Smith v. Woolace Elec. Corp., Case No. 19-3907
| Decision Date | 04 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-3907 |
| Parties | THOMAS SMITH, as Power of Attorney for Menno Schwartz, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WOOLACE ELECTRIC CORPORATION; STEVEN GARZA, as both an individual and as an employee of Woolace Electric Corporation, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 20a0461n.06
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
BEFORE: SILER, MOORE, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Accidents invite rescue. And when Menno Schwartz, Jr. and the men with whom he was travelling saw an overturned van, they stopped to help. But what started as a good Samaritan act ended in Schwartz, Jr. getting hit by another car.
At a jury trial to recover for negligence against Steven Garza (the driver of the overturned van) and his employer, the district court judge (1) granted the Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on Ohio's rescue doctrine, (2) excluded evidence that Garza received a traffic citation, and (3) excluded testimony about the relationship between the first accident and the second accident that injured Schwartz, Jr. The jury found Garza not liable for negligence. Smith's representative contests all those decisions. Because we find any error harmless for some of those decisions and no error for others, we AFFIRM.
While driving a van for his employer, Woolace Electric Corporation, Steven Garza lost control on U.S. 30 in Allen County, Ohio. The van ultimately came to rest on its side. Garza and his passenger, Randy Clemens, left the van and moved to the guardrail. The parties agree that Garza "was acting within the scope of his employment when he lost control of the van." (R. 95, PID 1359.)
Another van carrying several men, including Michael Whitacre and Menno Schwartz, Jr., stopped at the scene. There is some dispute about exactly what the occupants of the second van did after they stopped, but there is no dispute that a third vehicle, driven by Corey McManues, came along sometime after and hit Menno Schwartz, Jr. The impact sent Schwartz, Jr. over the highway's guardrail into a ditch below. Schwartz, Jr. allowed Reverend Thomas Smith, Schwartz's power of attorney, to sue several parties involved, including Garza and Woolace Electric. Smith sued to "separate [Schwartz, Jr.] from the lawsuit" because Schwartz, Jr.'s religious beliefs did not allow for that conflict in the legal system. (R. 96, PID 1579, 1590-92.)
The parties dispute exactly what Schwartz, Jr. was doing when McManues's car hit him. This matters, because if Schwartz, Jr. was acting as a rescuer when McManues hit him, then Garza may have been liable to him under Ohio's rescue doctrine. Adding to the dispute, Schwartz, Jr. lost all recollection of the events. So other witnesses had to explain Schwartz's actions. Whitacre testified that he and Schwartz went to the overturned van, which protruded slightly into the roadway, to see if anyone was in it. They spent a couple of minutes looking for people in the van and then looked around it. Whitacre explained:
[A]fter that, I mean, time lapsed, I mean, I don't - I can't remember. All I remember is him not being there anymore. I mean, it could be less than ten minutes, you know, it could be, I don't know. My average guess is maybe ten minutes on the scene before the accident happened.
(Id. at 1455.) Whitacre did not remember doing anything to warn McManues's vehicle barreling toward them. Whitacre just remembered turning and saying they needed to get out of there. He did not see the vehicle hit Schwartz, Jr., and he was not sure what exactly Schwartz, Jr. was doing when McManues's car hit him.
Giving a different account, Schwartz, Sr., who also rode with Whitacre that day, assumed his son spoke with Garza and Clemens before McManues's car hit him. Schwartz, Sr. walked toward Garza and Clemens after getting out of the car. He spoke with them and thought his son was with him, but then said that he was not sure about that.
What's more, Garza agreed that he told a trooper that some men who stopped to help him were waving off oncoming traffic with lights. And at least one trooper's report conveyed that someone (presumably Garza) stated just that. So Smith argues that Schwartz, Jr. was acting as a rescuer by waving off traffic when McManues's car hit him.
