Snell v. Neville

• Decision Date: 25 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-2018,19-2018
• Citation: 998 F.3d 474
• Parties: Emory SNELL, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Thomas NEVILLE, Patricia Ruze, Massachusetts Department of Correction, Carol Mici, Stephanie Collins, Lois Russo, Dale Bissonnette, Douglas Demoura, Jeffrey J. Quick, Monserrate Quinones, and Joann Lynds, Defendants, Appellees, Thomas Dickhaut, Superintendent, Thomas A. Groblewski, Greg A. Poladian, Theresa Smith, Robert Conley, Clesely M. Garcia, Philip H. Kong, Kevin Anahory, Gene Chaission, John A. Belair, Thomas Demoura, Jane Roe, and John Doe, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

998 F.3d 474

Emory SNELL, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v. Thomas NEVILLE, Patricia Ruze, Massachusetts Department of Correction, Carol Mici, Stephanie Collins, Lois Russo, Dale Bissonnette, Douglas Demoura, Jeffrey J. Quick, Monserrate Quinones, and Joann Lynds, Defendants, Appellees,Thomas Dickhaut, Superintendent, Thomas A. Groblewski, Greg A. Poladian, Theresa Smith, Robert Conley, Clesely M. Garcia, Philip H. Kong, Kevin Anahory, Gene Chaission, John A. Belair, Thomas Demoura, Jane Roe, and John Doe, Defendants.

No. 19-2018

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

May 25, 2021

Lucas I. Silva, with whom Sommer Wiss, Andrew C. Yost, and Foley Lardner LLP, Boston, MA, were on brief, for appellant.

Mary Eiro-Bartevyan, Department of Correction Legal Division, Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General for appellees Thomas Neville, Massachusetts Department of Correction, Carol Mici, Stephanie Collins, Lois Russo, Dale Bissonnette, Douglas Demoura, Jeffrey Quick, Monserrate Quinones, and Joann Lynds.

George J. Puddister IV, with whom Victor J. Koufman and Koufam & Frederick, LLP, Boston, MA, were on brief, for appellee Patricia Ruze.

Before Thompson and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.^*

THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

Americans are reputedly a litigious bunch, and Emory Snell, an inmate at MCI-Concord in Massachusetts, has greatly aided in keeping the federal and state judiciaries busy. In this lawsuit, one of at least 170 he has filed challenging his conviction and his prison conditions, Snell's legal focus is on a first-floor Lexis Nexis terminal and typewriter (collectively "the first-floor Terminal" or "the Terminal") where he spent two plus years conducting legal research and cranking out legal documents.¹ Regrettably for Snell, prison officials nixed his habit upon learning he was using the resources without a diagnosed disability preventing him from climbing stairs to the second-floor law library. Not appreciating this purported lack of accommodation, Snell sued various prison officials as well as the Massachusetts Department of Correction (collectively, "DOC defendants"), and his prison physician, Dr. Patricia Ruze, for injunctive and declaratory relief and damages. Finding no merit to Snell's complaint, the district court granted summary judgment to all defendants. See Snell v. Mici, No. 16-cv-11643-DJC, 2019 WL 4303264 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2019). Snell appeals part of that order alleging several claims of error.² Espying none, we affirm.³

Background

In order to understand the legal issues addressed in our decision, we find it necessary to provide the reader with a detailed background of events which triggered this appeal. Therefore, we ask the reader's patience as we soldier through the facts.

When a party appeals from a district court's grant of summary judgment, we describe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (here, Snell), so far, at least, as a reasonable review of the record obliges. See Nunes v. Mass. Dept. of Corr., 766 F.3d 136, 138 (1st Cir. 2014) ; see also Santiago–Ramos v. Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica de Puerto Rico, AEE, 834 F.3d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Chaloult v. Interstate Brands Corp., 540 F.3d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 2008) ("drawing all inferences in" the non-movant's favor)).

The Accommodation Process and Two-Tiered Library at MCI-Concord

After a jury convicted Snell of the first-degree murder of his wife in 1995, he began serving a life without parole sentence in the Massachusetts prison system, eventually landing at the facility known as MCI-Concord in 2010. See Commonwealth v. Snell, 428 Mass. 766, 705 N.E.2d 236, 238-39 (1999). Snell arrived there in less than stellar health. Amongst other ailments, he suffered knee and back pain, and had degenerative joint disease which limited his body's range of motion.⁴ A walking cane facilitated his mobility. In consequence, upon his confinement, he began to seek ways to better manage and endure his terms of incarceration. Therefore, before delving into the details of Snell's particular claims, some background on MCI-Concord's protocols for servicing prisoners with physical disabilities is in order.

