Smith Wilson Co. v. Trading & Dev. Establishment, Civ. A. No. 90-1125 (CRR).
Decision Date | 31 August 1990 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 90-1125 (CRR). |
Citation | 744 F. Supp. 14 |
Parties | SMITH WILSON COMPANY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TRADING AND DEVELOPMENT ESTABLISHMENT, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Philip O'Neill, with Charles B. Molster, III, of Keck, Mahin & Cate, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.
Chang S. Oh, with Bruce Zagaris of Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, Washington, D.C., for defendants Trading and Development Establishment and Badawi Al-Masri.
The above-captioned case arrives in this Court after an international business deal involving a Royal Jordanian Airlines ("Airlines") passenger jet airliner went awry. To assist them in achieving their goal of purchasing and then selling the airplane for a profit, the plaintiffs enlisted the defendants' assistance. Although the precise contours of the relationship between the various parties remains to be resolved, it is sufficient for the moment to say that the defendant Trading and Development Establishment ("T & D") and its sole owner, the defendant Badawi Al-Masri, were to use their influence to encourage Airlines to sell the airplane to the plaintiff. Holding himself out as the plaintiffs' duly authorized agent, the third defendant, Tawfiq Al-Ghanem, signed a Commission Agreement ("Agreement") which purported to promise that T & D would receive an $800,000 commission once Airlines initially accepted a proposal to sell its airplane to the plaintiffs. When T & D claimed its entitlement to this commission, the plaintiffs refused to pay, arguing that the "Agreement" was a nullity because the defendant Al-Ghanem had acted without any authority to bind the plaintiffs.1
Pursuant to the provisions of a broad arbitration clause in the "Agreement,"2 T & D filed an arbitration claim with the American Arbitration Association. In turn, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, seeking, inter alia, declaratory relief and a stay of the arbitration proceedings pending a judicial determination of the validity of the "Agreement." In addition to opposing the plaintiffs' motion for a stay of arbitration, the defendants have responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration and to stay further judicial proceedings pending completion of arbitration. Upon consideration of the parties' motions and oppositions, the underlying law, and the entire record herein, the Court will stay the proceedings before the American Arbitration Association pending the Court's ruling on the legal validity of the "Agreement."
What little common ground exists between the plaintiffs and the defendants consists of the consensus that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15, and the case law construing the FAA control the analysis on this issue. On the one hand, the defendants contend that this Court should stay its hand and compel the plaintiff to submit to arbitration because of the FAA's well-established presumption favoring arbitration and specifically because the FAA requires that a court, "upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, ... shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (emphasis added). On the other hand, the plaintiffs argue that the FAA contemplates that a court — and not an arbitrator — must determine that an agreement to arbitrate exists before it may order the parties to submit to arbitration. See id. ().
At this early stage in these proceedings, the Court simply cannot be satisfied — as § 4 requires — that the making of the arbitration agreement is not in issue. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1353, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960)). "This axiom recognizes the fact that arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration." Id. 475 U.S. at 648-49, 106 S.Ct. at 1418; see also Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 828 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C.Cir.1987) ().
The plaintiffs strenuously deny ever entering into a contract with T & D, and they have provided evidence to support their contention that Al-Ghanem, their purported agent, actually had no authority to bind the plaintiffs to any of the provisions contained in the "Agreement." Even if the evidence submitted by the parties is in conflict, the plaintiffs' evidence is sufficient — at this preliminary stage — to support their position because, as in the summary judgment context, the Court must give the party opposing the motion to compel arbitration, "the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences that may arise." Par-Knit Mills v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51, 54 (3d Cir.1980). Thus, if the "Agreement" itself is not a binding contract between T & D and the plaintiffs, then it is impossible to construe the arbitration provision of the "Agreement" to give rise to a contractual duty to arbitrate. See Hartford Lloyd's Insurance Co. v. Teachworth, 898 F.2d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir.1990) (). In other words, while a signed arbitration agreement leaves a court with no choice but to compel arbitration, see, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985), this proposition applies only if the individuals who signed the agreement are legally authorized to bind the respective parties, see Par-Knit Mills, 636 F.2d at 54-55 ( ).
The foregoing demonstrates that this case belongs in that first category of arbitrability cases involving "disputes over the formation of an agreement to arbitrate — i.e., whether the parties ever agreed to submit anything to arbitration in the first place." National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 850 F.2d 756, 761 (D.C.Cir.1988) (emphasis added).3 A court — and not an arbitrator — must resolve this threshold question of whether the parties ever entered into an arbitration agreement since there is no authority to require a party to submit to arbitration if there never was an agreement to arbitrate. Id. This result comports with both the language of the FAA, which protects the right to a jury trial of the party contesting the existence of an arbitration agreement, see 9 U.S.C. § 4, and with common sense because "before a party to a lawsuit can be ordered to arbitrate and thus be deprived of a day in court, there should be an express, unequivocal agreement to that effect." Par-Knit Mills, 636 F.2d at 54; see also I.S. Joseph Co. v. Michigan Sugar Co., 803 F.2d 396, 398, 399 (8th Cir.1986) ( ); cf. N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Industries, Inc., 548 F.2d 722, 729 (8th Cir.1976) ( ). Thus, before it may grant the defendants' motion to compel the plaintiffs to submit to arbitration, the Court must decide whether the "Agreement" is valid and legally binding.
In resisting this conclusion, the defendants make two kinds of arguments; one has no merit and the other is premature. First, the defendants' reliance on the "fraud in the inducement" rule of Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967), and its progeny is misplaced. It is well established that the dispute must be arbitrated when a party raises fraud in the inducement of the contract generally whereas when "the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself — an issue which goes to the `making' of the agreement to arbitrate — the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it." Id. at 403-04, 87 S.Ct. at 1806 (emphasis added); accord Manning v. Energy Conversion Devices, Inc., 833 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir. 1987); Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 763 F.2d 866, 868 (7th Cir.1985); N & D Fashions, Inc., 548 F.2d at 728; Leone v. Advest, Inc., 624 F.Supp. 297, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The rationale behind this proposition is that under certain circumstances — but not always — an arbitration clause is severable from the rest of the contract and therefore is not "infected" by the dispute going to the contract's central purpose. Matterhorn, Inc., 763 F.2d at 868-69 ; see Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1983) (...
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