Smoot v. Smoot
| Decision Date | 12 June 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 841565,841565 |
| Citation | 233 Va. 435,357 S.E.2d 728 |
| Parties | Bernice Elizabeth Lam SMOOT v. Ronald Leo SMOOT. Record |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
William H. Ralston, Jr. (Nancy D. Poster; Moore, Jackson, Graves & Ralston, Harrisonburg, on brief), for appellant.
Paul J. Neal, Jr., Woodstock, for appellee.
Present: POFF, COMPTON, STEPHENSON, RUSSELL, and THOMAS, JJ., and COCHRAN, Retired Justice.
We consider two issues presented in a wife's appeal from a divorce decree: whether the chancellor erred in granting the husband a monetary award equal to his cash contribution to the construction of the marital home and whether the chancellor gave proper consideration to the fault ground of divorce in determining the equitable distribution award.
Ronald and Bernice Smoot were married in August 1975. No children were born of their marriage. While married, Ronald and Bernice both were employed as public school teachers, and their incomes were approximately equal.
Bernice had purchased a house in 1973, and Ronald and Bernice resided there following their marriage until 1981. That residence is titled solely in Bernice's name and Ronald agrees that it remains her separate property for purposes of this suit. Prior to the marriage, Bernice and another individual had acquired a joint tenancy in a 4 1/2-acre tract of land in Shenandoah County. Ronald purchased that individual's one-half interest for $1,000 and, prior to their marriage, Ronald and Bernice took title to that tract as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.
In 1977, Ronald and Bernice commenced construction of a new home on the 4 1/2-acre tract. Funding was obtained from two sources: a $25,000 construction loan secured by a deed of trust on the property, and $20,000 in cash contributed by Ronald. The $20,000 represented a portion of a settlement Ronald had received for an injury he sustained in an automobile accident two years before the marriage.
Construction of the home was completed in the spring of 1981. During the four-year period of construction, Bernice's salary was used to pay the parties' basic living expenses, while Ronald's earnings were spent primarily on construction bills.
Following an extended series of disputes between the parties and unsuccessful attempts at reconciliation, Ronald left the home on February 15, 1982. On February 23, 1983, he filed a bill of complaint seeking a no-fault divorce. Ronald's bill recited that he had used $20,000 of his personal injury settlement in the construction of the marital home; that he was obligated to repay his father $2,500 which he had borrowed in order to purchase appliances for the home; and that he had expended $2,765.06 for carpeting for the home. Ronald asked the court to award "separate property to the Complainant" in the amount of $25,265.06. Alternatively, he asked the court to award this amount to him "based upon the equities and pursuant to Code of Virginia Section 20-107.3" in the event the court concluded the sum was not separate property. Bernice filed an answer to the bill of complaint and a cross-bill seeking a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on the grounds of willful desertion and/or adultery.
The cause was referred to a commissioner in chancery. At the time of the commissioner's hearing in July 1983, the parties stipulated that the value of the residence was $89,000. After deducting the balance due on the deed of trust note, the couple had an equity of $67,359.42 in the home. The commissioner recommended that Ronald be awarded a no-fault divorce. The commissioner also recommended "that the marital domicile be sold and that out of the proceeds of said sale that the Complainant receive [$20,000] representing his contribution of separate property into the purchase and construction of said marital domicile, in addition to his equity in said real estate."
The chancellor sustained Bernice's exception to the commissioner's recommendation that Ronald be granted a divorce. Although the chancellor found Bernice's evidence insufficient to prove adultery, he agreed that she was entitled to a divorce on the ground of desertion. The chancellor overruled Bernice's exception to the commissioner's recommendation of a monetary award to Ronald, holding that Ronald was entitled to "a credit ... of $20,000 for funds contributed by him ... for construction of the improvements on the [4 1/2-acre] lot". Finding that Bernice was entitled to a credit of $1,991.46 for sums she had contributed and that the marital home was the only marital property subject to equitable distribution, the chancellor ruled that, after deducting the two credits from the equity in the marital home, "[t]he sum remaining shall accrue one-half each to the parties."
On appeal, Bernice argues that, by awarding Robert the $20,000 monetary award, the chancellor, in effect, classified the marital home as "part marital and part separate", and, Bernice says, such a classification is not permitted by Virginia's equitable distribution statute. She notes that, in his letter opinion, the chancellor discussed the case of Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982). There the Court of Appeals of Maryland applied the "source of funds" doctrine to determine the parties' rights with respect to marital property purchased in part with separate funds. Construing the Maryland statute, the Harper court explained:
Under [the source of funds] theory, when property is acquired by an expenditure of both nonmarital and marital property, the property is characterized as part nonmarital and part marital. Thus, a spouse contributing nonmarital property is entitled to an interest in the property in the ratio of the nonmarital investment to the total nonmarital and marital investment in the property. The remaining property is characterized as marital property and its value is subject to equitable distribution.
We agree with Bernice that Virginia's equitable distribution statute does not adopt the source of funds doctrine as explained and applied in Harper. Under Code § 20-107.3, * the chancellor is directed first, to determine the legal title to all the real and personal property of the parties and to classify it as separate property or as marital property; second, to determine the value of that property; and, third, to make an equitable distribution of all property classified as marital property. As a tool to facilitate an equitable (as distinguished from an equal) distribution of marital property, the chancellor is authorized to weigh the equities of the parties and to make a monetary award. In his determination of the monetary award, the chancellor is required to consider the 11 factors enumerated in subsection (E) of the statute. See Robinette v. Robinette, 4 Va.App. 123, 129-130, 354 S.E.2d 808, 811 (1987).
