Smithson v. York Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-cv-01794
| Decision Date | 03 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-cv-01794 |
| Parties | CHRISTIAN MICHAEL SMITHSON, Plaintiff, v. THE YORK COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(KANE, J.)
(SAPORITO, M.J.)
The plaintiff, Christian Michael Smithson,1 filed his original prose complaint on September 4, 2015. (Doc. 1). He filed an amended complaint as a matter of course on September 28, 2015. (Doc. 9). In essence, he claims that he is entitled to an award of damages from the defendants in the amount of $250,000 per day of his incarceration—beginning on July 13, 2015, and continuing through the present—pursuant to two "notices" that he appears to claim operate in the nature of self-executing contracts between himself and the defendants. Thus, he appears to seek an award of contractual damages totaling nearly $100 million. He also seeks injunctive relief: an order dismissing thestate criminal charges against him and directing that he be released from custody. He purports to bring this action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
On December 2, 2015, Smithson filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to freeze all of the defendants' assets.
I. BACKGROUND
At the time of filing, Smithson was a criminal defendant in proceedings before the Court of Common Pleas for York County, Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v. Smithson, Docket Nos. CP-67-CR-0007794-2012, CP-67-CR-0000709-2013 (York County C.C.P.). The charges are not specified in his pleadings, but it appears that he was found guilty and sentenced to serve a prison term while this federal civil action was pending, based on his transfer from the York County Prison to SCI Rockview, a state correctional institution located in Centre County, Pennsylvania.
Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 282 (2011) (footnote omitted). See generally Charles E. Loeser, From Paper Terrorists to Cop Killers: The Sovereign Citizen Threat, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 1106, 1120-29 (2015) ().
The tactic adopted by Smithson here was the preparation of a "Notice" dated July 26, 2015, advising the state trial court that he was a "secured party" under the Uniform Commercial Code, distinct from the "defendant" subject to criminal proceedings, and that he was therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the state court. (Doc. 1, at 8-24). The notice further provided that, unless the state court or the county district attorney's office provided "verifiable evidence" to contradict his claims of sovereignty and the court's lack of jurisdiction, their failure to respond would constitute silent assent to a contract under which they would be liable to Smithson for contractual damages in the amount of $250,000 per day of his incarceration. (Id.). On September 1, 2015, Smithson prepared a superseding "Notice of International Commercial Claim Within the Admiralty," advancing substantially the same claims, butthis time naming the rest of the defendants as well. (Doc. 10, at 22-27). As with the original "Notice," Smithson contends that the "International Commercial Claim" document is a self-executing contract, and that the defendants' failure to respond to it constitutes their silent assent to be bound by its terms.
On August 6, 2015, Smithson began submitting invoices charging the defendants $250,000 per day of his incarceration, which began on July 13, 2015. (See, e.g., Doc. 1, at 26). He filed a collection of these invoices as exhibits to his original and amended complaints, and he has continued to intermittently submit them for filing in this action. (See, e.g., Doc. 10). His most recent invoice—the 349th such invoice—was filed on July 25, 2016, and purported to bill the defendants $5,250,000 for the period June 27, 2016, through July 17, 2016. (Doc. 78).
As an initial matter, we consider Smithson's motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. 23). By this motion, Smithson requests a preliminary injunction freezing all of the defendants' assets until this case is resolved. He claims that preliminary injunctive relief is necessary to prevent the defendants from "squandering" funds that they"no longer own" because they owe him approximately $100 million in damages under the purportedly self-executing "International Commercial Claim Contract." (See Doc. 23; see also Doc. 10, at 22-27 (purported contract)). But the Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that federal district courts have "no authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing [defendants] from disposing of their assets pending adjudication of [a plaintiff's] claim for money damages." Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 333 (1999). Accordingly, it is recommended that Smithson's motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 23) be denied.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen a civil complaint in which a prisoner is seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 230 Fed. App'x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it is "frivolous" or "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The Court has a similar obligation with respect to actionsbrought in forma pauperis and actions concerning prison conditions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). See generally Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008) ().
An action is "frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Thomas v. Barker, 371 F. Supp. 2d 636, 639 (M.D. Pa. 2005). To determine whether it is frivolous, a court must assess a complaint "from an objective standpoint in order to determine whether the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or clearly baseless factual contention." Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992)); Thomas, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 639. Factual allegations are "clearly baseless" if they are "fanciful," "fantastic," or "delusional." See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33. "[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them." Id. at 33. A district court is further permitted, in its sound discretion, to dismiss a claim "if it determines that the claim is oflittle or no weight, value, or importance, not worthy of serious consideration, or trivial." Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1089.
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1) or § 1915(e)(2) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brodzki v. Tribune Co., 481 Fed. App'x 705, 706 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010); Banks, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 588. "Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility." Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). Although the Court must accept the fact allegations in the complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). In deciding the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged on theface of the complaint, as well as "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
This action should be dismissed sua sponte as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and § 1915A(b)(1).
Smithson purports to bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. He appears to rely on § 1981 in the mistaken belief that it creates a federal cause of action for the making or enforcement of contracts in general. It does not. Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. See Boykin v. Bloomsburg Univ. of Pa., 893 F. Supp. 400, 406 (M.D. Pa. 1995). "To establish a right to relief under § 1981, a plaintiff must show (1) that he belongs to a racial minority; (2) 'an intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) discrimination concerning one or more of the activities enumerated in' § 1981, including the right to make and enforce contracts." Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548,569 (3d Cir. 2002). Smithson has not alleged racial discrimination, nor any interference with his right to make and enforce contracts. Moreover, all of the defendants in this action are state...
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