Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 August 2019
• Docket Number: SC 19929
• Citation: 212 A.3d 646,332 Conn. 720
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Brenda SNELL v. NORWALK YELLOW CAB, INC., et al.

332 Conn. 720

212 A.3d 646

Brenda SNELL

v.NORWALK YELLOW CAB, INC., et al.

SC 19929

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 13, 2018

Officially released August 13, 2019

Adam J. Blank, Stamford, with whom was Sarah Gleason, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Laura Pascale Zaino, Hartford, with whom were Gregory S. Kimmel, Westport, and, on the brief, Kevin M. Roche, Hartford, Logan A. Carducci and Zachary M. Dunn, Hartford, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

Jeffrey R. Babbin, New Haven, and Christopher P. Kriesen, Hartford, filed a brief for the Connecticut Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Palmer, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

PALMER, J.

The plaintiff, Brenda Snell, brought this negligence action against the defendants, Johnley Sainval, a taxicab driver, his employer, Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc. (Yellow Cab), and Vito Bochicchio, Jr., the sole shareholder of Yellow Cab, seeking damages for serious injuries she sustained when she was struck by a taxicab that had been stolen from Sainval by two teenagers after Sainval left the vehicle unattended with the key in the ignition in a Norwalk neighborhood known to have a higher than average crime rate. A jury trial ensued at which the defendants claimed, inter alia, that the conduct of the two thieves was a superseding cause that relieved Sainval of any liability to the plaintiff for his alleged negligence. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury, in response to interrogatories submitted to it by the trial court, found that Sainval was negligent in leaving the taxicab unattended with the key in the ignition; that, in light of the surrounding neighborhood, it was reasonably foreseeable that the vehicle would be stolen and operated in an unsafe manner; and that Sainval's negligence was a proximate cause of some or all of the plaintiff's injuries. The jury also found, nevertheless, that the defendants were not liable for the plaintiff's injuries because the accident that occurred was not within the scope of the risk created by Sainval's negligence.

The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial claiming, inter alia, that the jury's finding that Sainval's negligence constituted a proximate cause of the accident was legally inconsistent with its finding that the accident was outside the scope of the risk created by Sainval's negligence. The court denied the motion and rendered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict. The plaintiff then appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that (1) it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury on the doctrine of superseding cause, (2) even if the doctrine were properly submitted to the jury, the court's instructions and interrogatories misled the jury, and (3) the trial court improperly denied the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial on the ground that the jury's verdict was irreconcilable with its responses to the interrogatories. Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc. , 172 Conn. App. 38, 41, 158 A.3d 787 (2017). The Appellate Court rejected the plaintiff's claims; id., at 41–42, 158 A.3d 787 ; and we granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: (1) "Did the Appellate Court correctly determine that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed on the basis that the doctrine of superseding cause applies in cases in which the conduct of a third party is criminally reckless?" Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc. , 325 Conn. 927, 927–28, 169 A.3d 232 (2017). And (2) "Did the Appellate Court correctly determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial?" Id., at 928, 169 A.3d 232. Although we answer the first question in the affirmative, we answer the second in the negative and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history. "On December 3, 2009, Sainval, who was employed by Yellow Cab as a taxicab driver, was operating a taxicab owned by Yellow Cab in Norwalk. In the early evening, he drove the taxicab to Monterey Village, a housing complex located in an area of the city with significant criminal activity. Sainval parked the taxicab and went inside one of the apartments, leaving the taxicab unlocked and unattended with the keys in the ignition.

"Two teenagers, Shaquille Johnson and Deondre Bowden, who that afternoon had been consuming alcohol and smoking marijuana, noticed the parked taxicab. Although they initially intended to steal anything of value that they could find inside the unlocked taxicab, once they observed the keys in the ignition, the two teens decided to steal the taxicab and to go on a ‘joy-ride.’ They drove the taxicab from Norwalk to Stamford, making one brief stop in between, with each of the teens taking a turn driving the vehicle.