Along with these facts, witnesses disputed whether one or both vans had flashers on. Smith argues that if the Whitacre van had flashers on, then Schwartz, Jr. acted as a rescuer by being in the car that stopped and flashed its hazards. Smith's logic is that those hazard lights were warning oncoming cars of the dangerous scene and protecting Garza and Clemens from getting hit while on the side of the road. But if only the overturned van had flashers on, then Schwartz, Jr. could not have been helping with flashers.
Witnesses also disagreed over what parts of the road had ice on it. Some witnesses thought only the bridge where Garza lost control had ice on it. At least one other witness said the road was icy before the bridge too.
Both troopers who responded to the scene testified at trial. On cross examination, defense counsel asked Trooper Robert Gatchel about why he filled out two accident reports. Gatchel at first agreed with counsel that "there were two separate and distinct accidents that morning" but then stated that he would have submitted two accident reports, even if the accidents were related. (Id. at 1517-18.) He explained that "the only time [they] do two vehicles and one crash [report] is when it was a bam, bam incident." (Id. at 1518.) On redirect, counsel asked a clarifying question about whether the two accidents (the overturned van and then McManues's crash) were related. Trooper Gatchel responded: "The second one would not have occurred if the first one wasn't in the roadway." (Id. at 1521.) Defense counsel did not object.
Then Trooper Matthew Murphy testified. Smith's counsel also asked Murphy about the relationship between the two accidents: "[W]hat is your understanding for the relationship between Mr. McManues'[s] accident and the initial accident of Mr. Garza's van?" (Id. at 1551.) Defense counsel objected without stating grounds, and the judge sustained the objection. Later, Smith's counsel asked about the risk of later accidents after an accident like the one that led to the overturned van. Trooper Murphy agreed there was "a propensity" for more collisions in that scenario: "That's why you have secondary collisions . . . ." (Id. at 1559.) Counsel then again asked if the two collisions were related. Defense counsel again objected, and the judge sustained.
After Smith rested his case, the defense moved for a directed verdict. The judge entered a judgment as a matter of law, finding that the rescue doctrine did not apply, but denied the motion for negligence, instead allowing the jury to resolve that issue. Toward the end of trial, the judge permitted the jury to submit written questions. At least one juror asked whether an officer issued a citation to any drivers. The judge explained to the jury that "[w]hether one or more driver was cited as a result of these accidents is not relevant for your purposes, and you should not speculateabout that." (R. 97, PID 1656.) In fact, before voir dire, the judge decided to exclude from evidence Garza's traffic citation issued after the accidents.
The judge gave the jury a series of questions to answer to aid them in their verdict. In the end, the jury needed to answer only the first question because it found that Garza was not negligent. That obviated the need for the jury to answer further questions regarding causation, comparative negligence, damages, etc.
Smith moved for a new trial on four grounds: (1) that the district judge improperly granted the Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the rescue doctrine, (2) that the district court should have admitted the citation into evidence, (3) that the district court should have allowed testimony from Trooper Murphy about the relatedness between the two accidents, and (4) that the verdict went against the weight of the evidence. The district court denied the motion, and this appeal from the denied motion for a new trial "and the decisions described therein" followed. (R. 103, PID 1778.)
Under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may grant a motion for a new trial "after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). Some examples include when the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, damages are excessive, or the trial court acted unfairly, perhaps after "being influenced by prejudice or bias." Tompkins v. Crown Corr, Inc., 726 F.3d 830, 835 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1046 (6th Cir. 1996)). In diversity cases, "[w]e review a denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion, applying the federal standard rather than Ohio law." Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 672 (6th Cir. 2000). Abuse of discretion means that the district court "relie[d] on clearlyerroneous findings of fact, use[d] an erroneous legal standard, or improperly applie[d] the law." Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., 775 F. App'x 178, 186 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Arny, 831 F.3d 725, 730 (6th Cir. 2016)).
But Smith also independently challenges the rulings mentioned within the motion for a new trial too. To the extent that the standard of review changes when analyzing those decisions, we cite the appropriate standard below. We first examine the judgment as a matter of law on the rescue doctrine, then the exclusion of the citation, then the relatedness issue, and finally whether sufficient evidence supported the jury's conclusion.
We review a district court's grant or denial of a motion for...
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