Smith v. Windsor Group
Decision Date | 06 March 2000 |
Citation | 750 A.2d 304 |
Parties | Justin C. SMITH, Individually and as Assignee of Curtis Calaman, Appellant, v. THE WINDSOR GROUP and The Windsor Insurance Group, Appellees. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Alan L. Pepicelli, Meadville, for appellant.
Joanna K. Budde, Erie, for appellees.
Before KELLY, JOHNSON and TAMILIA, JJ.
¶ 1 Justin C. Smith appeals from the June 14, 1999 Order entering judgment on the pleadings in favor of appellee, The Windsor Group/The Windsor Insurance Company (Windsor).
¶ 2 The material facts of this case are not in dispute. On September 2, 1994, Cherlyn Burdick tendered a personal check in the amount of $175.25 to Windsor representing the premium payment for automobile insurance policy XXXXXXXXXX (the policy). A policy was issued on September 3, 1994 and was to be effective from that date until September 3, 1995. On September 12, 1994, Curtis Calaman, as an authorized operator of Burdick's vehicle, struck and injured appellant, a minor who was riding his bicycle at the time of the accident. On September 15, 1994, Windsor presented Burdick's check for payment.1 The following day, the drawee bank returned the check to Windsor indicating that it had not been honored on the basis of insufficient funds. On October 3, 1994, Windsor returned the check to Burdick along with written notice informing her the policy was null and void as of September 3, 1994.
¶ 3 Appellant initiated a personal injury action against Calaman. Thereafter, judgment was entered in favor of appellant and against Calaman in the amount of $1.45 million. Calaman then executed an assignment of rights under the policy in favor of appellant. Appellant initiated this action to recover the full amount of the judgment as well as damages for alleged bad faith and breach of a duty to defend in the initial personal injury action. Both parties filed motions for judgment on the pleadings.
¶ 4 The trial court noted "this is case of first impression in terms of a binder-policy being rescinded within the 60 day period by the insurer under Act ... 78." (Trial Court Opinion, Wolfe, S.J., 4/29/99, at 1.)2 The court determined tendering a check absent sufficient funds to cover the check constitutes misrepresentation "that would cause a rescission of the policy within the first 60 days of issuance." Id. at 4. Accordingly, the trial court granted Windsor's motion and this appeal followed.
¶ 5 Appellant presents the following challenges for our review.
Public Service Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kidder-Friedman, 743 A.2d 485, 487 (Pa.Super.1999), quoting Gambler v. Huyett, 451 Pa.Super. 351, 679 A.2d 831, 833-34 (1996)
.
¶ 6 "Act 78 was enacted as remedial legislation directed at correcting the imbalance in the relative bargaining positions of the insurer and insured." Erie Insurance Exchange v. Lake, 543 Pa. 363, 368, 671 A.2d 681, 683 (1996).
Erie Ins. Co. v. Department of Ins., 684 A.2d 1115, 1117 (Pa.Commw.1996).
¶ 7 In the present case, the policy was terminated within the first 60 days of its issuance and declared "null and void" as of the day of its issuance. "Recision is a retroactive remedy, by which the rights and obligations of all parties under the policy are abrogated, as if the policy had never been issued." Lake, supra at 367, 671 A.2d at 683. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed the impact of Act 78 upon the recision of an insurance policy in Klopp v. Keystone Ins. Cos., 528 Pa. 1, 595 A.2d 1 (1991), and Lake, supra.
¶ 8 In Klopp, the insured had failed to disclose prior speeding violations and an automobile accident in applying for automobile insurance coverage. Upon discovering these facts, the insurer rescinded the policy and returned the premium payment. It did so 57 days after acceptance of the application for insurance. In discussing the Klopp decision, the Court in Lake explained that the issue of "whether the legislature intended to exclude the remedy of recision in all instances when they enacted Act 78" was not directly addressed by the Klopp court. Lake, at 371-372, 671 A.2d at 685. Regardless, the Act has no effect upon terminations effectuated within the first 60 days of the policy.3
¶ 9 Accordingly, "an insurance company may only avail itself of the remedy of recision within the 60 day period before the terms and conditions of Act 78 become effective." Id. Thus, the issue in this case is whether Windsor properly availed itself of the common law remedy of recision of the automobile insurance contract.
It is generally recognized that misrepresentation may be either fraudulent or negligent in nature and that the elements of fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation are essentially identical. To prove either or both torts, a plaintiff must, by clear, precise and convincing evidence, prove (1) a misrepresentation; (2) a fraudulent utterance thereof; (3) an intention by the maker that the recipient will thereby be induced to act; (4) justifiable reliance by the recipient on the misrepresentation and (5) damage to the recipient as the proximate result.
Greenberg v. Tomlin, 816 F.Supp. 1039, 1054 (E.D.Pa.1993) (citations omitted). Appellant argues "[t]he common law right to rescind a policy has never been extended to situations involving non-payment of [a] premium." (Appellant's Brief at 14.) Upon careful review of all relevant case law, we are compelled to agree with this statement.4
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