Snell v. Wyman, No. 67 Civ. 2676.
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Writing for the Court | KAUFMAN, Circuit , and METZNER and FRANKEL |
Citation | 281 F. Supp. 853 |
Parties | Geraldine SNELL, Miriam Ramos and Juan Malave, Individually and on Behalf of their minor children, and on Behalf of all other Parents of needy, dependent children, and Robert Whaley, Individually and on Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. George K. WYMAN, as Commissioner, New York State Department of Social Welfare, Mitchell Ginsberg, as Commissioner New York City Department of Welfare, Edna Lisle, as Director and Clara K. Linet as Supervisor, Fort Green Center, New York City Department of Welfare, Defendants. |
Docket Number | No. 67 Civ. 2676. |
Decision Date | 29 February 1968 |
281 F. Supp. 853
Geraldine SNELL, Miriam Ramos and Juan Malave, Individually and on Behalf of their minor children, and on Behalf of all other Parents of needy, dependent children, and Robert Whaley, Individually and on Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
George K. WYMAN, as Commissioner, New York State Department of Social Welfare, Mitchell Ginsberg, as Commissioner New York City Department of Welfare, Edna Lisle, as Director and Clara K. Linet as Supervisor, Fort Green Center, New York City Department of Welfare, Defendants.
No. 67 Civ. 2676.
United States District Court S. D. New York.
February 29, 1968.
Martin Garbus, James J. Graham, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., of the State of New York, for defendant Wyman; Maria L. Marcus, Asst. Atty. Gen. of counsel.
J. Lee Rankin, Corp. Counsel, City of New York for defendant Ginsberg.
Before KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge, and METZNER and FRANKEL, District Judges.
OPINION
FRANKEL, District Judge.
The welfare laws and administrative regulations of New York State contain provisions, more particularly described below, which impose upon welfare recipients an obligation to repay the cost of assistance benefits out of specified kinds of assets. The plaintiffs, who have received and are receiving various forms of welfare payments, brought this suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, urging that such provisions are invalid and unenforceable on one or more of several federal constitutional grounds. Predicating federal jurisdiction upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a),
I.
The problems of the plaintiffs which brought them to the welfare authorities and then to this court — problems which cannot fail to evoke profound sympathy from fellow humans, whether or not they warrant revision of New York law by federal judges — may be summarized as follows:
Plaintiff Geraldine Snell is thirty-three years old, divorced, mother of four children ranging from four to seventeen years of age. She owns an equitable interest, worth about $900 as of September 1, 1967, in a three-room cooperative apartment where she and her children reside. She has a regular, part-time clerical job at which she earns net wages of some $32 per week. Pursuant to court order, she receives $25 weekly from her first husband toward the support of the children. Her second husband, from whom she was divorced in 1966, contributes nothing for her support or the children's. Since September 1965 (financed by state and private scholarship funds), she has been enrolled in a course of full-time college study, scheduled for completion in June of 1969, after which she hopes to pursue a teaching career.
In February of 1967, Mrs. Snell applied and was found eligible for benefits under the state program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).1 She receives currently what is described in the papers as "a complete, regular budget allowance."
Purporting to act under sections 1042 and 3603 of the New York Social Services
Plaintiff Miriam Ramos is the nineteen-year-old mother of three children, all under the age of three, who are dependent upon her alone for support. Her husband is in jail. Since 1963 Mrs. Ramos has been a recipient of AFDC benefits. On February 26, 1967, Mrs. Ramos and her oldest child were injured in an automobile accident. Three months later she was requested, as a condition to her continued receipt of public assistance, to execute an "Assignment of Proceeds of Lawsuit," a document which assigns (to the extent of assistance received) to the Department of Social Services the proceeds of any personal injury claim arising out of the accident. The assignment was taken pursuant to the general obligation set out in N.Y. Social Services Law § 104,5 and the more specific authority of § 104-a.6
The third plaintiff, Juan Malave, is the father of eight minor children. He earns $86 weekly and is the sole support of his wife and family. Prior to 1967 Mr. Malave had received AFDC benefits for brief periods, in 1955 and 1965. However, in March, 1967, he suffered personal injuries on the premises of the public housing project where he lives, and was unable to continue working; for several months the family received emergency AFDC assistance and disability insurance checks. In March, 1967, plaintiff Malave received $400 from the New York City Housing Authority as compensation for his injuries. These funds have been exhausted in providing necessities for the family.
