Smithee v. Cal. Corr. Inst.

• Decision Date: 18 August 2020
• Docket Number: No. 1:19-cv-00004-NONE-JLT,1:19-cv-00004-NONE-JLT
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: DANA SMITHEE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, et al., Defendant.

DANA SMITHEE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, et al., Defendant.

No. 1:19-cv-00004-NONE-JLT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

August 18, 2020

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

(Doc. Nos. 66, 67, 79)

This action came before the court after Cyrus Ayers, an inmate at California Correctional Institution ("CCI"), committed suicide by hanging on February 2, 2018. (Doc. No. 65 ¶¶ 8, 59.) Ayers's mother, Dana Smithee, and his daughter, E.M., by and through her guardian ad litem, Jennifer Montes, brought this civil rights, survival and wrongful death action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California law. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 6-7.) Plaintiffs claim that defendants Rhonda Litt-Stoner, Pratap Narayan, Jennifer Seymour, and Karin Celosse were deliberately indifferent in treating Ayers's suicidal ideation in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment and, as a result, caused his death. (Id. ¶¶ 1-15.) Defendants twice moved to dismiss plaintiffs' second and third amended complaints, and the court granted those motions and dismissed those complaints with leave to amend.¹ (Doc. Nos. 41, 47, 54, 59.) Now before the court are defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiffs' fourth amended complaint ("4AC"). (Doc. Nos. 65-67.)

On March 30, 2020, the assigned magistrate judge found that plaintiffs' 4AC had failed to sufficiently plead a federal claim against any of the named defendants and recommended that the 4AC be dismissed without further leave to amend. (Doc. No. 79.) On April 10, 2020, plaintiffs objected to those findings and recommendations, arguing that the magistrate judge misapplied Rule 12(b)(6) standard in not construing the allegations in light most favorable to them. (Doc. Nos. 81 at 3-8; 83 at 3-8.)² Defendant Narayan filed a response thereto on April 17, 2020, (Doc. No. 84), and defendants Litt-Stoner, Seymour, and Celosse together filed a separate response to plaintiffs' objections on April 24, (Doc. No. 85). The court has reviewed this case de novo pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C).

The court agrees with the magistrate judge's analysis and conclusion that defendants Narayan, Litt-Stoner, and Seymour should be dismissed from this action but concludes that defendant Celosse should not be dismissed.

ANALYSIS

A. Eighth Amendment Violation for Deliberate Indifference in Treating Ayers's Suicidal Ideation

Before turning to the analysis, the court notes that both parties appear to be confused regarding the distinction between plaintiffs Eighth Amendment survival claim and the wrongful death claims under California law. See Garofalo v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 4th 1060, 1072 (2000) ("'Although they are often lumped together without any distinction, they are, in fact, quite distinct.'" (citation omitted)); (see, e.g., Doc. No. 67-1 at 19-20 (defendants mixing plaintiffs' negligence claim as both a survival claim under California Civil Procedure Code § 377.34 and wrongful death claim under California Civil Procedure Code § 377.61)). A survivor cause of action belongs to the decedent but is brought on behalf of the decedent by the decedent's personal representative or successor in interest. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1545, 1553 (2007) (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc.§§ 377.20, 377.30); see also id.at 1553 ("[T]he survival statutes do not create a cause of action but merely prevent the abatement of the decedent's cause of action and provide for its enforcement by the decedent's personal representative or successor in interest." (emphasis added)). The survivor claim here is Ayers's claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights resulting in his death, (see Doc. No. 65 ¶¶ 68-122), but by operation of California survival statutes, his claim passes on to his successor in interest or personal representative after his death. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.30. Moreover, damages for a survival claim in California (contrary to what plaintiffs are seeking) are limited to "punitive damages and all the decedent's losses incurred prior to death." Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.34 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs nonetheless seek damages for their own personal losses, such as their loss of Ayers's companionship—as opposed to damages Ayers suffered before his death—with respect to their survival claim. (See Doc. No. 65 ¶¶ 83, 97, 115; see also Doc. Nos. 67-1 at 23; 73 at 30 (plaintiffs appear to conflate the survival claim under § 1983 with their wrongful death claims brought under state law in responding to defendants' arguments)). Plaintiffs cannot do so under California law.

