coal mines and allied industries. It has a three-level structure with the intermediate level composed of districts which in turn are made up of local unions. We are concerned with District 22 which includes Utah, Wyoming, and Arizona. The individual plaintiffs-appellees are members of locals and were designated by the locals to oppose the merger. All of the local unions who appear as plaintiffs-appellees are within the territorial jurisdiction of District 22.

UMWA has had a turbulent history in recent years. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528, 92 S.Ct. 630, 30 L.Ed.2d 686, and United States v. Boyle, D.C.Cir., 482 F.2d 755. Many districts have been in trusteeship. Hodgson v. United Mine Workers of America, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 407, 473 F. 2d 118, 121. Pursuant to a court-ordered election, new officers were installed in December, 1972. They ordered an investigation of the possibility of merging Districts 10, 15, 22, and 27. After considering the report the International Executive Board approved the merger and ordered an election of officers. The action before us was brought to enjoin the merger. The defendants answered and, among other things, attacked the jurisdiction of the court. An evidentiary hearing was held on the application for a preliminary injunction.

Art. IV, § 2, of the UMWA constitution provides:

"The International Executive Board shall have authority to change the boundaries of Districts as conditions may require; but the boundaries of self-supporting Districts shall not be changed except by a vote of the membership affected, as determined by the District, the referendum to be taken by the officers of the District affected and representatives of the International Union * * *."

The court held that it had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 411, and 412 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2201, and 2202. After finding that District 22 was self-supporting and that no election had been held, the district court enjoined the merger. The International contends that the finding that District 22 is self-supporting is clearly erroneous. We do not reach that issue.

Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) provides:

"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."

Section 301(a) confers federal jurisdiction over suits for violations of contracts between labor organizations representing employees in an industry affecting commerce. The International and the locals are labor organizations. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) made applicable to § 301(a) by 29 U.S.C. § 142(3). They represent employees in an industry affecting commerce. The contract violation is based on the claim that the action of the International merging districts is a breach of the provisions of the International's constitution relating to changes in the boundaries of districts.

The basic question is whether Congress, by the enactment of § 301(a), intended to confer jurisdiction over internal union affairs which have no connection with industrial peace or to a collective bargaining contract. The legislative history of § 301(a) has been considered in a number of cases. See e. g. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 75 S.Ct. 488, 99 L. Ed. 1256; Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972; and Parks v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 4 Cir., 314 F.2d 886, 915-916, cert. denied 372 U.S. 976, 83 S.Ct. 1111, 10 L.Ed.2d 142. The most that can be said of that history is that Congress did not anticipate the problem which is before us. See Parks, 314 F.2d at 916.

Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972; Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 82 S.Ct. 519, 7 L.Ed.2d 483; Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593, and Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462, all recognize § 301(a) jurisdiction as applying to suits arising out of collective bargaining contracts. Retail Clerks International Association v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 82 S.Ct. 541, 7 L.Ed.2d 503, upheld § 301(a) jurisdiction over a suit by a local union to enforce a strike settlement agreement. Both Retail Clerks, 369 U.S. at 28, 82 S. Ct. 541, and Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455, 77 S.Ct. 912, say that federal policy established by § 301(a) is to promote industrial peace by permitting enforcement in federal courts of contracts made by labor organizations. To the same effect is Smith v. Evening News Association, 371 U.S. 195, 200, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246, which also rejects the contention that the word "between" as used in § 301(a) refers to "suits" rather than "contracts," and held that § 301(a) permits a suit by a union member to enforce a collective bargaining contract.

The local unions and their members rely on Parks v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 4 Cir., 314 F.2d 886, cert. denied 372 U.S. 976, 83 S.Ct. 1111, 10 L.Ed.2d 142. In that case the local had gone on strike in violation of certain requirements of the International's constitution and the International revoked the local's charter. The local and some of its members sued the International for injunctive relief to compel the restoration of the charter. The court upheld § 301(a) jurisdiction. In so doing the court recognized that disputes such as the one before it have "traumatic industrial and economic repercussions." 314 F.2d 916. At the same time the court recognized that the grant of jurisdiction should not be expanded "into a carte blanche for unrestrained judicial inventiveness in the areas of union structure." 314 F.2d at 917. The court also said, 314 F.2d at 906, that: "Questions as to how relations between an international and its local might best be regulated are for internal settlement or for Congress, which possesses the legislative power."

Section 301(a) is not restricted to suits arising from collective bargaining agreements. See Retail Clerks, supra, 369 U.S. at 28, 82 S.Ct. 541 (a suit involving a strike settlement agreement). At the same time § 301(a) does not confer jurisdiction of a dispute between a parent union and a local union over the meaning of the parent's constitution. We recognize that § 301(a) must be liberally applied to promote industrial peace, but that principle has no application here. This controversy relates only to the construction and application of the union constitution and has nothing to do with labor-management relations. It may be that under the law of some states a union constitution is a contract between the union and its members. See International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 618-619, 78 S.Ct. 923, 2 L.Ed.2d 1018, applying California law. We are concerned with federal, not state, law and we must view § 301 in the light of its underlying purpose to provide a federal remedy in cases where, because of difficulties in suing labor associations, other remedies were inadequate. See Lincoln Mills, supra, 353 U.S. at 453-454, 77 S. Ct. 912.

A holding that the word "contracts" as used in § 301(a) encompasses union constitutions would open the doors of the federal courts to every dispute between a parent union and a local union over the meaning and effect of the union constitution. If Congress intended to turn over to the federal courts the control and supervision of internal union...