Snelling v. Ribicoff

• Citation: 198 F. Supp. 432
• Decision Date: 13 October 1961
• Docket Number: No. AC/439.,AC/439.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Ruby H. SNELLING, Plaintiff, v. Abraham A. RIBICOFF, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant.

198 F. Supp. 432

Ruby H. SNELLING, Plaintiff, v. Abraham A. RIBICOFF, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant.

No. AC/439.

United States District Court E. D. South Carolina, Aiken Division.

October 13, 1961.

Henderson, Salley & Cushman, Aiken, S. C., for plaintiff.

Terrell L. Glenn, U. S. Atty., Columbia, S. C., Frank H. Cormany, Sr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Aiken, S. C., for defendant.

CHARLES CECIL WYCHE, District Judge (sitting by designation).

This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) to review a decision by the defendant which held that plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of the disability freeze provision of the Social Security Act. That provision, 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(i) (1), defines "disability" as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or to be of long-continued and indefinite duration," and Section 416(i) (2) states that a "period of disability" must be "a continuous period of not less than six full calendar months * * * during which an individual was under a disability * * *." This period of low or zero income will be eliminated from the wage earner's records, increasing his "average monthly wage" and consequently the amount of future old age benefits.

The basic facts in this case are not in dispute.

The plaintiff is a married female, who was born on December 25, 1899, in Graniteville, South Carolina. She left school during the seventh grade of elementary school, and she has had no further education, vocational or otherwise, since that time. At the age of eleven years she began work as a spooler in a cotton mill. She continued such employment until October 19, 1956, at which time she was retired because of physical inability to perform any available job in the cotton mill, for which she was qualified. Excluded from this period of employment are those periods required for the giving of birth to three children. Likewise excluded is that period of approximately six months required for treatment of, and for partial recuperation from, injuries sustained on June 15, 1949, in an automobile accident. Further from the time of her marriage, very early in life, until a few years ago, plaintiff has performed, without outside assistance, her duties as a housewife and a mother. The employment of plaintiff has been exclusively confined to one employer, and to manual labor jobs in the cotton mill such as warping, tying, grading and tacking. Such training, education and skill as plaintiff possesses are solely derived from, and entirely encompassed within the foregoing experiences.

On June 15, 1949, plaintiff sustained in an automobile accident a severe fracture of her right ankle, a fracture of her right wrist, an injury to her back and fractures of several ribs. She was unable to recover fully from these personal injuries. By reason of manual labor performed in the course of her employment and by reason of the injuries aforesaid, her physical condition over the years has steadily deteriorated with increasing manifestation of objective symptoms as follows: severe traumatic arthritis of the right ankle joint; marked swelling of right ankle; a decided limp when walking; chronic thrombophlebitis of right leg; post traumatic changes in lower dorsal region involving an intervertebral disc; arthritic changes in lumbar region of spine, sacroiliac joints, and upper dorsal region; marked limitation of motion in lower dorsal region; marked muscle spasm in lumbar region of spine; and, a dependent, pitting edema in her legs. In addition to the foregoing, plaintiff has manifested increasing subjective symptoms of pain, inability to stand for any significant period of time, inability to sit comfortably for any significant period of time, inability to move about for any significant distance or for any significant period of time. By reason of her physical condition, plaintiff has been compelled since the date of her retirement to take daily periods of bed rest. Before the date of her retirement and since that time she has been compelled to wear continuously an elastic stocking, to take pain-relieving drugs in large amounts, to wear modified shoes, and to curtail drastically all forms of physical activity. These therapeutic measures have all been directed almost exclusively toward the relief of pain and discomfort and attending physicians have been unable to prescribe any therapeutic measures which could be or would be of substantial usefulness in the direction of effecting a cure of the ailments suffered by plaintiff.

The record indicates that plaintiff has not as yet manifested any neurological changes or mental impairment.

