Smith v. West Virginia Human Rights Com'n

Decision Date02 July 2004
Docket NumberNo. 31645.,31645.
Citation602 S.E.2d 445,216 W.Va. 2
PartiesPatti A. SMITH, Appellant, v. THE WEST VIRGINIA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION and UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, Appellees.
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court

Herbert H. Henderson, Esq., Dwight J. Staples, Esq., Henderson, Henderson & Staples, Huntington, for Appellant.

Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General, Barbara H. Allen, Managing Deputy Attorney General, Charleston, for the West Virginia Human Rights Commission.

David J. McAllister, Esq., Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Kevin L. Carr, Esq., Spilman, Thomas & Battle, PLLC, Charleston, for Appellee United Parcel Service, Inc.

STARCHER, Justice.

In this appeal from the West Virginia Human Rights Commission ("the Commission"), we are asked to review an order setting aside the findings of two administrative law judges that an employer failed to reasonably accommodate an employee's disability. We find that the Commission applied the wrong legal standard to the employee's claim, and find that the substantial evidence on the whole record supported the findings of the administrative law judges. As set forth below, we reverse the Commission's order.

I. Facts & Background

Appellee United Parcel Service, Inc. ("UPS"), is a corporation in the business of package delivery. Appellant Patti S. Smith began working for the appellee in 1980 sorting, loading and unloading packages onto and off of delivery vehicles, and after two-and-a-half years took a position as a "feeder-dispatcher," organizing the loading and unloading of vehicles. She began her employment at UPS's South Charleston facility (or "hub"), but in 1983 she transferred to a position as a "pre-load supervisor" at the UPS Huntington hub. In 1986, after three years in Huntington, the appellant accepted a job as a full-time "package car" driver, working out of the South Charleston hub.

At some point in the early 1990s, the appellant began having problems with weight-loss, crying spells, insomnia, fatigue and depression. By March 1994, the appellant was diagnosed with a history of depression. Then, in September 1994, the appellant was injured in a work-related accident. Within a week of the accident, the appellant attempted to return to work, but physical and emotional problems — some connected to her accident, many not — interfered with her job and she remained off work beginning in October 1994. The appellant underwent a hysterectomy in March 1995 in response to other physical conditions.

The appellant was released to return to work by her doctors on May 2, 1995. However, her doctors noted that she was suffering from mood disorders, personality disorders with obsessive traits, and depression. Her doctors specifically recommended to UPS that the appellant be placed in a structured work setting, essentially one where she would not be required to drive a package truck or other vehicle. The record suggests that the appellant could not function in a job where she would need to deal with the public, and that the appellant therefore could not work as a package car driver because the job entailed many uncontrollable variables which largely involved contact with the public.

The appellant specifically requested, on May 2, 1995, that she be provided with eight hours of work per day in a non-driving position. UPS was later provided with statements from the appellant's mental health providers stating that the appellant should be placed in a non-driving position inside the warehouse. UPS refused, asserting that there were only six "inside" full-time positions at the South Charleston hub, and that the appellant did not have enough seniority to "bump" any of those individuals from their positions. Testimony presented during the course of litigation indicated that the appellant sought, in lieu of a full-time position, two part-time, non-driving jobs inside the warehouse. Furthermore, evidence was presented that three male employees who had physical impairments had been accommodated by UPS by being given "inside," non-driving positions. Each employee had been a package car driver, and upon developing a disability (for instance, one had diabetes, while another an injury to a rotator cuff) each employee was given two part-time jobs working in or around the South Charleston hub.

The appellant never returned to her position as a package car driver at UPS, and was terminated from her employment on December 5, 1995. She later took a position with a chemical company in Huntington performing work where she is never required to deal with the general public. In the meantime, the appellant filed a complaint with the appellee West Virginia Human Rights Commission ("the Commission") alleging that UPS had violated the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va.Code, 5-11-1 to -21, by refusing to acknowledge the appellant's disability and to accord her a reasonable accommodation.

UPS's position below was that the appellant was not disabled because she was capable of doing the package car driver job, and that therefore no accommodation was necessary. After several hearings, an administrative law judge disagreed with this position and issued a ruling on January 10, 2001, finding that the appellant had a disability in the form of depression, a disability that impaired the appellant's ability to work, and that UPS had discriminated against the appellant and failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations. The administrative law judge concluded that UPS could have accommodated the appellant by offering her a position that did not involve driving a package truck or working with the public.

