Smith v. Vasquez
| Decision Date | 08 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-1530 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | DUNCAN ERIC SMITH, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER KEVIN VASQUEZ, Defendant. |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine.
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on November 12, 2017, Prince William County Police Officer Kevin Vasquez ("Defendant") made a traffic stop of Mr. Duncan Smith ("Plaintiff") for speeding. Defendant was hired by the Prince William County Police Department in July 2016 and wrote his first citation on December 22, 2016 - approximately 11 months before the incident. Defendant was wearing a body-worn camera during the entirety of the traffic stop, which he turned on after Plaintiff pulled off the roadway and stopped in a parking lot. Plaintiff's brother Joshua Smith and friend Robert Pulley were passengers in the car when Defendant pulled Plaintiff over.
Defendant approached Plaintiff's car and informed him that he was speeding and requested to see Plaintiff's driver's license and registration. As Plaintiff and Defendant engaged in some conversation, Plaintiff provided his registration and Maryland issued driver's license to Defendant. Defendant then returned to his patrol car where he prepared one summons for speeding in violation of Virginia Code § 46.2-870 and a second summons for expired registration in violation of Virginia Code § 46.2-613. Defendant was in his patrol car preparing the summonses for approximately 14 minutes, during which time he recorded some of the information from Plaintiff's driver's license to both summonses.
When Defendant returned to Plaintiff's car, he requested that Plaintiff sign each summons. Defendant handed Plaintiff the summons for speeding, and Plaintiff immediately signed and handed it back to Defendant. Defendant then removed the carbon copy of the first summons and returned it to Plaintiff, who put the carbon copy of the first summons in the car's windshield visor. Defendant then handed Plaintiff the summons for expired registration and instructed Plaintiff to do "the same thing." When Plaintiff returned the second summons, Defendant stated that the mark Plaintiff made on the second summons' signature line "did not look like [Plaintiff's] signature." Defendant then requested that Plaintiff sign his "actual name" on the second summons, butPlaintiff refused, stating that he had already provided his signature.
Defendant instructed Plaintiff that he needed a signature to let him leave because it would serve as his "promise to come to court." Defendant then requested to see Plaintiff's driver's license so that he could compare the signature on the second summons to the signature on his license. Reviewing Plaintiff's driver's license and the summons, Defendant believed that Plaintiff's signature did not match.
Defendant continued to request Plaintiff's "actual signature" on the summons as Officer Kelly arrived on the scene and approached the passenger side of Plaintiff's car. Ofc. Kelly was also wearing a body-worn camera, which he activated upon arriving at the scene. Shortly after Ofc. Kelly arrived, Defendant asked Plaintiff to step out of the vehicle. Plaintiff complied, and Defendant handcuffed Plaintiff and escorted him to the rear of Plaintiff's vehicle, where Defendant searched Plaintiff. While Defendant was searching Plaintiff, Sergeant Benjamin Grantham also arrived at the scene. Sgt. Grantham was not Defendant's supervisor, but like Ofc. Kelly, stopped to assist Defendant. As Sgt. Grantham and Ofc. Kelly arrived, Defendant escorted Plaintiff to the rear of his patrol car, placing him in the back seat.
Ofc. Kelly reviewed both summonses and Plaintiff's driver's license and concluded that the signature on the documents matchedthe signature on Plaintiff's license. Having concluded that the signatures matched, Ofc. Kelly advised Defendant to release Plaintiff. Sgt. Grantham also advised Defendant to let Plaintiff go because in his experience, marking a summons "with a line or an x" was sufficient. Having received both Ofc. Kelly and Sgt. Grantham's recommendations, Defendant released Plaintiff on his own recognizance. The duration of the traffic stop was approximately 37 minutes.
On January 13, 2018, Plaintiff appeared in the General District Court for Prince William county and pled not guilty to the speeding charge. Plaintiff was tried and ultimately found guilty of going 50 mph in a 35-mph zone.
Count I of Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Defendant unreasonably searched and seized Plaintiff in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts II, III, and IV allege state law claims for False Arrest, Assault, and Battery. Plaintiff's principal argument is that Defendant unlawfully searched and seized Plaintiff after he had signed the second summons because Defendant "exceed[ed] the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made[.]" Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court should grant summary judgment if the pleadings and evidence show that there isno genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made, the opposing party has the burden to show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). This Court finds this case is ripe for summary judgment.
As to Count I, Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity for two reasons. First, Defendant argues that he did not violate any clearly establish law because he was entitled to arrest Plaintiff for speeding. Second, Defendant argues that even if he was mistaken when he refused to accept Plaintiff's signature on the second summons, his mistake was reasonable. Plaintiff argues that Defendant violated the "principle requirement of reasonableness underpinning the rights afforded [by] the Fourth Amendment" because Defendant did not have any reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity to justify the subsequent search and brief detention of Plaintiff after receiving Defendant's mark on the second summons.
Police officers sued for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity if the police officer did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To determine whether the defense is available, a court must determine: (1) whether the officer's conduct violated a clear constitutional right; and (2) it would be clear to an objectively reasonable officer that his conduct violated that right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001). The doctrine of qualified immunity extends protection to a "margin of error" where officers "navigate uncharted areas at the margins of constitutional criminal law." Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F.2d 772, 774 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992) ().
The Court agrees with Defendant that he was entitled to arrest Plaintiff for speeding, and thus, did not violate any "clearly established" law. Virginia Code § 46.2-936 provides that "[w]henever any person is detained by or in the custody of an arresting officer . . . for a violation of any provision of this title punishable as a misdemeanor, the arresting officer shall . . . issue a summons [and] [u]pon the giving by such person of his written promise to appear . . . the officer shall forthwith releasehim from custody." Speeding and expired registration violations are misdemeanors under Virginia law. Va. Code. § 46.2-937. But while Virginia law dictates that an officer "shall" issue summonses for speeding and expired registration, Virginia Code § 46.2-936 also provides that "[a]ny person refusing to give such written promise to appear . . . shall be taken immediately by the arresting officer before a magistrate[.]"; see also Virginia Code § 46.2-940 ().
In addition to Virginia state law, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that police officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by arresting drivers for minor traffic infractions. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (); see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (). And because Defendant's arrest of Plaintiff was lawful, so was the subsequent search. Moore, 553 U.S. at 177 ().
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Defendant violated the Virginia Code's requirement to only issue Plaintiff summonses for speeding and expired registration, a state requirement to issue a ticket cannot, by itself, serve as the basis of a Fourth Amendment violation. Any "additional protections" the state provides are exclusively a matter of state law. Moore, 553 U.S. at 171; Whren v....
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