Smith v. University of Detroit

• Citation: 378 N.W.2d 511,29 Ed. Law Rep. 384,145 Mich.App. 468
• Decision Date: 26 December 1985
• Docket Number: Docket No. 75864
• Parties: Lindsey SMITH and Brenda Sanders, for themselves and a class similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT, a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellee. 145 Mich.App. 468, 378 N.W.2d 511, 29 Ed. Law Rep. 384
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

Page 511

378 N.W.2d 511

Lindsey SMITH and Brenda Sanders, for themselves and a class similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT, a Michigan corporation Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 75864.

145 Mich.App. 468, 378 N.W.2d 511, 29 Ed. Law Rep. 384

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 22, 1985.

Decided Sept. 4, 1985.

Released for Publication Dec. 26, 1985.

[145 MICHAPP 470] Milton R. Henry and Godfrey J. Dillard, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Butzel, Long, Gust, Klein & Van Zile by William M. Saxton and Keefe A. Brooks, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before HOOD, P.J., and WAHLS and KALLMAN, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs appeal as of right from an involuntary dismissal pursuant to GCR 1963, 504.2 of their discrimination action brought under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. Sec. 37.2101 [145 MICHAPP 471] et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 3.548(101) et seq. Defendant cross-appeals as of right.

Plaintiffs are black and former students at the University of Detroit (U of D) Law School. The U of D refused to permit plaintiffs to register for classes beginning the 1983 fall term because plaintiffs' grade-point averages fell below 2.0, out of a maximum 4.0 average. On August 23, 1983, plaintiffs filed this class action asking the circuit court to enjoin the U of D from preventing their registration and seeking declaratory relief and money damages. Plaintiffs alleged that they were the victims of ingrained, systematic, and studied racism. Plaintiffs also alleged that, even if the U of D had not intended to discriminate, the effect of the U of D's grading practices and administrative rules disparately affected members of their class. Plaintiffs allege that this racial discrimination, whether deliberate or not, violated Sec. 402(1) of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. Sec. 37.2402(1); M.S.A. Sec. 3.548(402)(1) which provides:

"An educational institution shall not:

"(a) Discriminate against an individual in the full utilization of or benefit from the institution, or the services, activities, or programs provided by the institution because of religion, race, color, national origin, or sex.

"(b) Exclude, expel, limit, or otherwise discriminate against an individual seeking admission as a student or an individual enrolled as a student in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the institution, because of religion, race, color, national origin, or sex."

On August 25, 1983, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction, compelling the U of D to register plaintiffs as students even though plaintiffs had failed to meet the law school's minimum academic requirements. On September 2, 1983, the [145 MICHAPP 472] trial court entered an amended pretrial schedule order which provided an October 24, 1983, trial date for plaintiff's equitable claims. On September 23, 1983, the trial court certified plaintiffs' class. GCR 1963, 208. On that same date, plaintiffs filed a demand for a jury trial. On October 7, 1983, plaintiffs moved for an accelerated trial, and on October 21, 1983, the trial court granted the motion and ordered the trial on the equitable claims to begin December 5, 1983, and a trial on the legal issues to proceed pursuant to the general and local court rules.

On November 4, 1983, the trial court entered "conclusions of law" on plaintiffs' motion for a jury determination of the U of D's liability under the Elliott-Larson Civil Rights Act. The trial court said:

"[I]t is the nature of the relief sought which determines the right to jury trial in a civil right case, not the fact that such a claim is historically a tort. Therefore, this Court rules that the Circuit Court has a duty to hear and decide factual issues without a jury on all complaints for equitable relief, and that such is the case in claims under the Elliott-Larsen Act.

"It only remains, then, to determine the precise nature of the Plaintiffs' Complaint, in order to apply the Michigan practice to this civil right case.

"It is textbook law under the English system of Jurisprudence that the determination of whether the nature of the jurisdiction of the court is equitable or legal is made by examination of the nature of the relief sought. Where, as in this case, the Complaint filed seeks 'preliminary injunction' and 'injunctive and declaratory relief as shall be proved appropriate', the jurisdiction of equity is unquestionable.

