Smoak v. Liebherr-America, Inc., LIEBHERR-AMERIC

• Decision Date: 19 March 1984
• Docket Number: INC,No. 22085,LIEBHERR-AMERIC,22085
• Citation: 315 S.E.2d 116,281 S.C. 420
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Gerald C. SMOAK as Executor of the Estate of Vance Hudson, Formerly Vance Hudson d/b/a Vance Hudson Logging Company and Owsley & Sons, Inc., Respondents, v., and Lease-Afex, Inc., of whom Liebherr-America, Inc., is Appellant. Appeal of . Heard

Page 116

315 S.E.2d 116

281 S.C. 420

Gerald C. SMOAK as Executor of the Estate of Vance Hudson Formerly Vance Hudson d/b/a Vance Hudson Logging Company and Owsley & Sons, Inc., Respondents, v. LIEBHERR-AMERICA, INC., and Lease-Afex, Inc., of whom Liebherr-America, Inc., is Appellant Appeal of LIEBHERR-AMERICA, INC.

No. 22085.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard March 19, 1984.

Decided April 23, 1984.

Buist, Moore, Smythe & McGee, Charleston, for appellant.

Young, Clement, Rivers & Tisdale, Charleston, and Henderson & Shuford, Charlotte, N.C., for respondents.

NESS, Justice:

This is a products liability case. Essentially appellant, Liebherr-America, Inc., argues the jury's $98,000 verdict in favor of respondent, Gerald C. Smoak, et al., is unsupported by the evidence contained in the record, when considered in light of the theories of recovery submitted to the jury. We disagree and affirm.

In September 1977, respondent purchased a Liebherr-America, Inc. logging machine, equipped with an optional fire suppression system manufactured by Lease-Afex, a co-defendant who is no longer a party to this action. In November 1977, after appellant's representative installed a new fuel tank and heater in the machine, respondent reported the occurrence of two minor electrical fires originating in the heater's wiring. The wiring was subsequently repaired, and respondent reported no additional problems with the machine until February 1978, when the machine was completely consumed by a fire which allegedly began in the heater area.

At trial, after receiving instructions on the theories of negligence and breach of express and implied warranties, the jury returned a $98,000 verdict against appellant.

Appellant first contends the trial court erred in refusing to submit either a special interrogatory or special verdict form to the jury. We disagree.

The determination as to whether a special verdict should be submitted to the jury is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Love v. Oswald, 272 S.C. 347, 251 S.E.2d 766 (1979). See also S.C.Code Ann. § 15-33-30 (1976). Additionally, the record indicates the trial judge asked the respective attorneys for assistance in constructing a special verdict form to submit to the jury, but received none. We hold the trial court did not abuse his discretion in denying appellant's request.

Appellant next asserts the trial court erred in qualifying respondent's witness Smith, who testified, as an expert, as to the design defects of the fire suppression system. We disagree.

The qualification of a witness as an expert in a particular field is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Parks v. Morris Homes Corporation, 245 S.C. 461, 141 S.E.2d 129 (1965); Hanselmann v. McCardle, 275 S.C. 46, 267 S.E.2d 531 (1978). While we hold this contention of error is inappropriate as the adequacy of the design of the fire suppression system is no longer in issue, we find Smith had, through education and experience, acquired sufficient knowledge to testify as to design defects of the fire suppression system and hold the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in qualifying him as an expert.

Alternatively, appellant claims Smith's testimony provided insufficient evidence of probative value upon which to...