Smookler v. Wheatfield Township

• Decision Date: 19 August 1975
• Docket Number: No. 11,11
• Citation: 232 N.W.2d 616,394 Mich. 574
• Parties: Bernard H. SMOOKLER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TOWNSHIP OF WHEATFIELD and Robert Smith, Supervisor thereof, Defendants-Appellants. 394 Mich. 574, 232 N.W.2d 616
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 616

232 N.W.2d 616

Bernard H. SMOOKLER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TOWNSHIP OF WHEATFIELD and Robert Smith, Supervisor thereof Defendants-Appellants.

No. 11.

394 Mich. 574, 232 N.W.2d 616

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Aug. 19, 1975.

Appeal from Court of Appeals.

Anderson, Green & McKay, P.C., M. Dale McKay, Lansing and Clan Crawford, Jr., Ann Arbor, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Church, Wyble, Kritselis & Tesseris by F. Merrill Wyble, Thomas H. Hay, Lansing, for defendants-appellants.

Before the Entire Bench except SWAINSON and LINDEMER, JJ.

LEVIN, Justice.

We affirm the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated in our opinion in Sabo v. Monroe Twp., 394 Mich. 531, 232 N.W.2d 584 (1975).

WILLIAMS, Justice.

This zoning appeal invites this Court to once again confront a facet of exclusionary zoning, this time the creation of a zoning classification without attaching it to any specific land. Such a zoning ordinance is, of course, invalid on its face, and this causes us to invalidate the zoning ordinance of the defendant township as exclusionary. ¹

I--FACTS

Plaintiffs purchased the subject property at the intersection of Jolly and Meridian Roads in Wheatfield Township in 1968. Two years later, they requested a zoning change from rural agricultural to mobile home park, with a strip 300 feet deep to be zoned commercial. Their property consists of 123 acres in Wheatfield Township, 90 acres of which are used presently for agriculture, and 1.5 acres rented to a tenant for residential use. The proposed site plan for this Wheatfield Acres Mobile-Home Park included 535 units, with a density of five units per acre.

As of the 1970 census, population of Wheatfield Township was 1,117, with 325 housing units. Testimony at trial was that only about 5% of the Township was developed. The township is approximately 36 square miles, or 18,297 acres, with three areas designated as residential. All are in the northern half of the township, one directly south of plaintiffs' property, one in the central part of the township, and the other closer to the easterly edge.

The property is located in the northwest corner of Wheatfield Township, about 1 mile north of I-96, two miles south of Grand River and about three or four miles diagonally southeast of a new shopping center. Adjacent to it on the north is a 43-acre parcel of land used for agriculture. From I-96 north to Grand River, the land is agricultural. South of the property is a residential development of sixteen half-acre lots, of which only nine are built upon. Those homes range between $35,000 and $40,000 in value. The owner of that subdivision owns 76 acres adjacent to it, but has not yet developed it. The remainder of that area is agricultural.

On the west, the property abuts Meridian Road. Another subdivision, this one in Meridian Township, is located across Meridian Road, just a little north of the property. Lots in that subdivision are approximately two acres large, and the homes are worth about $50,000. A third subdivision is located further west in Meridian Township along Jolly Road, with houses also in the upper-income category. There are no other developments in the vicinity of the parcel.

Wheatfield Township itself has thus far limited its commercial development to one gas station along I-96. It does not have its own police or fire department, relying on the Ingham County Sheriff's Department, and the State Police for police protection. The City of Williamston and Wheatfield Township participate together in providing fire services, with the volunteer fire department located five or six miles away from the subject property in Williamston. Residents of the proposed mobile-home park would send their children to school in Williamston.

There are no mobile-home parks in the township, and nothing else which can be characterized as low-cost housing. There has been discussion of possibly rezoning one area for high-density use, which would include mobile-home parks, but no action has been taken on this. [T 106-107]

The township does not have a master plan, although work apparently began on one after institution of the instant suit. The zoning ordinance was amended to permit operation of mobile-home parks within the township, but no district has been specifically zoned for that purpose. Instead, applications for zoning land for use as a mobile-home park are to be considered as they are received by the Township Board. All applications received for such zoning, including plaintiffs', have been rejected.

The Zoning and Planning Commission recommended denial of plaintiffs' application, and the Township Board followed this recommendation for the following reasons:

"(a) The area would be better suited for residential development,

"(b) added burden of police and fire protection,

"(c) added burden to schools,

"(d) no benefit to surrounding community." [34a]

At trial in Circuit Court, no testimony was offered that the land is worthless as zoned, but plaintiffs maintain the property would be more valuable as a mobile-home park and that the lack of growth of the subdivision to the south indicates that the area in question is not suitable for single-family residential development.