During the time period relevant to this appeal, incarcerated persons like Snell had a couple of avenues to attain relief. First, inmates could seek reasonable accommodations from prison officials if they had physical or mental health disabilities which prevented them from engaging in the standard routines of prison life, such as a prison education or technical training program. See 103 DOC 620, https://www.mass.gov/doc/doc-620-special-health-care-practices/download; 103 DOC 408.07, https://www.mass.gov/doc/doc-408-reasonable-accommodations-for-inmates/download.⁵ For example, an individual with hearing loss could request a hearing aid or a person with walking difficulties could request a wheelchair. An inmate did not need to have a medically documented disability to apply for such a reasonable accommodation. See 103 DOC 620.

Second, inmates could also seek a "medical restriction" from a medical professional. For instance, if a prison physician advised an inmate not to climb stairs because such movement would be harmful to the person's health, the inmate would have a "no-stairs" medical restriction. A medical restriction traditionally lasted for a maximum of one year, after which a physician would have to renew it. But prison officials did accord indefinite restrictions in some instances for individuals diagnosed with long-term disabilities. A medical restriction, though, did not automatically translate into an accommodation.

MCI-Concord followed prison regulations promulgated by the Department of Correction when deciding whether to grant a reasonable accommodation to an inmate, and Snell does not contend MCI-Concord ignored them. Inmates could request accommodations by: (1) asking any DOC staff member; (2) filling out a written accommodation request; or (3) asking medical staff for a restriction that the DOC defendants could translate into an accommodation. See 103 DOC 408.07(8). One of the DOC defendants, the facility's American with Disabilities Act ("ADA")⁶ coordinator, reviewed such requests, filed written proof of the accommodation (if granted), and provided written proof of the accommodation directly to the requesting inmate. The regulations required the DOC defendants to "[e]nsure that appropriate documentation concerning an inmate's reasonable accommodation(s) is maintained" in their records. 103 DOC 408.05.

For requests related to medical needs, such as not climbing stairs, the ADA coordinator almost always consulted with medical staff before providing or denying the accommodation in writing. While the DOC defendants ordinarily deferred to a medical professional's judgment about what inmates needed, there were limits built into the regulations. Before implementing a requested accommodation, the DOC defendants, ever mindful of their overarching responsibility to maintain order and security within the prison confines, weighed risks including ensuring accommodations did not appear to give unfair preferential treatment to any particular inmate. See 103 DOC 408.07(8).

The accommodation process mattered to Snell because of the prison layout. MCI-Concord has two libraries: the general library on the first floor, and, as mentioned, the law library on the second floor. The latter housed several Lexis Nexis terminals and typewriters for inmate use. The general library on the first floor also had the Terminal (which, recall, includes a typewriter), but DOC defendants installed that station as an accommodation for inmates with documented medical restrictions which hampered their ability to reach the second floor.⁷ With few exceptions, even inmates with medical restrictions other than a no-stairs restriction did not have (or should not have had) an accommodation to access the Terminal according to prison rules.⁸ By prison formality, the librarian (who oversaw both the first floor and second-floor libraries) was charged with verifying an inmate's documented accommodation before permitting use of the Terminal. Without the appropriate accommodation, according to prison rules, the inmate should not have been allowed use of the Terminal.

An Inmate's Litigious Medical History

Soon after arriving at MCI-Concord, Snell's persistent health problems caused him to complain about having to climb stairs to get to various areas within the prison, including the law library. He sought (but did not get) a reasonable accommodation from prison officials to use the first-floor Terminal.⁹ The denial baffled Snell because when he was housed at a prior facility, he had been given an indefinite medical restriction for bottom tier housing (meaning he could reside in rooms on the first floor). The authorizing doctor reasoned Snell needed a bottom tier allowance because of his trouble negotiating stairs. From Snell's vantage, an indefinite bottom tier restriction and a no-stairs restriction were the same. However, DOC defendants clarified (in a deposition for this suit) that even prisoners with bottom tier restrictions ordinarily had to scale stairs; only prisoners with specific no-stairs restrictions could avoid the climb.

Of import here, Snell maintains DOC defendants, specifically MCI-Concord's ADA coordinator, did in fact grant him a reasonable accommodation to use the first-floor Terminal at some point prior to July 2013 because of his problems climbing stairs. However, Snell has never produced any documentation to verify that he ever had such an accommodation.¹⁰ The DOC defendants say that's because in the timeframe pertinent to this litigation, he didn't.

Stair mobility issues aside, Snell had other troubles. Various maladies, aches, and pains brought Snell to Dr. Ruze, his prison physician, up to fifteen times a year. By her thinking, Snell had obesity, a condition which she deemed a primary cause of his degenerative joint disease and likely a contributor...