Smith v. University of Idaho

• Decision Date: 14 June 1946
• Docket Number: 7264
• Parties: SMITH v. UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO et al
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

170 P.2d 404

67 Idaho 22

SMITH v. UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO et al

No. 7264

Supreme Court of Idaho

June 14, 1946

Appeal from Industrial Accident Board.

Affirmed.

Walter M. Oros, of Boise, for appellants.

The burden of proof is on the claimant to show that the death of the deceased arose out of and in the course of her employment. Walker v. Hyde, 43 Idaho 625, 253 P 1104; Croy v. McFarland-Brown Lumber Co., 51 Idaho 32, 1 P.2d 189; Vaughn v. Robertson and Thomas, 54 Idaho 138, 29 P.2d 756; I.C.A. § 43-1001.

Where the evidence is as consistent with the absence, as with the existence of liability, the defendants should not be held liable. Swanson v. Wasson, 45 Idaho 309, 262 P. 147; Hawkins v. Bonner County, 46 Idaho 739, 271 P. 327.

In reviewing the hearings of the Industrial Accident Board upon questions whether the evidence sustains the findings of the Board, the Supreme Court will consider the competency relevancy, and materiality of the evidence according to the rules applicable to trials in court. In re Larson, 48 Idaho 136, 279 P. 1087; McNeil v. Panhandle Lumber Co., 34 Idaho 773, 203 P. 1068.

Murray Estes, of Moscow, for respondent.

The injury and death of Mrs. Smith arose out of and in the course of her employment. Scrivner v. Franklin School District, 50 Idaho 77, 293 P. 666.

The State Insurance Fund, having contested the claim in this action without reasonable grounds, should be subjected to an assessment for the payment of respondent's attorneys' fees. Chapter 96, page 146, 1945 Idaho Session Laws.

Budge Justice. Ailshie, C. J., and Holden, J., concur. Givens, J., dissents.

OPINION

Budge, Justice.

This proceeding was commenced before the Industrial Accident Board by Richard O. Smith, as residuary legatee under the last will and testament of Ida M. Smith, deceased, against the University of Idaho, employer, and State Insurance Fund, surety, to recover medical and burial expenses incurred by the deceased's estate as the result of an accident and injury culminating in her death. It is alleged in claimant's petition that the death of Ida M. Smith was caused by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with the University of Idaho. Both the employer and the surety denied said allegation. Briefly stated, the facts are substantially as follows:

During the afternoon of December 8, 1943, Ida M. Smith, who was employed by the University as hostess or housemother at Ridenbaugh Hall, a girl's dormitory located on the campus, accidentally slipped and fell on a sidewalk in the city of Moscow and, as a result of the fall, fractured the neck of the left femur. The accident occurred near the Gritman Hospital; she was carried into the hospital where she received medical attention by Dr. C. J. Klaaren. On the 10th of December, Dr. William Grieve and Dr. Klaaren reduced the fracture and pinned the femur. December 12th Mrs. Smith died. Dr. Klaaren testified that, in his opinion, the cause of her death was a cerebral hemorrhage.

From an award of the board in favor of claimant this appeal is prosecuted.

Appellants specify and rely upon five assignments of error. There is however but one question necessary to be determined, namely, Did the accident and injury resulting in the death of Ida M. Smith arise out of and in the course of her employment with the University of Idaho?

The board found the following facts, among others:

"III. That among the dormitories and other facilities for students maintained by said University at Moscow, is one known as Ridenbaugh Hall; that for some time prior to the 8th day of December, 1943, and continually until her death, Ida M. Smith, deceased, was a 'hostess' in said Ridenbaugh Hall under a contract of employment with the said University; that as such hostess, among other duties, she was in charge of and had the direction of the social program of the girls housed in said hall, charged with the duty of promoting the girls' social, health, and recreational activities, and to see that the rules and regulations promulgated by the office of the Dean of Women and Director of Dormitories were carried out; that the expenses of operating the hall were borne by the University, but that the girls bought, processed and served their own food on a cooperative basis; that the said deceased was furnished a suite of rooms in which there is a kitchenette, in which suite she was required occasionally to entertain the Dean of Women and girls of said hall; that she was furnished by the University all of her meals which she ate in the hall with the girls except her breakfast which she ate in her room, and the food for such breakfast she purchased and paid for herself; that she had no specified hours but was on duty twenty-four hours each day.

