Snell v. Welch

• Decision Date: 14 July 1903
• Citation: 72 P. 988,28 Mont. 482
• Parties: SNELL v. WELCH, Superintendent of Public Instruction, et al.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

72 P. 988

28 Mont. 482

SNELL v. WELCH, Superintendent of Public Instruction, et al.

Supreme Court of Montana

July 14, 1903

Appeal from District Court, Lewis and Clarke County; J. M. Clements Judge.

Suit by Chas. H. Snell against W. W. Welch and others, members of the textbook commission of Montana. From an order restraining defendants from proceeding under an act of the Legislature defendants appeal. Appeal dismissed.

Jas Donovan, Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Robt. B. Smith, E. A. Carleton, and Edward Horsky, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before the court upon the appeal of the defendants from an order enjoining them "from proceeding or acting under a certain act of the Eighth Legislative Assembly of the state of Montana, to wit, senate bill No. 84, entitled 'An act to create a state text-book commission for the purpose of adopting and maintaining a uniform series of text books for the public schools of Montana; to regulate the price of same; define the duties and powers of said commission and appropriating a sum of money named therein for the expenses of said commission,' approved March 7, 1903 or from receiving any bid or bids, or letting any contract or contracts, for the furnishing of public school textbooks under said act, unless they shall receive, consider, and treat any and all bids which may be offered for the furnishing of said textbooks, or from awarding any contract or contracts therefor, irrespective of whether the bidder or bidders attach to said books the union label or not." The act referred to is entitled as stated in the above order and provides, among other things, that "all text books shall bear the union label." It is certain from statements made by counsel for appellants and respondents respectively, to this court, during the argument, that the defendants, after service of the injunction order, at the time and place prescribed in the act, met for the purpose of letting all necessary contracts for the awarding of which the meeting was held under the law, and did let the same; the letting of all being done in the way and manner satisfactory to both appellants and respondents, and then adjourned. There is nothing in this case now for us to decide. It has been disposed of by the parties themselves pending the appeal. If the defendants (appellants here) desired to have the court consider and decide the questions involved in the case, they might have adjourned from...