Smith v. Williams
| Decision Date | 06 October 1880 |
| Citation | 44 Mich. 240,6 N.W. 662 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | SMITH and another v. WILLIAMS. |
An ordinary deed of bargain and sale, containing a covenant for quiet enjoyment, will give the grantee therein the benefit of title afterwards acquired by the grantor. The owner of a tax deed commenced a chancery suit against one, as a non-resident, in whose name the title of record to certain lands stood, in which a decree was entered quieting the title in complainant as against the defendant. The defendant had conveyed the lands long prior to the commencement of the suit, and prior to the taxes for which the deed was given. Held, that such decree and proceedings were no evidence of title.
Case made from Mecosta.
Elsworth & Sapp, for plaintiffs.
Wm. D Fuller, for defendant.
The defendant in error brought ejectment against Smith and Field to recover certain land in Mecosta county. To show title in herself she put in evidence the following conveyances:
(1.) A patent of the land from the United States to Byron F Squires, bearing date August 10, 1859. (2.) A deed from Byron F. Squires to John Squires, dated December 13, 1856. This was an ordinary deed of bargain and sale, with a covenant "that the premises thus conveyed in the quiet and peaceable possession of the said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, he will forever warrant and defend against any person whomsoever lawfully claiming the same or any part thereof." (3.) A like deed from John Squires to the plaintiff, dated December 13, 1856 containing a like covenant. The patent was not recorded; the deeds were recorded in December, 1877.
1. The deeds from the patentee and from John Squires were objected to as irrelevant and ineffective, for the reason that at their date the title to the lands had not passed out of the United States, and therefore they conveyed nothing. It is not disputed that a deed with covenants of seizin and title would be effectual to give the grantee the benefit of an after-acquired title under the doctrine of estoppel; but these covenants were absent from the deeds in question, and the covenant of quiet enjoyment, it is said, will not have the like effect. No reason is given for any such distinction and it is not recognized by the authorities.
Where one assumes by his deed to convey a title, and by any form of assurance obligates himself to protect the grantee in the enjoyment of that which the deed purports to give him, he will not be suffered afterwards to acquire or assert a title and turn his grantee over to a suit upon his covenants for redress. The short and effectual method of redress is to deny him the liberty of setting up his after-acquired title, as against his previous conveyance. This is merely refusing him the countenance and assistance of the courts in breaking the assurance which his covenants have given. Long Island, etc., R. Co. v. Conklin, 29 N.Y. 572; Doe v. Dowdall, 3 Houst. 369.
2. The defendants below, to show title in themselves, offered in evidence the enrolled record and proceedings in a cause commenced in the Mecosta circuit court in chancery instituted by Sextus N. Wilcox, as complainant, against Byron F. Squires, as defendant, by bill filed February 23, 1870, in which Wilcox claimed title to the land under certain alleged conveyances on sales thereof for delinquent taxes, and prayed the court of chancery to quiet his title as against the claims of Squires. It appeared from the enrollment that Squires was proceeded against as a non-resident; that he was brought in by publication, and did not enter an appearance or file any pleading; and that a decree that the title of Wilcox to the premises be quieted, as against any claim of Squires, was entered May 28, 1870. The plaintiff objected to the introduction of this evidence as...
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