The New York recovery provisions have been applied to Mr. Malave in the following ways: by requiring the endorsement over to the Department of Social Services of one of three disability insurance checks; and by asserting on June 13, 1967, a "Notice of Lien" in the amount of $420.29 for assistance furnished since the accident and after the receipt of the Notice. The same provisions invoked against plaintiff Ramos were the claimed authority in the case of Mr. Malave.7
Plaintiff Helen Marley is a sixty-eight year old chambermaid who has worked for the YWCA since 1954. She currently earns $30 for a twenty-hour work week and supports herself solely on this salary and Social Security benefits totalling $86 a month. Her only asset is a $600 bank account.
In 1943 Miss Marley became ill with cancer, and from 1945 to 1954 she was sustained on public assistance totalling $4,000. During this time of sickness and despondency, she assigned to the Department of Social Services an insurance policy on her life. With the help of a cousin Miss Marley finished paying the premiums on this policy in 1967. However, the insurance company will not release the proceeds of the policy to plaintiff Marley because of the prior assignment to the Department of Social Services. The statutory authority for the public welfare official's action is section 105 of the Social Services Law.8
Robert Whaley is a twenty-six year old welfare recipient who lost his right leg in an accident on a New York City subway platform on July 31, 1966. Prior to this misfortune plaintiff Whaley earned his living as a free-lance photographer, a career which he hopes to resume. Eleven months after the accident, on June 30, 1967, Mr. Whaley applied for assistance in the form of Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD).9 As a condition to granting
In addition to the foregoing facts, which are not in dispute, plaintiffs have adduced some deposition testimony bearing mainly upon a species of "constitutional fact" — consisting, at least in large measure, of expert judgments designed to show that the New York repayment requirements are onerous, destructive of morale, and, generally, so negative in their impact on effective rehabilitation as to be arbitrary and irrational. Such testimony emanates mainly from Miss Barbara Lounds, a social work consultant, and Dr. Charles Grosser, assistant professor at the New York University School of Social Services, both extensively experienced in working with and for poor people. Among other things, these experts state that assignments of life insurance policies deprive welfare recipients of an effective symbol of independence and accomplishment; that there is similar symbolic import in the family home or apartment; that assignments of personal injury claims breed "tremendous resentment;" and that, in general, "any social work purpose in the recovery provisions is quite beyond * * * comprehension." Moreover, these witnesses testify, enforcement of the recovery requirements tends to cause return to the welfare rolls of people who might otherwise postpone or avoid such renewed dependence.
Also in the record are depositions of the defendant Commissioners — both of whom, as the court may notice, have careers of recognized distinction for scholarship and active service in the field of social work.11 Both Commissioners acknowledged that there are imperfections in existing welfare programs, and indicated their concern to seek improvements. Commissioner Ginsberg reaffirmed his published...
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...clearest." Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 275, 60 S. Ct. 523, 526, 84 L.Ed. 744 (1940). See Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 865 (S.D.N.Y.1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed.2d 511 (1969); cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208, 47 S.Ct. 584,......
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...or consistently stand together.'" Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10, 58 S.Ct. 87, 92, 82 L.Ed. 3 (1937). See Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (three-judge district court), aff'd, 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed.2d 511 B. The Connecticut Statute and Its History In o......
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Patrick v. Tennessee Department of Public Welfare, Civ. No. 3-74-248.
...the cited cases and this one, but we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard. See Snell v. Wyman, D.C., 281 F.Supp. 853, aff'd, 393 U.S. 323 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed.2d 511. It is a standard that has consistently been applied to state legislation restricting the avai......
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Rite Aid Corp. v. Bd. of Pharmacy of State of NJ, Civ. A. No. 74-1628.
...and is not applicable to the states.32 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957); Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 864 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (3 judge dist. ct.) aff'd mem. 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed.2d 511 The second attack against N.J. S.A. 52:14B-1......
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Paka v. Manson, Civ. No. H-241.
...clearest." Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 275, 60 S. Ct. 523, 526, 84 L.Ed. 744 (1940). See Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 865 (S.D.N.Y.1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed.2d 511 (1969); cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208, 47 S.Ct. 584,......
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Doe v. Norton, Civ. No. 15579
...or consistently stand together.'" Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10, 58 S.Ct. 87, 92, 82 L.Ed. 3 (1937). See Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (three-judge district court), aff'd, 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed.2d 511 B. The Connecticut Statute and Its History In o......
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Patrick v. Tennessee Department of Public Welfare, Civ. No. 3-74-248.
...the cited cases and this one, but we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard. See Snell v. Wyman, D.C., 281 F.Supp. 853, aff'd, 393 U.S. 323 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed.2d 511. It is a standard that has consistently been applied to state legislation restricting the avai......
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Rite Aid Corp. v. Bd. of Pharmacy of State of NJ, Civ. A. No. 74-1628.
...and is not applicable to the states.32 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957); Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 864 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (3 judge dist. ct.) aff'd mem. 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed.2d 511 The second attack against N.J. S.A. 52:14B-1......