Smith v. Watkins

Decision Date05 November 1998
Docket NumberNo. 98-1416,98-1416
Citation159 F.3d 1137
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
PartiesLeroy SMITH, Appellant, v. Horace WATKINS; The City of Eudora, Appellees.

John P. Lewis, Hot Springs, AR, argued, for appellant.

Shane Perry, North Little Rock, AR, argued, for appellees.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, WOLLMAN, and KELLY, 1 Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Leroy Smith appeals from the district court's 2 grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Eudora (City). We affirm.

The City hired Horace Watkins as a full-time police officer on June 20, 1994. On September 8, 1994, Watkins arrested Leroy Smith for fleeing a police officer. In the course of apprehending Smith, Watkins broke Smith's hip. Smith brought this action against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on two grounds. 3 First, he claimed that the City had an unconstitutional policy of condoning Watkins's use of excessive force. Second, he alleged that the City failed to train Watkins adequately.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. See Hossaini v. Western Missouri Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d 1140, 1142 (8th Cir.1998). Summary judgment should be granted if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

The City would be liable for Watkins's conduct only if it had a policy or custom that caused Smith's injury. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). In the absence of a written policy, Smith must identify a pattern of widespread unconstitutional conduct that was so pervasive and well-settled that it had the effect of law. See Jane Doe A v. Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir.1990). Smith must show that the City "through its deliberate conduct ... was the 'moving force' behind the injury alleged." Brown, 117 S.Ct. at 1388.

Smith contends that the City established a policy or custom of condoning Watkins's use of excessive force by refusing to act on complaints about Watkins's conduct. The only evidence that such a policy existed before September 8, 1994, are the affidavits of Mabel Alexander, a dispatcher, and Ronald Nichols, a deputy sheriff. Alexander asserted that the City had received complaints about unreasonable stops by Watkins before Smith's arrest. Nichols averred that complaints had been made regarding unnecessary stops by Watkins "since 1991." However, neither Alexander nor Nichols could identify specific complaints that put the City on notice of a widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct by Watkins prior to Smith's arrest. We recently held that two specific complaints and various rumors about an officer were not sufficient to establish a policy or custom of condoning unconstitutional conduct. See Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir.1996) (stating that although complaints and rumors gave the municipality notice of the officer's questionable conduct, they did not establish a widespread pattern of misconduct rising to the level of a policy or custom). In view of our holding in Andrews and the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Brown, the affidavits of Alexander and Nichols do not raise a genuine issue of material fact whether the City had a policy or custom of tolerating excessive force by Watkins at the time of Smith's arrest.

Smith also claims that the City's failure to train Watkins constituted a policy or custom that caused Smith's injury. Although a plaintiff can make out a claim for failure to train by showing that city officials were deliberately indifferent to deficient training programs or special training needs, see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-90 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989), Smith does not point to any evidence showing that the City's training procedures are deficient. ...

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20 cases
  • Tirado v. City of Minneapolis
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • 22 Febrero 2021
    ...force—even assumed to be true—cannot be considered a pattern of widespread and pervasive unconstitutional conduct."); Smith v. Watkins , 159 F.3d 1137, 1138 (8th Cir. 1998) ("We recently held that two specific complaints and various rumors about an officer were not sufficient to establish a......
  • Winters v. Arkansas Department of Health and Hum. Serv., 4:04-CV-00206 GTE.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas
    • 2 Junio 2006
    ...municipal policy or custom. See id.; see also Doe v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Watkins, 159 F.3d 1137, 1138 (8th Cir.1998). In Monell, the Supreme Court recogfized that "Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to o......
  • Brewington v. Keener
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • 30 Agosto 2018
    ...unconstitutional conduct that was so pervasive and well-settled that it had the effect of law.’ " Id. (quoting Smith v. Watkins , 159 F.3d 1137, 1138 (8th Cir. 1998) ). It also granted qualified immunity to Sheriff Jeffery, finding that Brewington "offer[ed] no proof that Sheriff Jeff[er]y ......
  • Teasley v. Forler
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • 10 Marzo 2008
    ...academy as well as over a month of training while riding with another officer. (Mot. for Sum. J. at Ex. D, L); see Smith v. Watkins, 159 F.3d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir.1998) (explaining that sufficient training constituted on the job training and graduation from police academy); accord Andrews, 9......
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