Smock v. State
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
| Writing for the Court | SULLIVAN. |
| Citation | Smock v. State, 766 N.E.2d 401 (Ind. App. 2002) |
| Decision Date | 20 March 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 89A01-0105-CR-191.,89A01-0105-CR-191. |
| Parties | Rodney SMOCK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
E. Thomas Kemp, Richmond, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
Following a jury trial, Rodney Smock was convicted of Murder,1 a felony, and being a habitual offender.2 Upon appeal, he presents two issues for our review:
(1) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence seized without a warrant, and
(2) whether the verdict form utilized during the habitual offender phase of the trial violated Article 1, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution.
We affirm.
The facts most favorable to the judgment reveal that in the late evening hours of March 22, 2000, officers from the Richmond Police Department were dispatched to Smock's apartment following a neighbor's report of a strong odor. Upon arriving at the apartment building, the complainant indicated that there was a strong odor in the air, which the officers could smell, and that he had not seen one of his neighbors in some time. The officers went to Smock's apartment and received no answer upon knocking on the front and back doors. Based upon the odor of decay and their concern about the well-being of someone inside Smock's apartment, the officers contacted their supervisors, including Captain Chris Wolski. After learning that people had been coming in and out of the apartment, Wolski used his pocketknife to unlock the door because he determined that it was necessary to gain entry into the apartment to see if someone inside needed help. Once inside, the four officers conducted a search of the apartment using their flashlights to see if anyone was inside. The final place searched by Wolski was a closet underneath the stairs, wherein the body of Tim Miller was found in a pile of clothes and bags which had been covered with paint, bleach, and other cleaners.
After finding the body, the officers secured the scene and waited for detectives and the coroner to arrive. Upon the arrival of detectives and the coroner, the officers re-entered Smock's apartment and from the kitchen gathered items of evidence, which were covered in dried blood. The items included a claw hammer, a lockblade knife, and a box cutter. The items were collected and packaged at approximately 4:15 a.m. on March 23, and later removed from the apartment. Around 8 a.m., a search warrant was obtained, after which officers conducted a further search of Smock's apartment, locating a knife in a drawer. The knife had also apparently been used in the attack upon Miller.
Upon learning that the police had found the body in his apartment, Smock, who had been living at Miller's apartment since Miller's death, fled to Union City and spent the weekend there in a motel. On March 27, Union City Police were called to the motel because of a disturbance caused by Smock. Smock had attempted to commit suicide by slitting his wrists and left arm. When the officers asked why Smock wanted to kill himself, he replied that he had killed someone in Richmond and that he was wanted by the police. In the motel room, the police also recovered a prescription bottle that belonged to Miller. Smock was then transported to a hospital for treatment.
Later that day, Detective Harold Raver of the Richmond Police Department was notified that Smock was being treated at Winchester Hospital. Raver went to the hospital and placed Smock under arrest for the murder of Miller. Smock was given his Miranda warnings at that time, and also again on March 29, before Raver conducted an interview and took a statement from Smock. Smock confessed in detail to the murder.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States requires a warrant be issued before a search of a home is conducted in order to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. Swanson v. State, 730 N.E.2d 205, 208 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. However, there are exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593, 597 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). The State bears the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement exists when a warrantless search is conducted. Swanson, 730 N.E.2d at 208. A well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is when exigent circumstances exist. Vitek v. State, 750 N.E.2d 346, 348-49 (Ind.2001), reh'g denied. Under the exigent circumstances exception, police may enter a residence if the situation suggests a reasonable belief that someone inside the residence is in need of aid. Id. at 349. The facts and circumstances of each warrantless search and seizure determine its validity. Robinson v. State, 730 N.E.2d 185, 192 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.
Smock asserts that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures because they entered his apartment and seized items without a warrant. The State counters that the officers could enter Smock's apartment under the exigent circumstances doctrine because of the odor present in the apartment building, the report that Smock had not been seen in some time, and the acknowledgement by neighbors that many people had come and gone from the apartment. The State reasons that these circumstances created the reasonable belief that someone may be in the apartment in need of aid. Smock contends that the odor of decay precluded the officers from possessing any belief that someone was in need of aid in the apartment. Rather, Smock contends that the facts show that a fatality had already occurred; therefore, no exigent circumstances existed, and the police should have obtained a warrant before entering the apartment.
No Indiana case has directly addressed the issue of whether the presence of a strong odor of decay may form the basis for the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement. However, in Vitek, our Supreme Court did rely upon United States v. Presler, 610 F.2d 1206 (4th Cir.1979), in upholding a warrantless entry of a home in search of a missing person. In Presler, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a warrantless entry of a home when the defendant's landlady had not seen him in some time and an unusual odor was emanating from his room. Likewise, in State v. Scott, 343 N.C. 313, 471 S.E.2d 605 (1996), the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of a crawl space under a house and the subsequent entry of the residence when a police officer noticed green flies and the smell of rotting flesh coming from the crawl space. Several other cases have similarly found that there was no violation of the warrant requirement when officers smelled the odor of decaying flesh and had further fears that someone may have been in the residence in need of aid. See State v. Epperson, 571 S.W.2d 260 (Mo.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909, 99 S.Ct. 2820, 61 L.Ed.2d 274 (1979); People v. McGee, 140 Ill.App.3d 677, 95 Ill.Dec. 218, 489 N.E.2d 439 (1986) (), appeal denied.
While we do not address whether the presence of the odor of decaying flesh in and of itself is enough to trigger the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, we hold that in this situation the officers did have a reasonable belief that someone may have been in need of immediate assistance. Just as in the above cited cases, the officers could smell the odor of decaying flesh. They were unable to make contact with anyone in the apartment through knocking. They had information that Smock had not been seen in some time. They were also told that many people had come and gone from the apartment, leading them to believe that someone could still be inside of the apartment alive but severely injured, or that someone may have been hiding in the apartment. Based upon the reasonableness of the officers' beliefs, no warrant was needed for the initial entry and search of Smock's apartment, which resulted in the discovery of Miller's body.
However, while no warrant was needed to enter Smock's apartment initially, the facts are clear that upon finding the body the officers did not remain inside the apartment, but exited the apartment to wait for the arrival of detectives and coroner. After detectives and the coroner arrived, the officers re-entered the apartment and seized items of evidence, including the claw hammer, a knife, and a box cutter, so that they would not be disturbed and contaminated by the individuals retrieving the body and to prevent someone from being accidentally injured by one of the knives. This seizure, upon re-entry of the apartment, did violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (); see also Middleton v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind.1999) ().
Here, as in Middleton, supra, the officers were originally upon the premises legitimately in response to exigent circumstances. Further, in Middleton, the officers left the premises but returned, re-entered and seized the items in controversy.
It is worthy of note that in Mincey,...
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...because the apparent death may turn out to be a barely surviving life, still to be saved." (Citations omitted.)); Smock v. State , 766 N.E.2d 401, 404–405 (Ind. App. 2002) (rejecting argument that odor of decay precluded belief that someone was in need of aid because such facts show that fa......
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Barker v. State
...was improper, admissions of evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment are subject to harmless error analysis. Smock v. State , 766 N.E.2d 401, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Jackson v. State , 669 N.E.2d 744, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ). Harmless error occurs when the conviction is sup......
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Table of Cases
...Smith, United States v., 73 F.3d 1414 (6th Cir. 1996) 72 Smith, United States v., 783 F.2d 648 (6th Cir. 1986) 139 Smock v. State, 766 N.E.2d 401 (Ind. App. 2002) 144 Snell, Commonwealth v., 705 N.E.2d 236 (Mass. 1999) 166 Snell, State v., 99 P.3d 191 (Mont. 2004) 152 Snook, United States v......
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...United States v. Stafford, 416 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2005) (odor of decaying flesh in home justified entry and search); Smock v. State, 766 N.E.2d 401 (Ind. App. 2002) (warrantless entry proper when officer smelled decaying flesh at the doorway); Cherry v. Commonwealth, 605 S.E.2d 297 (Va. Ap......