Smylie v. Pearsall
| Citation | 93 Idaho 188,457 P.2d 427 |
| Decision Date | 27 June 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 10237,10237 |
| Parties | Mabel R. SMYLIE, a widow, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Oliver R. PEARSALL and Agnes O. Pearsall, his wife; Earl L. Palmer and Gladys Palmer, his wife; the State of Idaho; Bonner County, a Political Subdivision of the State of Idaho; and All of the Unknown Owners of and Unknown Claimants to all or any Part of the Following Described Real Estate Situate in Bonner County, Idaho, to-wit: Lots 6 and 7 of Paradise Point Lake Lots according to the Plat thereof recorded in Book 1 of Plats, , records of Bonner County, Idaho, together with that part of the banks and shores of Priest Lake, if any, lying Westerly of said lots and between the East-West boundary line on the North side of said Lot 6 as extended West to the original natural or ordinary high water mark of Priest Lake, and the East-West boundary line on the South side of said Lot 7 as extended West to the original natural or ordinary high water mark of Priest Lake, together with all riparian or littoral rights pertaining and belonging thereto, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Idaho |
Greene & Hunt, Sandpoint, and Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, by E. Glenn Harmon, Spokane, Wash., for appellant.
Everett D. Hofmeister, Sandpoint, and Edmund T. Brigham, Newport, Wash., for appellees.
This case was tried before District Judge Cogswell, sitting without a jury. On September 13, 1954, plaintiff Mabel R. Smylie purchased lots 6 and 7 of Paradise Point Lake Lots according to the plat thereof recorded in Bonner County. On June 13, 1958, defendant Pearsall purchased lots 8 and 9 of the Paradise Point Lake Lots according to the same recorded plat. The original common owners of all the lots under whose direction they were platted in 1945 were Mr. and Mrs. Earl L. Palmer. Neither they nor Mr. Arthur Tiggelbeck, the original surveyor, appeared at the trial.
At the time Paradise Point was platted, a small irregular and triangular shaped parcel of ground lying westerly of lot 7 owned by the plaintiff, and northerly of lot 8 owned by the defendants, was left unplatted and not included within the confines of the lot lines of either lot. This parcel of ground is the land in controversy in this action and abuts Priest Lake as the westerly terminus of a driveway as shown on the plat lying between lots 7 and 8, 11 and 12.
From the testimony presented, and from the court's personal observation of the property in question, it appeared that the disputed area is rocky and steep, sloping northerly from a high area along the north side of lot 8 to the cove on Priest Lake westerly of lot 7. The only flat space on the disputed tract lies next to the line on the southwest boundary of lot 7 shown as being 38 feet long and running N 30 0 W. This flat space provides enough room to launch a boat. This flat area would increase the value of either lot 7 or lot 8 as the only property in close proximity where boats could be launched into the lake. The rocky area near the launching site provides a suitable area for a dock and boat moorage in a protective cove.
Most of the trial was devoted to the efforts of plaintiff and defendant to show that each had gained ownership of the disputed parcel by adverse possession. The respective activities of each party over the years are excellently summarized in the court's findings of fact VIII, IX, X and XI. It is sufficient to state here that the court found that neither party had met the requirements of adverse possession. This finding disposed of the main factual issue in the case.
The principal legal issue in the case stems from plaintiff Smylie's argument that the east-west lines of her lot 7 must be extended westward to the ordinary high water mark of the lake, thus including within her ownership most of the disputed area. On the other hand, defendant Pearsall claimed all of the disputed area on the basis of a quitclaim deed to the area which he acquired in 1964 from the Palmers as original owners.
The court disposed of both of these contentions by finding that, since the plat as recorded contained a space, namely, the disputed parcel, forming no part of the platted lots, that parcel of land respresented by the excluded space was dedicated to the public use. Though the county records contain no formal dedication, the dedication is presumed from the plat, and no evidence was presented to rebut the presumption. The short from deeds by which the parties took title to their lots refer only to the plat. As a matter of geography, the court found that the disputed parcel forms a natural boat launching and landing area at the terminus of the driveway which was marked on the plat. Moreover, several of the Paradise Point lot owners used the parcel as such. Since the disputed parcel was thus dedicated to the public by the Palmers upon the recording of the plat, Smylie's lot line may not be there extended and the subsequent quitclaim deed from the Palmers cannot be effective.