"When they reached Stamford, they [encountered] traffic. At that time, Bowden was driving the taxicab. He ‘kind of nodded off’ and rear-ended the vehicle in front of him. Bowden, who was both ‘tipsy’ and ‘high,’ then attempted to flee the scene. In order to maneuver the taxicab around the vehicle he had struck, Bowden drove the taxicab up over the curb of the road and onto the adjoining sidewalk. In doing so, Bowden first hit a fire hydrant before striking the plaintiff with the taxicab.

"The plaintiff sustained severe physical injuries, particularly to her midsection, requiring millions of dollars in medical expenditures as of the time of trial, with additional treatments and surgeries expected. After hitting the plaintiff, Bowden never attempted to stop the vehicle; he and Johnson exited the stolen taxicab while it was still moving and fled the scene on foot, returning home by train. The police later identified the teens as the individuals involved in the hit and run of the plaintiff and arrested them.¹

"The plaintiff initially commenced this action solely against Sainval and Yellow Cab.² Johnson and Bowden were not named by the plaintiff as defendants in the civil action. Although the defendants filed an apportionment complaint against the two teens, the court later granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the apportionment complaint, agreeing with the plaintiff that apportionment was unavailable in the present case because the misconduct of the teenagers was not pleaded as mere negligence but as reckless or intentional conduct. See General Statutes § 52-572h (o ) (‘there shall be no apportionment of liability or damages between parties liable for negligence and parties liable on any basis other than negligence including, but not limited to, intentional, wanton or reckless misconduct’); Allard v. Liberty Oil Equipment Co. , 253 Conn. 787, 801, 756 A.2d 237 (2000) (recognizing that § 52-575h [o] was enacted to expressly overrule in part Bhinder v. Sun Co. , 246 Conn. 223, 234, 717 A.2d 202 [1998], in which [this court] had recognized [common-law] extension of statutory apportionment liability for parties whose conduct was reckless, wilful and wanton).

"The operative second amended complaint contains two counts relevant to the issues on appeal.³ Count one sounds in negligence against Sainval. According to the plaintiff, Sainval acted negligently by leaving his taxicab in an unguarded public parking lot in a high crime area with the keys in the ignition, which created the reasonably foreseeable risk that the taxicab would be stolen and that a thief would drive the taxicab in an unsafe manner and cause injury to a person or to property. Count two alleges that Yellow Cab was vicariously liable for Sainval's negligence on a theory of respondeat superior. Prior to trial, Yellow Cab conceded that it would be liable to the same extent that Sainval was found liable on count one.

"In their amended answer, the defendants, by way of a special defense, raised the doctrine of superseding cause. The defendants pleaded that, ‘[i]f the plaintiff sustained the injuries and losses as alleged in her complaint, said injuries and losses were the result of the intentional, criminal, reckless and/or negligent conduct of a third party, which intervened to break the chain of causation between [Sainval's] alleged negligence and/or carelessness and the plaintiff's alleged injuries and losses.’ " (Footnotes altered; footnote in original, footnotes omitted.) Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc. , supra, 172 Conn. App. at 42–45, 158 A.3d 787.

"[T]he court initially indicated to the parties that it was not inclined to give a superseding cause instruction to the jury because, on the basis of its reading of ... Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc. , [263 Conn. 424, 820 A.2d 258 (2003) ], superseding cause was no longer part of our tort jurisprudence except in limited circumstances, specifically, cases involving either an intervening intentional tort, act of nature, or criminal event that was unforeseeable to the defendant. The court suggested that the exception was not at issue in the present case because, under the plaintiff's theory of liability, the intervening theft of the car was entirely foreseeable.

"The defendants, however, argued that the court was focusing on the wrong criminal act. They indicated that it was not necessarily the theft of the taxicab in this case that warranted an instruction on superseding cause but the unforeseeability of the thieves' subsequent criminal conduct, namely, intentionally driving the taxicab up onto a sidewalk to evade responsibility for a rear-end collision and the ensuing criminal assault on the plaintiff. Furthermore, the defendants noted that part of the court's rationale in Barry for abandoning the doctrine of superseding cause in cases alleging that an intervening negligent act or acts contributed to a plaintiff's injuries was that apportionment of liability between tortfeasors was...