The parties stipulated that no traffic problem would be created by the proposed development, as the Ingham County Board of County Road Commissioners anticipated a traffic increase from 800 to between 1,500 and 1,800 cars per day, but that Jolly and Meridian Roads were each capable of handling 4,000 to 5,000 cars per day. No objection was made based on sanitary or sewage arrangements as any system had to be approved by the Michigan Department of Public Health and the Ingham County Road Commission.

The trial court found there was "not sufficient evidence to support Plaintiffs' contention that the Township had a preconceived scheme to eliminate or prohibit mobile home parks." [72a] Additionally the court found that plaintiffs proposed to "(a) double the population of the Township, (b) more than double the number of household units in the Township, (c) provide two parking places per mobile home unit, ¹ (sic) and do it all on approximately 100 acres of land." [73a-74a] These factors combined with the township's lack of police force and fire department, led the court to hold that it "cannot say that the action of the Township did not bear a real and substantial relationship to public health, safety, or the general welfare." [74a]

The Court of Appeals reversed in a per curiam opinion, 46 Mich.App. 162, 207 N.W.2d 464 (1973). Applying Bristow v. Woodhaven, 35 Mich.App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971) and Green v. Lima Twp., 40 Mich.App. 655, 199 N.W.2d 243 (1972), they found that the issue on appeal was whether defendant township had shown that "the needs of public health, safety, convenience, morals or general welfare of the local community far outweigh those of the public at large." 46 Mich.App. 162, 163, 207 N.W.2d 464. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's finding of facts did not meet this burden of proof, but rather related to "an increase in the burdens, economic and otherwise, on the township for future services. This type of economic justification for exclusionary zoning was rejected in Green, supra." 46 Mich.App. 162, 164, 207 N.W.2d 464, 465.

II--IS A TOWNSHIP ZONING ORDINANCE WHICH PROVIDES FOR A MOBILE-HOME-PARK CLASSIFICATION BUT PLACES NO LAND WITHIN THAT CLASSIFICATION VOID AS EXCLUSIONARY?

A. The Kropf Principle

In Kropf v. Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974), we stated that although, "The ordinance comes to us clothed with every presumption of validity" ² "that ... [a] reasonable governmental interest [is] being advanced by the present zoning classification ..." ³, "an ordinance which totally excludes from a municipality a use recognized by the Constitution or other laws of this State as legitimate also carries with it a strong taint of unlawful discrimination and a denial of equal protection of the law as to the excluded use." 391 Mich. 139, 156, 215 N.W.2d 179, 185. Therefore, when confronted with a regulation invalid on its face, it is not necessary for this Court to examine the reasonableness of the ordinance as applied to plaintiffs' land.

Kropf also disposed of the notion of a favored or preferred use as it affected the shifting of the burden of proof. We found this "concept and the attendant shifting of the burden of proof as to the constitutionality of an ordinance upon the municipality, rests upon no statutory or case law foundation in this State." 391 Mich. 139, 154, 215 N.W.2d 179, 185. Therefore, insofar as the Court of Appeals in the instant case applied this test, their decision was incorrect.

The zoning ordinance is, however, invalid because it fails to pass the test outlawing total exclusion of an otherwise permissible use.

B. Kropf Exclusionary Rule Applied to Instant Land

Plaintiffs have properly borne the burden of proof in demonstrating that the Wheatfield Township Zoning Ordinance Amendment No. 2, ⁴ purporting to permit mobile-home parks in the township is, in fact, exclusionary on its face.

Critical is the fact that there is no reference to any actual territory to which this zoning applies. The net result is that there is no land in the township zoned for mobile-home parks and consequently they are excluded.

C. Application of Other Existing Precedent

The fact situation presented by the instant case does not vary substantially from those this Court examined in the past. Therefore, we find no reason to disturb solid past precedent, and find the Wheatfield Township zoning ordinance invalid as it effectively excludes mobile home parks from the area.

Similar ordinances were expressly disapproved by this Court in cases including Gust v. Canton Twp., 337 Mich. 137, 59 N.W.2d 122 (1953); 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955); Dequindre Development Co. v. Charter Twp. of Warren, 359 Mich. 634, 103 N.W.2d 600 (1960); Smith v. Plymouth...