Turning now to the merits, the Supreme Court has "recognized that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, requires the State to provide adequate medical care to incarcerated prisoners." DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-99 (1989). To establish Ayers's Eighth Amendment claim for failure to treat his suicidal ideation, plaintiffs "must show 'deliberate indifference' to [Ayers's] 'serious medical needs.'" Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original). Defendants do not dispute that Ayers's suicidal ideation was a "serious medical need." (See Doc. No. 67-1 at 5-25; see also Doc. No. 79 at 7.) Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has specifically recognized that "[a] heightened suicide risk or an attempted suicide is a serious medical need." Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Defendants' chief contention here is that Celosse was not acting with deliberate indifferent to Ayers's suicidal ideation. (See Doc. No. 67-1 at 5-8.)

///// Under the Eighth Amendment, deliberate indifference "includes 'both an objective standard—that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment—and a subjective standard—deliberate indifference.'" Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066. "To meet the objective element of the standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a serious medical need. Such a need exists if failure to treat the injury or condition 'could result in further significant injury' or cause 'the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" Id. (citation omitted). The "subjective inquiry involves two parts." Lemire v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). First, plaintiffs "must demonstrate that the risk was obvious or provide other circumstantial or direct evidence that the prison officials were aware of the substantial risk" to Ayers's safety. Id. (citation omitted). "Second, they must show that there was no reasonable justification for exposing the inmates to the risk." Id.

Here, plaintiffs allege as follows. In November 2017, psychologist Celosse³ rated Ayers—on a Suicide Risk and Self-Harm Evaluation—with "an Intensity of Ideation Score of '10'" and noted that Ayers had "collected pills in preparation [for] suicide." (Doc. No. 65 ¶ 38) (alteration in original); see, e.g., Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1025 n.1 (3d Cir. 1991) (recognizing that an official has knowledge of "a particular vulnerability to suicide" where there was "a psychiatric diagnosis identifying suicidal propensities." (citations omitted)). After reviewing Ayers' medical records, Celosse further noted that Ayers's "condition had significantly worsened over the past few months," and that he "had a history of self-harm and suicide." (Doc. No. 65 ¶ 39) (emphasis added.) Celosse subjectively understood the excessive risk to the health

/////or safety of Ayers. (Id. ¶¶ 69, 86.) Yet, Celosse "deliberately and consciously"⁴ failed to recommend any treatments to Ayers. (Id. ¶¶ 41-42, 93, 95); see also Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066 ("In deciding whether there has been deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs, we need not defer to the judgment of prison doctors or administrators." (citation omitted)). Ayers "was not placed under direct observation, no formal [Suicide Risk Assessment Checklist] was performed, no treatment plan was prepared, no wellness check was conducted." (Doc. No. 65 ¶¶ 35, 41) (alteration in original.) Because of Celosse's failure to take any action, Ayers successfully committed suicide on February 2, 2018. (Id. ¶¶ 42-46, 59, 68, 72, 79, 91, 96.) This deliberate and intentional disregard for the health and safety of CCI inmates is part of a documented and longstanding pattern beginning in 1999 until today. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23, 68-69, 71-76.)

Accepting these allegations as true, the court finds that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts showing that Celosse must necessarily have known (both objectively and subjectively) the seriousness of the suicidal ideations Ayers was having when Celosse made her psychological

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////assessment of Ayers.⁵ See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994) (holding that "deliberately indifference" is a question of fact that is "subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). Construing the allegations further "in the light most favorable" to plaintiffs, Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009), the seriousness of Ayers's suicidal ideation appeared or should have appeared obvious to Celosse. See Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 260 (7th Cir. 1996) (where "the defendant had the requisite knowledge of substantial risk through circumstantial evidence of the risk's obviousness," "evidence of past injury caused by the same risk or evidence that a defendant had recognized the risk before" is unnecessary). Still, Celosse allegedly made no recommendations on how...