Snead v. State, 665, Sept. Term, 2014.
| Decision Date | 30 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 665, Sept. Term, 2014.,665, Sept. Term, 2014. |
| Parties | Maynard SNEAD v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Appellant is Pro Se.
Brian S. Kleinbord (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: WOODWARD, KEHOE, ARTHUR, JJ.
Pursuant to Md. Code , § 8–301 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“C.P.”), a person convicted of a crime may file a petition for writ of actual innocence “if the person claims that there is newly discovered evidence that,” among other things, “creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been different, as that standard has been judicially determined[.]” C.P. § 8–301(a)(1).
Maynard Snead, a prisoner proceeding pro se, petitioned for a writ of actual innocence in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. On April 22, 2014, the court dismissed his petition without a hearing. The court relied on this Court's opinion in Keyes v. State, 215 Md.App. 660, 673, 84 A.3d 141cert. denied, 438 Md. 144, 91 A.3d 614 (2014), which affirmed the dismissal of a petition without a hearing where the newly-discovered evidence would merely have impeached the testimony of a witness for the prosecution. Snead appealed.
While the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in State v. Hunt and Hardy, 443 Md. 238, 116 A.3d 477 (2015). In that case, the Court of Appeals re-affirmed its decision in Douglas and Curtis v. State, 423 Md. 156, 31 A.3d 250 (2011), that if a petition for a writ of actual innocence substantially complies with the relevant pleading requirements, a court may not deny the petition without a hearing. In reaching its decision, the Court stated that, even after a hearing on the merits, a petition is not necessarily doomed because it relies on evidence that “merely impeaches” a witness, as opposed to evidence that directly exculpates a criminal defendant. See Hunt, 443 Md. at 260, 116 A.3d 477. In so doing, the Court implied that a court should not dismiss a petition because it cites evidence that “merely impeaches” a witness, but does not directly exculpate the defendant. See id.
Because the circuit court dismissed Snead's petition on account of his failure to meet a standard that no longer appears to apply, we vacate the order that dismissed his petition and remand for further proceedings.
On December 22, 1998, a man pointed a semi-automatic handgun into a crowd of people standing at a bus stop on the 2400 block of East Fayette Street in Baltimore City. He fired several shots, hitting three persons. One of the victims, Timothy Thornton, recognized the shooter as someone he had previously seen in the neighborhood. Later, Thornton positively identified Snead from a photo array as the shooter.
Snead was charged with attempted murder and other offenses related to the incident.1 He made a number of discovery requests, including a motion to produce documents and a motion for disclosure of exculpatory oral communications. At trial, Thornton testified that Snead was the person who shot him.
On May 25, 2000, a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted Snead of assault in the first degree, openly carrying a handgun, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, possession of a regulated firearm by a person with a disqualifying conviction, and three counts of reckless endangerment. The court sentenced Snead to an aggregate prison term of 35 years. This Court later affirmed his convictions in an unreported opinion. Snead v. State, No. 680, Sept. Term 2000 (filed May 7, 2001). The Court of Appeals denied a petition for certiorari.
In 2009, Snead petitioned for post-conviction relief. The circuit court denied that petition in 2012, and this Court denied his application for leave to appeal in 2013.2
On April 1, 2014, Snead filed a petition for writ of actual innocence, proceeding pro se in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Snead claimed that he did not commit the crimes for which he was convicted and that there was newly-discovered evidence that created a substantial or significant possibility that the result of his trial would have been different had the evidence been discovered before his trial.
Snead attached a set of documents as exhibits to his petition. All but one of the documents are database entries3 made by Detective Raymond Hunter of the Baltimore City Police Department. The reports document Detective Hunter's investigation of the December 1998 shooting and, in particular, his conversations with the victim, Thornton, between February and October 1999.
According to Detective Hunter's reports, Thornton advised the detective on February 22, 1999, that the person who shot him “hangs at the corner of Collington and Jefferson streets” and wears “an army fatigue jacket.” One report states:
On 25 Feb 1999 @ 1930 hrs, this detective spoke with the victim Timothy Thornton. Same advised this detective that he saw the person who shot him at the corner of Collington and Jefferson Street wearing a black sweat suit. Same also provided this detective with the street name O.G. for the suspect....
Another report states that the detective received additional information from Thornton on February 27, 1999. According to Thornton, one Leroy Milton, a person who was present at the shooting but not one of the victims, told Thornton that the shooter had been arrested outside of a bar on the previous day.
In his petition, Snead alleged that these reports came into his possession when they were accidentally included during discovery in connection with a separate prosecution “long after this case was adjudicated.” Snead alleged that he was incarcerated in February 1999, when the witnesses claimed to have seen the shooter, and thus he could not have been at either of the locations cited in the detective's notes. According to Snead, therefore, this evidence showed that Thornton and Milton identified someone other than Snead as the shooter.4
Snead further alleged that, at his trial, Detective Hunter had testified that Thornton never informed him that he had spotted the person who shot him. Snead also alleged that, according to the detective, Thornton did not provide a description of the shooter's appearance. Snead argued that the detective's undisclosed reports were “exculpatory to the extent that they show [Snead] could not have been the shooter and/or that perjury was committed to gain th[e] conviction[.]”5
The State did not file a response to Snead's petition. On April 16, 2014, the circuit court issued an order stating that Snead's petition failed to describe newly-discovered evidence. The court concluded that “the newly discovered evidence alleged by the Petitioner has no ‘direct bearing on the merits of the trial under review,’ Keyes v. State, 215 Md.App. 660, 673 (2014), citing Jackson v. State, 164 Md.App. 679, 698, 884 A.2d 694 (2005).” Consequently, the court dismissed Snead's petition, without a hearing, pursuant to C.P. § 8–301(e)(2), for failure to assert grounds upon which the petition could be granted.
On April 22, 2014, Snead noted a timely appeal from that order.
Snead's appeal presents a single question: Did the circuit court err in dismissing the petition for writ of actual innocence without a hearing?6
In concluding that the evidence described in Snead's petition did not meet the standard for “newly discovered evidence,” the court relied on a line of cases that the Court of Appeals has since limited. In light of the Court's opinion in State v. Hunt and Hardy, 443 Md. 238, 116 A.3d 477 (2015), we vacate the circuit court's order and remand for further proceedings.
In criminal cases in a Maryland circuit court, a defendant may move for a new trial within ten days after a verdict. Md. Rule 4–331(a). After that ten-day period has passed, a court may “grant a new trial or other appropriate relief on the ground of newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence” within ten days after the verdict. Md. Rule 4–331(c). Generally, a person must move for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence within one year after the court's imposition of sentence or after the date the court receives a mandate issued by the final appellate court to consider a direct appeal from the judgment, whichever is later. Md. Rule 4–331(c)(1).
A petition for writ of actual innocence is a collateral, civil proceeding through which a criminal defendant may, at any time, challenge his or her conviction, sentence, or imprisonment. State v. Seward, 220 Md.App. 1, 16–17, 102 A.3d 798 (2014), cert. granted, 441 Md. 666, 109 A.3d 665 (2015). The authorizing statute provides:
An actual innocence petition must: “(1) be in writing; (2) state in detail the grounds on which the petition is based; (3) describe the newly discovered evidence; (4) contain or be accompanied by a request for hearing if a hearing is sought; and (5) distinguish the newly discovered evidence claimed in the petition” from evidence claimed in any prior petition for actual innocence. C.P. § 8–301(b). For petitions filed on or after October 1, 2011, Rule 4–332 sets forth a number...
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