Snell v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.
| Decision Date | 22 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-427,MONTANA-DAKOTA,81-427 |
| Citation | 198 Mont. 56,39 St.Rep. 763,643 P.2d 841 |
| Parties | , 32 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 193 Levi James SNELL, Petitioner and Appellant, v.UTILITIES COMPANY and the Human Rights Commission of the State of Montana, Respondents and Respondents. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
James E. Terry, St. Louis, Mo., for petitioner and appellant.
Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Jack Ramirez, Billings, Frederick F. Sherwood, Helena, for respondents and respondents.
Petitioner appeals from a judgment in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, affirming the decision of the Human Rights Commission (Commission) and dismissing petitioner's employment discrimination action against Montana-Dakota Utilities Company (MDU). We affirm the District Court.
Petitioner presents the following issues for review:
(1) Did the District Court apply the proper standards of review in affirming the findings of the hearing examiner and the Commission?
(2) Are the findings of the hearing examiner adopted by the Human Rights Division and affirmed by the District Court supported by substantial evidence or are they "clearly erroneous?"
Petitioner, a Native American, worked as a serviceman fitter and welder for MDU in Wolf Point and Poplar, Montana, from July of 1973 until late September of 1976, when he resigned. He subsequently filed an employment discrimination complaint with the Commission, under section 49-2-501, MCA, alleging that racial harassment had forced his resignation, and seeking compensation for lost wages.
Petitioner's complaint was heard on December 21, 1979, before a hearing examiner appointed by the Commission. Witnesses appeared for both petitioner and MDU.
Petitioner testified that his foreman, Howard Hveem, pressured and criticized him unjustly, took tools from the truck and blamed him, handled machines in ways that endangered him, ignorantly criticized his welding technique, and directed veiled racial slurs at him by making derogatory comments about blacks, and references to Hveem's own youthful clashes with "Assiniboines." According to petitioner, his complaints to his superiors went unheeded until he quit his job rather than risk a violent confrontation. At that point, Hveem was replaced as foreman by Jack Sprague, who, upon petitioner's return to work, made efforts to assure petitioner's satisfaction with working conditions, and to socialize with him at work. Petitioner claimed that within a few weeks of Hveem's replacement, the rest of the crew "took up for" Hveem, and began to ostracize him. He said they would bunch together in the coffee room, exchanging derogatory jokes about Indians, and using such words as "fucking Indian" and "blanket ass." The jokes and comments were not obviously addressed to him, he said, but he was only a few yards away, the only Indian in the room. He said the coffee room door was slammed in his face. He claimed the harassment occurred several times a week until he resigned, although he reported it to his foreman, Sprague. Petitioner said he was particularly reluctant to confront his co-workers because he had twice served time for assault, and was determined not to risk a conflict that could result in his being imprisoned again. He claimed the strain was beginning to undermine his health at the time he resigned. Finally, petitioner claimed that when he applied for unemployment compensation, he indicated discrimination was the reason for his resignation. He presented no evidence to corroborate that claim.
Petitioner's co-workers and supervisors-those appearing for petitioner as well as those appearing for MDU-testified without exception that they had not observed, participated in or heard of any racially-motivated harassment of petitioner; he had not complained to them of racial slurs by fellow workers or discriminatory practices by the company. Their testimony presents an uncontradicted description of petitioner as a quiet loner, a good welder and valuable employee, toward whom his co-workers and supervisors felt no racial animus. Witnesses agreed that some MDU machinery moved quickly and could be suddenly and unexpectedly dangerous. But no one had witnessed any near miss they believed to be directed at petitioner by Hveem, nor had petitioner filed any "near miss report." Several men testified that petitioner had made them aware of his unwillingness to work with Hveem because Hveem's loud criticism made him nervous; not one said petitioner had mentioned that Hveem showed bias against Indians. Hveem himself agreed that he disapproved of petitioner because of petitioner's reluctance to do "the pick and shovel work," preferring welding. MDU supervisors testified that, subsequent to petitioner's complaining about Hveem, the foreman was replaced, not because of any racist behavior on Hveem's part, but because of his health and his difficulty handling his supervisory position. The supervisors also indicated that MDU has an active affirmative action program and instructs its management personnel that racial discrimination is not to be condoned.
There was general agreement among MDU employees that rough language and joking are common among MDU crews, and that many jokes are told, some about such ethnic groups as North Dakotans, Blacks, Norwegians, Poles, and Indians. But they all agreed, including an Indian crew member, and others whose ethnic groups had been the butt of jokes, that there was neither malice nor viciousness in the jokes, and that the jokes were not directed at petitioner. They testified, also, that the coffee room was airconditioned, although the rest of the warehouse was not, and during hot weather someone was always getting up and slamming the door shut. No one recalled the door being deliberately slammed in petitioner's face, as he claimed.
Several of petitioner's supervisors testified that he or his wife had indicated dissatisfaction with his salary precipitated his resignation, and that petitioner had never told them he resigned because of racial harassment.
The hearing examiner, on June 25, 1980, entered extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, here included in relevant part:
The hearing examiner concluded that foreman Hveem's actions "did not reflect racial animus;" that the jokes and profanity among co-workers "did not show racial harassment directed to the Charging Party but was conversation normally associated with construction workers;" that petitioner did not bring the alleged racial slurs and discriminatory treatment to the attention of MDU management; and finally, that charging party's resignation was due to a salary dispute, not racial harassment.
Petitioner filed exceptions to the hearing examiner's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On November 21, 1980, the Commission heard the exceptions, adopted the hearing examiner's findings and conclusions, and dismissed petitioner's complaint. Petitioner requested judicial review in the First Judicial District Court, pursuant to § 2-4-702, MCA, and oral argument was heard on March 24, 1981. Additional briefs were filed. On June 30, 1981, the District Court affirmed the decision of the Commission and dismissed petitioner's complaint.
The District Court opinion emphasized that "(a)lthough petitioner is seeking judicial review on grounds (a) through (f) of § 2-4-704, MCA no contention is made except as to subdivision (e), i.e., that the decision of the administrative agency is 'clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record' ..." The District Court, relying upon section 2-4-704(2), MCA, ("the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact,") and upon similar language in Martinez v. Yellowstone County Welfare Department (1981), Mont., 626 P.2d 242, 38 St.Rep. 474, concluded that the commissioner's decision was amply supported by evidence and testimony. Petitioner appeals.
We note Martinez' reference to federal case law arising under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The Montana Human Rights Act, Title 49, MCA, is closely modeled after Title VII, and reference to pertinent federal case law is both...
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