Smithwick v. Kulik
| Decision Date | 02 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | 2:18-CV-01057-MJH |
| Parties | JASMINE SMITHWICK, Plaintiff, v. DEPUTY DETECTIVE JARED KULIK, ACSO #212; AND LIEUTENANT JOHN KEARNEY, ACSO #011; Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff, Jasmine Smithwick ("Smithwick"), brings the within action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights under the United States Constitution and state law claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest, invasion of privacy, assault, battery, and illegal detention against Defendants, Deputy Detective Jared Kulik ("Kulik") and Lieutenant John Kearney ("Kearney"). Kulik and Kearney have a filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 7). After careful consideration of Smithwick's Complaint (ECF No. 1), Kulik and Kearney's Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support (ECF Nos. 7 and 8), Smithwick's Response in Opposition (ECF No. 11), the arguments of counsel, the Supplement submitted by Smithwick (ECF No. 14), and for the following reasons, Kulik and Kearney's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
On January 3, 2017, Kulik and Kearney arrested Smithwick for felony and misdemeanor possession of controlled substances during the execution of a bench warrant for her half-brother, Diaray Brown ("Brown"). (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 6 and 12). Smithwick shared a residence with Brown and other family members. Id. at ¶ 2. During the search for Brown, Kulik encountered Smithwick and her boyfriend, Devon Johnson in Smithwick's second-floor bedroom. Id. at ¶ 14. Johnson was shirtless and wearing only "long-john" underwear. Id. at 14. While they continued to look for Brown within the house, officers brought Smithwick and Johnson downstairs. (ECF No. 7-3)1. The officers requested that the adult individuals identify themselves, but Johnson persisted in giving a false name. Id. The officers then detained Johnson in order to positively identify him. Id. As Johnson was being escorted to the Sheriff's van, Kearney instructed Kulik to retrieve pants and a shirt from the second-floor bedroom. Id. Kulik located the sweatpants directly next to the bed where Johnson had been lying. Id. Upon picking up the sweatpants, Kulik felt a bulge in the right front pocket. Id. The bulge contained heroin, cocaine, and $400 cash. Id. Kulik seized the items and brought the sweatpants to Mr. Johnson. Id. Mr. Johnson denied that the sweatpants belonged to him. Id. Kulik then brought the sweatpants back into the house, and Kearney asked the occupants about the bedroom where they were found. Id. When asked by Kearney, Smithwick admitted that the bedroom belonged to her. Id. Kearney then instructed a detective to arrest Smithwick. Id.
Both Johnson and Smithwick were charged with felony Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance (35 P.S. § 780-113A30) and misdemeanor Possession of a Controlled Substance (35 P.S. § 780-113A16). (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 6 and ECF Nos. 7-2 and 7-4). The felony charges were later withdrawn, and both were arraigned on the remaining misdemeanor charges. Id. at ¶¶8-9. Johnson, who had several outstanding bench warrants, was also charged for false identification to law enforcement. (ECF No. 7-4).
Prior to a joint criminal trial, Smithwick orally joined Johnson's Motion to Suppress the evidence of the contents of the pants pocket, wherein they challenged the legitimacy of the search of the bedroom. (ECF No. 11-1). Judge Edward Borkowski denied that motion as to both criminal defendants. (ECF No. 14). Smithwick also filed an Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion to Dismiss which Judge Edward Borkowski granted, thereby dismissing all charges against her. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 11 and ECF No. 14). Johnson subsequently pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and false identification to a law enforcement officer. (ECF No. 7-4).
Defendants, Kulik and Kearney's, Motion to Dismiss argues that Smithwick fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in regards to her Section 1983 claims under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Kulik and Kearney also argue that any federal claims should be dismissed, based upon qualified immunity. As to the pendent state law claims, Kulik and Kearney anticipate dismissal of the federal claims, and thus ask this Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint,the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.2008)). "To survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Factual allegations of a complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A pleading party need not establish the elements of a prima facie case at this stage; the party must only "put forth allegations that 'raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s]."' Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Graff v. Subbiah Cardiology Associates, Ltd., 2008 WL 2312671 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2008)); see also Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir.2016) () (citing Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n. 1 (3d Cir.2014)).
Nonetheless, a court need not credit bald assertions, unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual averments. Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902, 906, n. 8 (3d Cir.1997). The primary question in deciding a motion to dismiss is notwhether the Plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but rather whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to establish the facts alleged in the complaint. Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir.2000). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to "streamline [ ] litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-327, (1989).
Finally, if the court decides to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must next decide whether leave to amend the complaint must be granted. The Court of Appeals has "instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236 (citing Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.2002)).
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Count A of the Complaint asserts Section 1983 claims for deprivation of Smithwick's rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 1). While Count A does not specify the types of Section1983 claims she is raising, Smithwick's Response Brief to the Motion to Dismiss clarifies that she is alleging claimsfor malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment and deprivation of her First Amendment rights. (ECF No. 11).
Smithwick argues that her arrest by Kulik and Kearney violated her First Amendment Rights, because she failed to implicate Johnson as the sole possessor of the subject sweatpants. Kulik and Kearny argue that that Smithwick has failed to state a claim for a retaliatory arrest, because her silence was not a constitutionally protected activity. "[A]s a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions, including criminal prosecutions, for speaking out." Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006) (citation omitted). To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff "'must prove (1) that [s]he engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the...
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