"Plaintiffs urge that their Complaint in this cause seeks equitable relief only temporarily during the pendancy of this action, and that it makes no request for permanent equitable relief. However, the Complaint [145 MICHAPP 473] itself speaks differently, and is the controlling factor here. The Complaint in this cause, in fact does seek relief both equitable in nature and legal in nature. The prayer for relief seeks, and the court has issued '(a) an immediate Preliminary Injunction pursuant to the provisions of GCR 718 ...'. That relief was granted in equity. It further seeks, in paragraph (b), 'such injunctive and declaratory relief as shall be proved appropriate'. That, too, is equitable relief. It also asks, in paragraph (c) and (d) 'for such damages as shall be appropriate', and 'attorney fees ... under MCL 27.2802' [sic]. The two latter are legal relief, that is, money damages.

"The fact that additional relief in the way of money damages and attorney fees is also sought in no way diminishes the equitable jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine the prayer for equitable relief under paragraphs (a) and (b) without a jury. In order to hear and determine those claims for equitable relief, the court must first make findings of fact concerning the alleged violation by the Defendant of the Elliott-Larsen Act. Those laws claims simply place before the court the requirement to determine in the trial of the claims for equitable relief, certain issues of fact that are common to the trial of the law claims. The non-jury determination by the Court of those issues of fact which are common to the equity claims and to the law claims does not foreclose to Plaintiffs the subsequence trial by jury, in accord with Plaintiffs' Jury Demand previously filed pursuant to GCR 508, of the balance of the issues of fact that go to the proof of Plaintiffs' law claims for money damages. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' demand properly filed under the court rules, the law claim is now set for jury trial under the procedures and time schedules established therein.

"The motion of the Plaintiff for jury trial determination of liability under Elliott-Larsen Act is denied." (Emphasis added.)

A four-week trial on the equitable claims began on December 5, 1983. After plaintiffs presented proofs and rested, defendant moved for an involuntary dismissal pursuant to GCR 1963, 504.2. The [145 MICHAPP 474] trial court granted that motion and dissolved the preliminary injunction on December 29, 1983. The trial court entered its findings of facts, conclusions of law, and judgment on the same date.

On January 3, 1984, plaintiffs filed a brief on appeal raising three issues. However, on January 12, 1984, plaintiffs filed a motion for an order of the trial court to provide for the filing of less than the full transcript of testimony and hearings on appeal. The trial court stated at the hearing on the motion that the entire transcript would have to be reviewed in order to resolve the second and third issues plaintiffs raised in their appellate brief. Plaintiffs said that they were not challenging the "chancellor's" findings, but only wished to appeal the question of their right to a jury trial. Therefore, the trial court entered an order which allowed plaintiffs to file a partial transcription of proceedings, conditioned upon plaintiffs' acceptance of its findings of fact.

The trial court found that the plaintiffs had not established that the U of D intentionally or deliverately discriminated against them. However, the trial court did find that the U of D's action did have a disparate effect on the members of plaintiffs' class. But the trial court also found that the evidence failed to show that any of the U of D's actions were taken because of the race of the plaintiffs. The trial court found that the U of D's actions were based upon academic factors and for academic reasons.

Plaintiffs' sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by entering an involuntary dismissal pursuant to GCR 1963, 504.2 of their legal claims under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act at the conclusion of a hearing on only the equitable claims when plaintiffs also sought a jury's determination[145 MICHAPP 475] of liability for money damages. We agree and reverse.

Article 8 of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act provides for direct court actions for equitable relief and for damages. M.C.L. Sec. 37.2801; M.S.A. Sec. 3.548(801) and M.C.L. Sec. 37.2803; M.S.A. Sec. 3.548(803). However, the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act does not expressly provide the right to a jury. The U of D argues that without such express legislation, plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial because Michigan Courts did not recognize a discrimination action against a private educational institution before Michigan adopted its constitution in 1963.

Const. 1963, art. 1, Sec. 14 preserves the right to a jury trial for causes of action which were part of the common law prior to its adoption. Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 60, fn. 6, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981), citing Conservation Dep't. v. Brown, 335 Mich. 343, 346, 55 N.W.2d 859 (1952). In Brown, the Court said:

"Michigan Constitution 1908, art 2, Sec. 13, provides, as did Michigan's previous Constitutions, that 'The right of trial by jury shall remain.' Thus the right to trial by jury is preserved in all cases where it existed prior to adoption of the Constitution. Tabor v Cook, 15 Mich 322 [ (1867) ]; Swart v Kimball, 43 Mich 443 [5 N.W. 635 (1880) ]. The constitutional guaranty applies to cases arising...