Smithson v. Hammond
| Docket Number | 3:22-cv-05029-TMC |
| Decision Date | 27 October 2023 |
| Parties | DANIEL B. SMITHSON, Plaintiff, v. DARYL JONATHAN HAMMOND, SARAH LEWIS, AMBER SMITH, RICHARD HENDRICKS, ALEX MCBAIN Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 22. Plaintiff Daniel B. Smithson's (“Smithson's”) complaint asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; arrest and imprisonment without a hearing under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and unconstitutional policy, practice or custom under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Dkt. 1. He also asserts one claim for failure to provide reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 22) moves for dismissal of all of Smithson's claims with prejudice. Dkt. 22 at 2. For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
In 2017, Smithson was convicted in Pierce County Superior Court of “second-degree assault and unlawful possession of a controlled substance.” Dkt. 23 ¶ 4. After his release from prison in July 2018, Smithson's sentence required him to serve eighteen months of community custody with the Washington State Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and report to Community Corrections Officer (“CCO”) Jonathan Hammond, one of the defendants in this case. Dkt. 23-1 at 7. After his release from prison, Smithson agreed to certain conditions of community custody imposed by DOC, including that he would not “threaten or exhibit assaultive behavior toward any Department employee.” Dkt. 23-3 at 2.
Smithson's claims revolve around an altercation and arrest on January 22, 2019, involving Hammond and several other Community Corrections Officers that occurred while Smithson was in the bathroom of a DOC field office to provide a urinalysis sample for drug testing (“UA”). Dkt. 1 at 4; Dkt. 22 at 4. During the incident, Smithson broke bones in his right hand. Dkt. 26 at 4; Dkt. 22 at 5. The parties dispute the events that resulted in his injuries.
In a sworn declaration, Smithson alleges that, after he reached towards Hammond to receive a UA cup, Hammond “suddenly seized both [his] shoulders, . . . [and] pushed [Smithson] against the wall next to the toilet.” Dkt. 27 ¶ 14. Then, according to Smithson, Hammond punched him in the face and ordered him to get on the ground and put his hands behind his back. Id. ¶ 15. Smithson asserts he complied with Hammond's orders. Id. Once Smithson was on the ground, Hammond began trying to handcuff him, at which point Hammond “gripped two fingers on [Smithson's] right hand with one of his hands and the other two fingers on [Smithson's] right hand with his other hand, forcibly spreading them until a bone snapped.” Id. Smithson alleges he did not “attempt to retaliate nor do anything to provoke” Hammond. Id. Smithson argues in opposing summary judgment that, based on his account, he “posed no threat” during the incident. Dkt. 26 at 10 (citing Dkt. 27 ¶ 12).
Defendants' account differs significantly. Defendant Hammond alleges that, after walking into the bathroom, Smithson “forcibly bumped into [him] with his elbow to [his] midsection and then turned toward [him] in an aggressive manor [sic] as if [Smithson] was getting ready to attack [him].” Dkt. 23-6 at 3. Hammond extended his left arm to move Smithson back and told him to get against the wall. Id. Smithson then “lunged at [Hammond] with his hands grabbing the front of [Hammond's] vest.” In his “Report of Alleged Violation” regarding the incident, Hammond continues:
I pushed Smithson back against the wall in an effort to restrain him and also give directives to get on the ground. As I was trying to restrain Smithson, he was swinging his arms trying to hit me in the face and head. I started to block Smithson's swings with my forearms. Smithson was in the corner of the bathroom refusing directives to get on the ground. At this point, CCO Mowatt and CCO Lewis (who were standing by) heard the commotion and came into the bathroom. Smithson was standing in the corner as CCO Mowatt grabbed him by his left arm and at the same time giving verbal directives to get on the ground. I grabbed him by his right arm and assisted CCO Mowatt in placing Mr. Smithson on the ground. Smithson continued to resist by tensing his arms while CCO Mowatt and I applied wrist restraints. CCO Lewis applied restraints to his right wrist as CCO Mowatt and I had to maintain control of his arms due to his continued resistance.
Id. Following Smithson's arrest, he “was charged with violations of his community custody conditions” for his “assaultive behavior” during the incident. Dkt. 22 at 5 (citing Dkt. 23-6). DOC, which has authority to adjudicate violations of “condition[s] or requirement[s] of community custody,” RCW 9.94A.737(4), held an administrative hearing regarding the charge on January 31, 2019. Dkt. 23-7. The DOC hearing officer issued a written decision, submitted into evidence by Defendants, which found Smithson guilty of “assaultive behavior” and sanctioned him to thirty days in prison. Id. at 3. A section of the decision entitled “Summary of Facts Presented/Reasons for Findings” appears to describe part of the incident that was the subject of the sanction: Id.[1]The decision form indicates the hearing officer relied on the following evidence in making his decision: Smithson's state court judgment and sentence, his “Notice of Allegation, Hearing, Rights and Waiver form,”[2]Defendant Hammond's written report of the incident, and a form setting out the conditions of Smithson's community custody sentence. Id. at 2.
Generally, “in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, ‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Defendant argues that the Court must give preclusive effect to the DOC hearing officer's decision and treat certain facts he allegedly found to be true as established in this case. Specifically, in regard to Smithson's excessive force claims, Defendants argue that Smithson is estopped from asserting facts inconsistent with the hearing officer's determination that he “engaged in assaultive behavior towards CCO Hammond” (Dkt. 22 at 9) and that Smithson engaged in this behavior “during the incident in which his hand was broken,” Id. at 10. They also argue that Smithson is estopped from alleging there was no probable cause for his arrest during the UA incident because his “conviction” for assaultive behavior establishes that Defendants had “reasonable suspicion” to arrest him under Washington law. Id. at 19. Smithson responds that Defendants have not met the standard for showing that collateral estoppel should apply. Dkt. 26 at 8.
1. Collateral Estoppel Standard
“Issue preclusion . . . bars ‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,' even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748-49 (2001)). “The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is grounded on the premise that once an issue has been resolved in a prior proceeding, there is no further fact-finding function to be performed.” Wabakken v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 801 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted).
Federal courts give preclusive effect to state agency fact finding when the agency acted in a “judicial capacity” and the parties had an “adequate opportunity to litigate” the issues decided. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, “federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts.” Id. Accordingly, the Court will apply Washington law in analyzing the collateral estoppel issues in this case. See Davis v. Clark Cnty., Wash., 966 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1124 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
“The burden of proof as to the propriety of applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel is on the party seeking its application,” and Washington courts “view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party” in making this determination. Reninger v. Dep't of Corr., 901 P.2d 325, 332 (Wash.Ct.App. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 951 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1998). “[C]ollateral estoppel extends only to ‘ultimate facts', i.e., those facts directly at issue in the first controversy upon which the claim rests, and not to ‘evidentiary facts' which are merely collateral to the original claim.” McDaniels v. Carlson, 738 P.2d 254, 258 (Wash. 1987).
Washington courts consider seven factors in determining whether to give preclusive effect to agency fact finding, four of which apply to every case and three of which only apply when the movant seeks collateral estoppel effect for agency findings. Christensen v. Grant Cnty. Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 96 P.3d 957, 961-62 (Wash. 2004) (en banc). Under the traditional four-factor test, the party seeking application of the doctrine must show that:
(1) the issue decided in...
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