Smith v. William Muirhead Const. Co., Inc.

• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: BRITT
• Citation: Smith v. William Muirhead Const. Co., Inc., 218 S.E.2d 717, 27 N.C.App. 286 (N.C. App. 1975)
• Decision Date: 15 October 1975
• Docket Number: No. 7514IC365,7514IC365
• Parties: George A. SMITH, Employee, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM MUIRHEAD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Employer, American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, Carrier, Defendants.

Page 717

218 S.E.2d 717

27 N.C.App. 286

George A. SMITH, Employee, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM MUIRHEAD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Employer American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, Carrier, Defendants.

No. 7514IC365.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Oct. 15, 1975.

Eugene C. Brooks, III, Durham, for plaintiff-appellant.

Smith, Moore, Smith, Schell & Hunter by Richmond G. Bernhardt, Jr., Greensboro, for defendants-appellees.

BRITT, Judge.

Plaintiff contends that the full commission erred in vacating the opinion and award of the hearing commissioner. Among other things, he argues that the evidence raised the issue of equitable estoppel and that the full commission failed to make findings of fact on the issue. We find merit in the argument.

In reviewing the opinion and award of the hearing commissioner, the commission was authorized by G.S. 97--85 to 'reconsider the evidence' and, if proper, to Vacate the award. Lee v. Henderson and Associates, 284 N.C. 126, 200 S.E.2d 32 (1973). The power of the commission to review and reconsider the evidence carries with it the power to modify or strike out findings of fact made by the hearing commissioner. Brewer v. Trucking Company, 256 N.C. 175, 123 S.E.2d 608 (1962). While the commission is not required to make a finding as to each fact presented by the evidence, it is required to make specific findings with respect to crucial facts upon which the question of plaintiff's right to compensation depends. Morgan v. Furniture Industries, Inc., 2 N.C.App. 126, 162 S.E.2d 619 (1968).

Next, we consider the question of estoppel. Plaintiff contends defendants are estopped to plead the lapse of time because of representations made to him by Mrs. Coleman at the time he signed form 28B. He argues that Mrs. Coleman's statements not only induced him to sign the form but also lured him into believing that the lapse in time following the last statement of compensation would not affect his right to receive additional compensation.

In Watkins v. Motor Lines, 279 N.C. 132, 139, 181 S.E.2d 588, 593 (1971), in an opinion by Justice Huskins, we find:

'The law of estoppel applies in compensation proceedings as in all other cases.' Biddix v. Rex Mills, supra (237 N.C. 660, 75 S.E.2d 777). In McNeely v. Walters, 211 N.C. 112, 189 S.E. 114 (1937), Chief Justice Stacy, speaking for the Court, said: 'The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based on an application of the golden rule to the every day affairs of men. It requires that one should do unto others as, in equity and good conscience, he would have them do unto him, if their positions were reversed. . . . Its compulsion is one of fair play.'

While the...