Snedigar v. Hoddersen
| Citation | 786 P.2d 781,114 Wn.2d 153 |
| Decision Date | 22 February 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 56214-8,56214-8 |
| Parties | Richard W. SNEDIGAR, Respondent, v. Guerry HODDERSEN, 1 a single person; Clara Fraser, a single person; Valerie Carlson, a single person; Tom Boot, a single person; Yolanda Alaniz, a single person; Fred Hyde, a single person; Gloria Martin, a single person; Sam C. Deaderick and Jane Doe Deaderick, husband and wife; Douglas K. Barnes, a single person; and Eldon Durham, a single person; d/b/a Freedom Socialist Party, an unincorporated association, Petitioners. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Clara Fraser, Seattle, pro se.
Valerie Carlson, Frederick Hyde, Jr., Smith, Midgley & Pumplin, Daniel Smith, Seattle (Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, Leonard Boudin, New York City, of counsel), for petitioners.
Bovy, Wampold & Munro, Thomas Wampold, Michelle Pailthorp, Seattle, for respondent.
Nat. Lawyers Guild, Paul Parker, Janet Varon, Seattle, amici curiae for petitioners Nat. Lawyers Guild.
Bricklin & Gendler, Michael Gendler, Seattle, amici curiae for petitioners American Civ. Liberties Union.
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of a discovery order requiring a political organization to disclose minutes of some of its meetings.
The principal defendant in this case is the Freedom Socialist Party (hereafter referred to as the Party). To use the Party's own description of itself, it is a socialist feminist national political party engaged in organizing for the rights of women, unionists, racial minorities, lesbians and gays, and for the civil liberties of political dissenters. The Party was founded in Seattle in 1966. Richard W. Snedigar, the plaintiff herein, was an active member of the Party from 1974 to 1980. During that period, the Party rented its headquarters in Freeway Hall from Ivar Haglund. In November 1978, Haglund served the Party with an eviction notice. The Party declared an emergency and began soliciting funds in order to buy or rent a new building. In response, plaintiff refinanced his home and contributed $22,500. This was in June of 1979. By letter, the Party thanked him for contributing to the "Emergency Eviction Fund." Plaintiff also helped in the search for a new headquarters. The Party was able to negotiate lease extensions and did not relocate until July 1985.
Plaintiff resigned from the Party in September 1980, largely because no new hall had yet been purchased with the eviction fund. In 1981, plaintiff asked a party member to return his $22,500 donation, but was told that such a refund was out of the question. In a letter dated July 12, 1983, plaintiff demanded that his money be returned. The Party refused the demand.
Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages against the Party and 10 of its members on January 16, 1984. The Party denied plaintiff's claims and filed counterclaims. The Party then moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Party's motion for summary judgment on two causes of action, but did not dismiss plaintiff's claims for breach of The plaintiff embarked on a course of pretrial discovery in accordance with the Superior Court Civil Rules. In March of 1985, plaintiff moved for an order compelling discovery. The trial court granted his motion, with the provisothat names of Party members and contributors need not be disclosed. Plaintiff then moved to compel compliance with this order. The trial court granted the motion and ordered the Party to produce all information previously requested and requested in the future.
contract, void contract, misrepresentation, conditional gift, undue influence and constructive trust.
The Court of Appeals granted discretionary review of the order and ultimately held that it was overly broad. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court and directed it to weigh plaintiff's need for information against the harm claimed by the Party. The trial court also was directed to conduct in camera hearings, if necessary, and to issue any appropriate protective orders.
After remand, in October of 1985, plaintiff requested the production of minutes of Party meetings having to do with the finding, location and search for an alternate to Freeway Hall as well as all minutes referring to the emergency. When the Party objected to these requests as unconstitutional infringements upon its rights of association, privacy and free speech, plaintiff moved to compel the Party to comply with his requests. The trial court granted the motion, and ordered the Party to produce the minutes with members' names deleted or submit them to the court for an in camera hearing. Both this court and the Court of Appeals denied discretionary review of that order.