For the reasons hereinbefore stated, plaintiff was compelled to seek and to receive treatment from Dr. C. G. Henry of Augusta, Georgia, from February 21, 1951, through May 16, 1957. Despite such treatment, the physical condition of plaintiff continued to deteriorate and in December, 1955, plaintiff became unable to continue performing the usual and customary duties to which she had been long assigned. On the advice of her attending physician, she requested and was granted assignment to a job with lighter duties on December 18, 1955. She attempted to perform these new duties, but because of increasing physical disability, she was ordered by her attending physician to cease work entirely on October 19, 1956.

Household activities of the plaintiff are limited to the following: preparation of breakfast; preparation of a late-afternoon meal; light dusting, and spreading covers over her bed. However, these household pursuits must be interrupted by periods of bed rest. Outside activities of the plaintiff are limited to occasional trips to the grocery store in the company of persons who can provide transportation and who can assist in shopping.

Medical opinions appearing in the record are unanimous in the prognosis that plaintiff's physical condition cannot be expected to improve, with or without treatment. It appears to be a matter of reasonable medical certainty that plaintiff will undergo the experience of constantly declining physical activity for the balance of her life. Any medication presently available for use by the plaintiff can be directed only to the temporary relief of pain and other discomfort.

Medical opinions appearing in the record are strong and specific with respect to the extent of plaintiff's disability. Under date of October 30, 1956, Dr. C. G. Henry summarized his medical findings and professional conclusions as follows: "In my opinion Mrs. Snelling is totally and permanently disabled for work." Again, under date of May 17, 1957, Dr. Henry stated as his opinion the following: "Slowly getting worse. No improvement can be expected." Under date of February 15, 1958, Dr. John A. Faulkner summarized his findings and conclusions as follows: "Because of post-traumatic arthritic changes in the right ankle, the patient is unable to do any type of work which will require her to stand. Because of the severe post-traumatic arthritic changes in the dorsal, lumbar spine, and sacroiliac joint, it is impossible for the patient to do any type of work in a sitting position. If any further information is required, I will be more than glad to comply with your request." (This information appears on medical report directed to Department of Health, Education and Welfare.) Under date of February 18, 1958, Dr. J. C. Pearce summarized his findings and conclusions as follows: "As a result of the traumatic arthritis and pain on movement she is unable to do any kind of work that causes her to sit or stand for any length of time."

In addition to the foregoing, the Hearing Examiner recognized the serious and substantial nature of the ailments being suffered by plaintiff, as will appear by reference to the following language set forth in his decision: "Although the evidence unquestionably shows that the claimant has suffered a serious loss of function in her right ankle and foot * * *"; and again, "The evidence also makes it clear that the claimant has post traumatic arthritic changes in the spine * * *".

It appears to be uncontradicted that plaintiff is and has been suffering from a physical impairment which can only be expected to be of long continued or indefinite duration.

The single issue in this case arises from the conclusion of the Hearing Examiner with respect to plaintiff's ability to engage in any substantial, gainful activity. This conclusion finds expression in the record in the following language: "Neither the medical findings nor claimant's testimony would support a conclusion that she is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity in the foreseeable future." Reconciliation of the conclusion of the Hearing Examiner with the uncontradicted facts respecting the physical condition of the plaintiff can be accomplished only by a construction of the pertinent statutory language which places greatest stress on the word "any" appearing in the phrase "any substantial gainful activity". In effect, the conclusion expressed by the Hearing Examiner constitutes a strict construction of the pertinent provision of the statute, and places primary and heaviest emphasis upon the word "any" appearing in the statute, while affording to the words "substantial" and "gainful", which likewise appear in the statute, only secondary and casual emphasis. It further appears that the Hearing Examiner has considered the statutory requirement of "inability to engage in any substantial, gainful activity" to be equivalent to or synonymous with a general standard of "total disability". Such a construction is not only contrary to the explicit provisions of the statute, but also is without support in the large majority of cases.

In reviewing the decision of the referee, the District Court is authorized to perform its conventional judicial function. 42 U.S.C.A. §...