"IV. That for some days prior to the 8th day of December, 1943, the girls in the Ridenbaugh Hall, under the direction of a committee appointed for that purpose, were preparing for the usual Christmas celebration and a Christmas tree in said hall.

"V. That on the 8th day of December, 1943, the said deceased left the said Ridenbaugh Hall and went to town and purchased some articles which, at the time of the accident hereinafter described, she had with her, and among which articles she so purchased and had with her were a jar of coffee and some Christmas tree ornaments; that after purchasing said articles, she started to return to Ridenbaugh Hall and, on the way, fell on the public street of Moscow and fractured the neck of her left femur; that she was picked up after her fall, taken to a hospital where she received surgical care and nursing.

* * * *

"X. That the State Insurance Fund has paid the fees charged by Dr. Grieve, the hospital, and the nurses who attended the said Ida M. Smith, but has not paid the fee of Dr. Klaaren and has not [paid] the burial expenses.

"XI. That the injury sustained by the said Ida M. Smith on the 8th day of December, 1943, was a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with the defendant, University of Idaho, and that her death on the 12th day of December was the result of said injury."

It may be conceded at the outset that the facts present a borderline case.

However "all courts are agreed that there should be accorded to the Workmen's Compensation Act a broad and liberal construction, that doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of compensation, and that the humane purposes which these acts seek to serve leave no room for narrow technical construction. * * *

"One of the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Acts is to broaden the right of employees to compensation for injuries due to their employment. * * * We quote from the decision of the Montana Court in Writa v. North Butte Mining Co., 64 Mont. 279, 210 P. 332, 335, 30 A.L.R. 964: 'The word "employment," as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, does not have reference alone to actual manual or physical labor, but to the whole period of time or sphere of activities, regardless of whether the employee is actually engaged in doing the thing he was employed to do. * * * To say that plaintiff "ceased" working for the defendant is not equivalent to saying that he severed the relation of employer and employee.'

"Since the courts have recognized the broad humane purposes of the act, they have readily perceived that the mere fact that the injury befell the claimant, at a moment when he was not performing manual labor for his employer, does not necessarily prove that the accident did not arise out of or in the course of the employment. The words just mentioned which are a part of most of the acts are never qualified by the limitation that the injury must have been inflicted during regular working hours." Lamm v. Silver Falls Timber Co., 133 Or. 468, 277 P. 91, 286 P. 527, 530, 291 P. 375. See, also, Hamlin v. University of Idaho, 61 Idaho 570, 104 P.2d 625; Olson v. Union Pac. R. Co., 62 Idaho 423, 112 P.2d 1005; Dawson v. Joe Chester A. L. Co., 62 Idaho 508, 112 P.2d 494; Long v. Brown, 64 Idaho 39, 128 P.2d 754; Dauphine v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 57 Cal.App.2d 949, 135 P.2d 644.

Mrs. Smith, at the time of the accident and injury and up to the time of her death, was in the employment of the University of Idaho at a stipulated amount per month, and was so employed at the time she purchased the coffee and Christmas tree ornaments.

The question therefore arises: Under the facts of this case did Mrs. Smith, employed 24 hours each day, interrupt her service so as to remove her from the protection of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, Code 1932, § 43-901 et seq?

Under the terms of her contract of employment with the university, Mrs. Smith was furnished all her meals at the expense of the university except her breakfast. She purchased food for her breakfast with her own funds and ate in her apartment in the hall; that it was necessary for her to purchase breakfast groceries and, in order to do so, it was incumbent upon her to go downtown. Conceding the purchase of the coffee was for her personal use, she had made the purchase, was on her way back to the hall when she accidentally fell on the public street, sustaining the injury from which she later died. Clearly she was doing what a person under like facts and circumstances, engaged in like employment may reasonably do, and would be expected to do, the doing of which would be incidental to and within the scope of her employment.

The rule would seem to be well established that an employee does not step aside from his employment and is without the protection of the statute when doing a reasonable and necessary act at the time and place to the end that the business of his employer may be properly conducted. Denials of awards for any period...