The Party refused to comply with the order on constitutional grounds. On plaintiff's motion for sanctions, the trial court imposed an order of default against the Party and dismissed its counterclaims. Then later, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a default judgment against the Party.
The Party appealed to the Court of Appeals, challenging the discovery order and the trial court's refusal to grant We are here presented with two issues.
summary judgment as to all of plaintiff's claims. In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the partial summary judgment and discovery orders, but vacated the default order and directed the trial court to reconsider whether the sanctions of default and dismissal were necessary. 2 The Party then sought discretionary review in this court of the Court of Appeals' analysis regarding the discovery and default orders
ISSUE ONE. Did the Court of Appeals correctly evaluate the parties' competing interests in assessing the constitutionality of the discovery order?
ISSUE TWO. Did the Court of Appeals err by remanding the default judgment to the Superior Court for reconsideration rather than reversing it outright?
ISSUE ONE.
CONCLUSION. The Court of Appeals properly held that once an association resisting discovery has shown that disclosure of associational materials would infringe on its First Amendment rights, the party seeking discovery must establish the relevancy and materiality of the information sought, and show that there are no reasonable alternative sources for the information. If this burden is met, the trial court must balance the competing interests. It is our view, however, that the Court of Appeals was not correct when it required an initial showing of actual infringement on First Amendment rights. The party asserting the First Amendment associational privilege is only required to show some probability that the requested disclosure will harm its First Amendment rights.
CR 26, which contains general provisions governing discovery in civil cases, provides that parties may not obtain discovery of privileged information. 3 While a First Amendment associational privilege to discovery requests does exist, that privilege is not absolute. 4 Under some circumstances, disclosure of associational information may permissibly be compelled. 5
Courts generally hold that to assert an associational privilege, a party must show that its First Amendment rights will be chilled by the requested disclosure. 6 If such a showing is made, the court must then balance this First Amendment claim against the opposing party's need for the information sought. 7
The analytical framework set forth by the Court of Appeals in its opinion is consistent with this analysis. The court held that once the party resisting discovery has shown that disclosure would infringe on its First Amendment rights, the party seeking discovery must establish the relevancy and materiality of the information sought, and make a showing that reasonable efforts to obtain the information elsewhere have been unsuccessful. If this burden is met, the trial court must then balance the parties' competing claims of privilege and need, perhaps via an in camera examination of the requested information. 8 In adopting this framework, the Court of Appeals relied on federal case law and on this court's analysis in State v. Rinaldo, 102 Wash.2d 749, 689 P.2d 392 (1984) and Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash.2d 148, 641 P.2d 1180 (1982). Rinaldo and Senear held that to defeat the qualified privilege for news reporters in a civil or criminal proceeding, the party seeking discovery must show (1) the claim is meritorious; (2) the information sought is necessary to the cause of action pleaded; and (3) a reasonable effort has been made to acquire the desired information by other means. 9
The Party's principal complaint in this court is with the Court of Appeals' articulation of the threshold showing required to successfully assert an associational privilege. The Court of Appeals held that the party asserting the privilege must show that disclosure would in fact impinge on First Amendment rights. 10 As support for such a strong threshold showing, that court cited Wilkinson v. FBI, 111 F.R.D. 432 (C.D.Cal.1986).
In Wilkinson, a civil rights activist sought to use the associational privilege as a blanket bar to discovery of some 240 boxes of documents, tapes and microfilm. 11 The federal trial court held that, as a threshold matter, the activist had not shown that the privilege should apply. In other cases applying the privilege, the challenged discovery was a specific request for membership or contributor lists. 12 We do not read the Wilkinson requirement of "some showing" as direct support for the requirement of the Court of Appeals that there be a showing of "infringement in fact" on associational activities.
The Court of Appeals also cited Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, ...
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