Snead v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 07 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 0044-22-3 |
| Parties | JACOB THOMAS SNEAD v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY Stacey W. Moreau Judge
Joseph A. Sanzone (Sanzone & Baker, L.L.P., on brief), for appellant.
William K. Hamilton, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Malveaux, Athey and Callins Judges.
The Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County ("trial court") convicted Jacob Thomas Snead ("Snead") of aggravated involuntary manslaughter in connection with a motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of his passenger, Daniel Adams ("Adams"). Snead contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. He also assigns error to the admission of his hospital records which included his blood alcohol test results as well as the admission of the expert testimony of a toxicologist based on those results. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.
On the night of January 30, 2021, Snead consumed several twelve-ounce beers. At approximately 2:25 a.m., Snead failed to recognize a curve in the road, continued straight, struck two road signs, careened down an embankment, and crashed into a tree. Within "two minutes," Ryan Allen ("Allen") and Amber Conard ("Conard"), a couple who lived nearby, heard the crash and ran to Snead's vehicle where they found Snead and Adams unconscious inside the vehicle. Conard called 911.
Trooper W. McCraw ("McCraw") arrived at 2:53 a.m. and attempted to question Snead and Adams. They were still inside the car and unable to respond. Adams was subsequently declared dead at the scene of the accident by emergency personnel, and Snead was transported to the local hospital for treatment. At trial, McCraw testified that the grassy shoulder of the road near the crash bore a light coating of snow. He also photographed and measured the tire tracks in the grass from the edge of the road to the crash site and testified that the tire tracks began just as the road curved left and continued straight for 220 feet to the crash site. He also found two damaged road signs along the path of the tire tracks, the first of which was a VDOT yellow marker signaling the oncoming curve. He found the first sign approximately 171 feet from where the car left the road, and another 27 feet later he found the second sign. McCraw further observed that no snow accumulation was on the road near the crash but there was "a crusty slush on it," forcing him to drive to the scene "at a reduced speed."
Snead arrived at the emergency room at approximately 4:32 a.m. Emergency room personnel performed a blood test, and Snead's "serum" blood alcohol concentration ("BAC") was .20 %. Several hours later, Snead submitted to a urinalysis and tested positive for amphetamines and benzodiazepine.
McCraw testified that Snead's last memory prior to the accident was being at Adams's house at midnight but that Snead did remember consuming "four to five twelve-ounce Bud Light beers" before he drove to Adams's house at 10:30 p.m. Snead also remembered having taken his prescription medication, buprenorphine that day as well.
Dr. Wright, a forensic toxicologist, testified that when she converted Snead's "serum" blood alcohol test results to "whole blood" alcohol results,[1] Snead's "whole blood" BAC was between 0.16 and 0.18 at the time of testing. Dr. Wright also opined that Snead's "whole blood" BAC at the time of the accident was 0.2. She testified that a 0.2 BAC level would negatively impact Snead's ability to drive by interfering with "the critical judgment . . . and . . . the motor skills . . . needed to react to different stimuli[,] . . . stay into [sic] the lanes or react to the speed and the distance between objects." Dr. Wright also noted that, "at night, visual acuity m[ight] become an issue."[2]
The trial court subsequently reasoned that Snead "chose to drive a vehicle after consuming alcohol in poor [weather] conditions" and that the "slushy" road conditions and poor visibility from falling snow required extra care, as demonstrated by McCraw's reduced speed en route to the scene. The trial court also determined that based on the tire tracks and the collision with the two road signs, Snead drove "straight," with "no braking [and] no indication that [he] tried to stop the vehicle." Moreover, the trial court found the extensive damage to the front end of the car indicated that Snead was not "going very slow" when he struck the tree. The trial court expressly excluded consideration of the positive urinalysis indicating drug use, but did find that, even excluding those drugs and, assuming Snead's BAC was at the lower end of Dr. Wright's estimate, Snead acted with a "gross wanton culpable disregard for human life" when he decided to drive in an impaired condition because "a sober person would have gone slower." The trial court also specifically found that the blood test results were reliable, stressing that Snead's physicians relied on them to treat him. Accordingly, the trial court found Snead guilty of aggravated involuntary manslaughter. Snead appeals.
"Decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence 'lie within the trial court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.'" Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 69 Va.App. 692, 697 (2019) (quoting Michels v. Commonwealth, 47 Va.App. 461, 465 (2006)). "Whether the foundation is sufficient to properly establish the chain of custody is a question within the sound discretion of the trial court." Anderson v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 469, 479 (2007). "[T]he admissibility of expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that court's decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Midgette v. Commonwealth, 69 Va.App. 362, 375 (2018) (alteration in original).
"When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, '[t]he judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va.App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). "In such cases, '[t]he Court does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). "Rather, the relevant question is whether 'any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). "If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, 'the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.'" McGowan, 72 Va.App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va.App. 149, 161 (2018)).
Snead argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the blood alcohol results contained in his hospital records because there was insufficient evidence presented on the chain of custody of the blood test and therefore the evidence was unreliable. We disagree.
"Although the Commonwealth is required to demonstrate evidence supporting every 'vital link in the chain of custody' when introducing the results of chemical analysis of physical evidence items, 'the burden is not absolute that "all possibility of tampering" be eliminated.'" Pope v. Commonwealth, 60 Va.App. 486, 511 (2012) (quoting Robinson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 136, 138 (1971)). "Moreover, '[a]ll that is required . . . to establish a chain of custody is that the Commonwealth's evidence "afford reasonable assurance that the exhibits at trial are the same and in the same condition as they were when first obtained."'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 121 (1987)). "Where there is mere speculation that contamination or tampering could have occurred, it is not an abuse of discretion to admit the evidence and let what doubt there may be go to the weight to be given the evidence." Brown v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 552, 556 (1996) (quoting Reedy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va.App. 386, 391 (1990)).
Here, the trial court found that the blood test results were reliable, noting that Snead's health care providers had relied on them to treat him. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized, "[t]here is good reason to treat a hospital record entry as trustworthy." Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355, 361 (4th Cir. 1962). The court stressed that "[h]uman life will often depend on the accuracy of the entry," and held that "it is reasonable to presume that a hospital is staffed with personnel who competently perform their day-to-day tasks." Id. Accordingly, the court held that "hospital records are deserving of a presumption of accuracy even more than other types of business entries."[3] Id.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Snead's blood test results and hospital records without further chain of custody foundation.[4] This finding is consistent with our ruling in Stevens v. Commonwealth, 46 Va.App. 234, 246 (2005), where Stevens similarly argued that though the rule against hearsay did not bar admission of a hospital toxicology report, the Commonwealth had laid insufficient foundation for its admission. There we concluded that the lower court had not abused its...
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