Unlike the Maryland statute as construed by the Harper court, Code § 20-107.3 contemplates only two kinds of property--marital property and separate property, each expressly defined. Our statute does not recognize a hybrid species of property. The discrete definitions are reinforced by the statutory rule that "[a]ll property acquired ... during the marriage ... is presumed to be marital property", Code § 20-107.3(A)(2)(ii), and by the proviso in § 20-107.3(A)(1) that all property acquired after the marriage in exchange for separate property becomes marital property unless, during the marriage, it is "maintained as separate property."
We construe the definitions, the presumption, and the proviso to evince legislative intent that when, as here, a spouse fails to segregate and instead, commingles, separate property with marital property, the chancellor must classify the commingled property as marital property subject to equitable distribution. See In re Marriage of Smith, 86 Ill.2d 518, 531-32, 56 Ill.Dec. 693, 699-700, 427 N.E.2d 1239, 1245-46 (1981) (); but see In re Marriage of Mayzner, 144 Ill.App.3d 645, 648-49, 494 N.E.2d 615, 617-18 (1986) ().
Although we agree with Bernice that the marital home cannot be classified as part marital and part separate, we reject her further contention that the chancellor's order granting a monetary award to Ronald was grounded in an application of the source of funds doctrine. In a comprehensive letter opinion, the chancellor noted that "the marital home is marital property", that "both parties are deemed to have rights and interests in this marital property", and that those rights and interests are to be used "as a consideration in determining a monetary award, if any". Next, the chancellor observed that, pursuant to subsection (D) of the statute, the court was authorized to grant either party a monetary award computed after consideration of the 11 factors listed in subsection (E). The chancellor then proceeded to discuss those factors seriatim.
Concerning the second factor, which directs the court to consider the monetary and nonmonetary contributions of each spouse "in the acquisition and care and maintenance of ... marital property", the chancellor found that although other contributions made by the parties "to the well-being of the family unit were equal", Bernice and Ronald were entitled to a "credit" for the monetary contributions each had made to the acquisition and maintenance of the marital home. "To hold otherwise," he said, "would totally ignore [the second] factor."
An objective reading of the letter opinion and the final decree shows that the chancellor did not apply the source of funds doctrine as defined in Harper. Rather, he merely discussed the rationale in that case as a useful analogy in his construction of Virginia's ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Whiting v. Whiting
...on other grounds, 86 N.C.App. 546, 358 S.E.2d 571 (1987); Little v. Little, 74 N.C.App. 12, 327 S.E.2d 283 (1985); Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987). See generally 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 529 at 538 (1986); L. Golden, Equitable Distribution of Property § 1.08 (1983); J. Gregor......
-
Leake v. Taylor, Record No. 0737-09-4 (Va. App. 3/30/2010), Record No. 0737-09-4.
...fails to support the findings of fact underlying [the] resolution of the conflict in the equities . . . ." Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 443, 357 S.E.2d 728, 732 (1987). Also, determining whether credible evidence exists, the appellate court does not retry the facts, reweigh the preponderanc......
-
Ranney v. Ranney
..."the chancellor is necessarily vested with broad discretion in the discharge of the duties the statute imposes." Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 443, 357 S.E.2d 728, 732 (1987). Considering all of the circumstances of this case, we hold that the trial court did not err either in classifying th......
-
Delanoy v. Delanoy
...or "that the evidence fails to support the findings of fact underlying [the] resolution of the conflict." Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 443, 357 S.E.2d 728, 732 (1987).1. SUNTRUST ACCOUNT 5678 (HUSBAND'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 2) In his second assignment of error, husband challenges the circuit......
-
§ 11.02 Transmutation by Agreement; Transmutation by Use
...Meason v. Meason, 717 P.2d 1165 (Okla. App. 1985). Rhode Island: Quinn v. Quinn, 512 A.2d 848 (R.I. 1986). Virginia: Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987); Roane v. Roane, 12 Va. App. 989, 407 S.E.2d 698 (1991). Wisconsin: Trattles v. Trattles, 126 Wis.2d 219, 376 N.W.2d 379 (W......
-
§ 7.05 Using Marital Funds to Pay a Premarital Mortgage or Using Separate Funds to Pay a Mortgage Loan Obtained During Marriage
...v. N.G., 412 A.2d 333 (Del. 1980). Maryland: Gravenstine v. Gravenstine, 58 Md. App. 158, 472 A.2d 1001 (1984). Virginia: Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987); Va. Code § 20-107.3(3) (d). [188] See § 3.02 supra.[189] In re Marriage of Lattig, 318 N.W.2d 811 (Iowa App. 1982).[1......
-
§ 7.01 Property Acquired with Contemporaneous Separate and Marital Property Consideration
...but an extensive reimbursement system was established to compensate the separate estate for its contribution. [12] See Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987). This rule may also apply in South Carolina. See Barrett v. Barrett, 290 S.C. 453, 351 S.E.2d 177 (S.C. App. 1986).[13] F......