The court thus quieted plaintiff's title to all of lots 6 and 7 extended to the ordinary high water mark, excepting only that portion marked as the disputed area on plaintiff's exhibit above and described as follows:
'A tract of land in Bonner County, Idaho, lying north of and adjoining, Lot 8 of Paradise Point, Lake Lots (10 July 1945); (1 Plats p. 179), more particularly described as follows:
beginning at the northeast corner of above Lot 8; thence running due north 10 feet, across the west end of the right of way shown on the south line of Lot 7, on above plat, to the southwest corner of above Lot 7;
thence northwesterly along the southwesterly side of above Lot 7 (N 30 W), 28 feet, to a point (marked by an iron stake);
thence westerly along the mean high water line of Priest Lake to a point 5 feet due north of the northwest corner of Lot 8 in above plat;
thence due south 5 feet to the northwest corner of above Lot 8;
thence easterly, along the north line of above Lot 8, about 75.6 feet, to the northeast corner of above Lot 8, the point of beginning;
together with all riparian and littoral rights belonging to or in any manner appertaining to the parcel above described.'
The court further denied damage claims of both parties and directed that each party bear its own costs. Only plaintiff Smylie has appealed, while defendant Pearsall filed no brief and made no appearance in the appeal.
This case presents a conflict in the operation of two rather distinct legal principles. On the one hand, the district court concluded that the open space on the Paradise Point plat corresponding to the small parcel of disputed land must constitute '* * * a common law dedication * * *.' When an owner of land plats the land, files the plat for record, and sells lots by reference to the recorded plat, a dedication of public areas indicated by the plat is accomplished. This dedication is irrevocable except by statutory process. The original owner and platter of such land is estopped to deny the dedication of public areas indicated on the plat. One purpose of this doctrine is to protect the interests of purchasers of platted lots in their reliance upon the valuable maintenance of such public areas. 1
On the other hand, appellant argues that the whole of the surveyed broken line at the western end of her lot 7 is a meander line. As such, that line is not a boundary but rather is merely a surveyor's line of convenience which roughly indicates the contour of the water and determines the portion of the lot for which a purchaser will pay. In contemplation of law, appellant contends, the owner of such a lot actually owns all the land between the sidelines extended to the ordinary high water mark of the water body. In thus claiming ownership of most of the disputed parcel, appellant relies upon other early Idaho cases among other authorities. 2
On the basis of the reasons and authority which follow, we are convinced that the line of reasoning adopted by the district court must carry. Appellant's main objection to the conclusion of the district court is that the finding of public dedication is based upon cases in which the plats contained spaces actually labeled or named as streets. Appellant would distinguish the situation at bar because the disputed area is not actually labeled on the plat as a public landing, for example.
We do not view the absence of a written designation in specific spaces on the plat as always foreclosing the possibility of a public dedication of the areas so represented. It has been recognized that the original owner's intent to accomplish such a dedication may be inferred from other circumstances. In City of Los Angeles v. McCollum, 3 the owner recorded an irregular plat of lots and certain marked and unmarked strips. It was held that an unmarked portion of one of the strips was dedicated as a street according to the character of the strip on the plat and because it represented the continuation of an existing street and supplied access to another named street.
A case quite similar to the case at bar was Cassell v. Reeves. 4 There a tract of land along Herrington Lake was platted as 'Daughters Park' into 102 lots. These lots, intended for use as summer cottage sites, were sold with reference to the plat. Teo lakeshore lots at the end of 'Spring View Avenue' were left unnumbered. The larger part of this space was along the shore and was conceded to be a public area for access to the lake. The smaller portion over which a dispute arose was used by the public as a parking area in connection with the shore portion. These spaces were not named on the plat. The court held that the entire area represented by the unlabeled spaces on the plat had been dedicated to the public:
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