The Commission reviewed the administrative law judge's order, and remanded the case for further hearings to clarify the reasoning behind the January 10, 2001 ruling. After additional hearings, on December 23, 2002, a new administrative law judge issued a 56-page ruling again finding that the appellant had a disability, and that UPS had discriminated against the appellant and failed to accommodate her disability. The administrative law judge concluded that the appellant was entitled to be reinstated with an accommodation that would allow her to work inside UPS's place of business for eight hours per day. Finally, the administrative law judge ruled that the appellant was entitled to back pay and benefits from May 2, 1995 to the present, attorney fees and costs, and damages for humiliation, embarrassment, emotional distress and loss of personal dignity.1

The ruling was appealed to the full Commission, and the Commission concluded that "depression is a disability cognizable under the West Virginia Human Rights Act." The Commission agreed with the findings of both administrative law judges, and found that the record supported a conclusion that the appellant suffered from depression and was disabled from performing her duties as a UPS package car driver.

However, in an order dated July 24, 2003, the Commission reversed the holdings of the administrative law judges, holding that the appellant had failed to prove that UPS engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices in May 1995 when it refused to reassign her to a less stressful, non-driving position.

The appellant now appeals the Commission's July 24, 2003 order.

II. Standard of Review

In the instant appeal, the appellant challenges the legal conclusions made by the Commission. The appellee, UPS, cross-assigns as error factual and legal conclusions made by the administrative law judges and the Commission. The standard under which the Human Rights Commission reviews a decision of an administrative law judge is established by statute. W.Va.Code, 5-11-8(d)(3) [1998] states that:

The commission shall limit its review upon such appeals [from the administrative law judge's decision] to whether the administrative law judge's decision is:
(A) In conformity with the constitution and the laws of the state and the United States;
(B) Within the commission's statutory jurisdiction or authority;
(C) Made in accordance with procedures required by law or established by appropriate rules of the commission;
(D) Supported by substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(E) Not arbitrary, capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

With regard to this Court's review of the factual findings and legal conclusions made by the Commission, "this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained in W. Va.Code § 29A-5-4(a) and reviews questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong." Syllabus Point 1, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996). See also, Syllabus Point 1, West Virginia Human Rights Commission v. United Transportation Union, Local No. 655, 167 W.Va. 282, 280 S.E.2d 653 (1981)("West Virginia Human Rights Commission's findings of fact should be sustained by reviewing courts if they are supported by substantial evidence or are unchallenged by the parties.") W.Va.Code, 29A-5-4 requires a court to "reverse, vacate or modify the order or decision of the agency if the substantial rights of the petitioner or petitioners have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, decisions or order are: '(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or (2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or (3) Made upon unlawful procedures; or (4) Affected by other error of law; or (5) Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.'" Syllabus Point 2, Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Department v. State ex rel. State of West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 172 W.Va. 627, 309 S.E.2d 342 (1983).

II...

To continue reading

Request your trial
39 cases
  • Erps v. West Virginia Human Rights Com'n
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • June 22, 2009
    ...Comm'n v. United Transp. Union, Local No. 655, 167 W.Va. 282, 280 S.E.2d 653 (1981). Syllabus point 2, Smith v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 216 W.Va. 2, 602 S.E.2d 445 (2004). 4. "To establish a claim for ancestral discrimination, under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, West Vi......
  • W. Va. Reg'l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A. B.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • October 31, 2014
    ...Act, W. Va. Code, 29A-1-2(d) [1982], and such a legislative rule has the force and effect of law." Syl. Pt. 5, Smith v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n., 216 W.Va. 2, 602 S.E.2d 445 (2004). 31. Respondent suggests that "Judge Webster's 'dismissal' of [the constitutional claims] . . ." may......
  • Mcelroy Coal Co. v. Schoene
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • April 12, 2018
    ...Act, W.Va. Code , 29A-1-2(d) [1982], and such a legislative rule has the force and effect of law." Syl. Pt. 5, Smith v. W.Va. Human Rights Comm'n , 216 W.Va. 2, 602 S.E.2d 445 (2004). It is clear from these legislative rules and Rose II that a coal operator is required to correct any materi......
  • W. Va. Reg'l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • November 18, 2014
    ...Act, W. Va.Code, 29A–1–2(d) [1982], and such a legislative rule has the force and effect of law.” Syl. Pt. 5, Smith v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 216 W.Va. 2, 602 S.E.2d 445 (2004).31 Respondent suggests that “Judge Webster's ‘dismissal’ of [the constitutional claims] ...” may have ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT