Smokowicz v. Graphic Packaging Int'l, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-5891 |
| Parties | MICHAEL D. SMOKOWICZ v. GRAPHIC PACKAGING INTERNATIONAL, INC. et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff, former employee Michael D. Smokowicz, brings a hybrid claim for breach of a Collective Bargaining Agreement and violation of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 et seq., against his former employer, defendant Graphic Packaging International, Inc., (Count I), and defendant AFL-CIO, CLC Local Union # 8071 (Count II), for failure to allow plaintiff to grieve his May 11, 2016 termination. He also brings a separate claim against Graphic Packaging for breach of his Last Chance Agreement (Count III).
Graphic Packaging filed a motion to dismiss Counts I and III against it, Dkt. No. 10, plaintiff responded, Dkt. No. 16, and Graphic Packaging replied, Dkt. No. 17. Defendant Union also filed a motion to dismiss the claim against it (Count II), Dkt. No. 15, to which plaintiff did not file a separate response. Under Local Rule 7.1(c), I am empowered to grant the Union's motion as uncontested.2 However, because plaintiff's response to Graphic Packaging's motionaddresses the legal issues discussed in the Union's brief, I will consider the merits of both motions.
After considering the parties' arguments, I will grant defendants' motions and dismiss the complaint. With respect to plaintiff's hybrid claims in Counts I and II, he has not pleaded sufficient facts showing that the Union breached its duty of fair representation as required to state a claim against either defendant. With respect to Count III, he has not stated a claim for breach of the Last Chance Agreement because he has not alleged facts showing that the agreement, on its own, gives him a right to continued employment.
On May 11, 2016, Graphic Packaging fired plaintiff "on the ostensible basis that he erred in shipping a pallet of Hershey Reese PB King Size packages" that were mislabeled "with SAP batch tags identifying it as a 8oz Kraft Cream Cheese." Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff petitioned the Union to protect his rights under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), but the Union refused to do so, advising him that he did not have the right to grieve Graphic Packaging's action under the terms of a "Last Chance Agreement" plaintiff had entered into in March 2013. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 18.
The Last Chance Agreement arose from an incident in which Graphic Packaging fired plaintiff for throwing a coating dolly at a co-worker. Compl. Ex. B. Plaintiff subsequently entered into the Last Chance Agreement with the Union and Graphic Packaging pursuant to which he returned to his job under certain conditions, including no back pay, loss of seniority and completion of a mandated counseling program. Compl. Ex. B. The Last Chance Agreementalso provided that plaintiff "will be terminated for his first failure to meet the any of terms [sic] or conditions outlined below" and that "[t]his agreement and any subsequent termination resulting from it will be non-grievable." Id. Finally, the agreement stated:
Compl. Ex. B (emphasis in original).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss all or part of an action for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Typically, "a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations," though plaintiff's obligation to state the grounds of entitlement to relief "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (citations omitted). A well-pleaded complaint may not be dismissed simply because "it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." Id. at 556. However, a complaint must provide "enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will revealevidence of" the necessary element. Id. at 556. The Court of Appeals has made clear that after Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009), quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court also set forth a two part-analysis for reviewing motions to dismiss in light of Twombly and Iqbal:
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief."
Id. at 210-11, quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that the Union's actions were arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith, as he must in order to state a hybrid § 301/fair representation claim against either Graphic Packaging or the Union. In a hybrid § 301/fair representation claim, a plaintiff suing either his employer or his union "must not only show that [his] discharge was contrary to the [CBA] but must also" demonstrate "breach of duty by the Union." DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983). This is so even for a claim against the employer alone. Id. It furthers the policy that, "[s]ubject to very limited judicial review, [a plaintiff] will be bound by the result [of the grievance process] according to the finality provisions of the [collective bargaining] agreement." Id. at 164. Thus even if, as plaintiff argues, the terms of the Last Chance Agreement do not eliminate his right under the CBA to have an arbitrator determinewhether he performed his job unsatisfactorily, see United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Lukens Steel Co., 969 F.2d 1468 (3d Cir. 1992), plaintiff must still allege facts showing breach of duty by the Union.
Because the grievance proceeding in which a union represents an employee can be binding, a union has a duty to "serve the interest of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 563 (1990). A union breaches its duty of fair representation if its actions are "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164. "A union's actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness . . . as to be irrational." Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). A union's actions are in bad faith where "the union and its representatives harbored animosity towards the employee; and . . . that animosity manifested itself as a material factor in the union's handling of the employee's grievance." Sterrett v. Giant Eagle, Inc., No. 14-235, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23304, *21-23 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2015).
A union's decision not to pursue a grievance it believes in good faith to be nonmeritorious is not a breach of its duty of fair representation. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192 (1967) ().
Rather, a union is obligated to exercise its power as bargaining agent fairly under the collective bargaining agreement and must not assert or press grievances that it believes in good faith do not warrant such action. . . . Accordingly, an employee is subject tothe union's discretionary power to settle or even to abandon a grievance, so long as it does not act arbitrarily, even if the employee's claim was meritorious. . . . Thus, proof that a union acted negligently or exercised poor judgment is not enough to support a claim that a union breached its duty of fair representation.
Abramowich v. CSX Transp., Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d 513, 522 (W.D. Pa. 2013), citing Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970).
Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that the Union's decision to abandon his grievance was based on anything other than its legal conclusion that the Last Chance Agreement precluded his claim. Rather, his allegations with respect to the Union's motive are "threadbare recitals of the elements of a...
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