Snelson v. State ex rel. The Bd. of Commissioners of Madison County

• Decision Date: 27 May 1861
• Parties: Snelson v. The State, on the relation of the Board of Commissioners of Madison County
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

16 Ind. 29

Snelson

v.

The State, on the relation of the Board of Commissioners of Madison County

Supreme Court of Indiana

May 27, 1861

APPEAL from the Madison Circuit Court.

The judgment is reversed, with costs. Cause remanded.

John Davis, for the appellant.

J. S Buckles, for the appellee.

OPINION

Worden J.

This was an action by the appellee against the appellants, upon the official bond of Snelson, as treasurer of Madison county. Trial by the Court; finding and judgment for the plaintiff. Proper steps were taken to present the questions involved to this Court.

The facts out of which the supposed cause of action arose are as follows:

In 1850 Snelson was elected treasurer of the county of Madison, and gave the official bond in suit, and entered upon the duties of his office. At the June session of the board of commissioners of the county for the year 1851, Snelson, in his annual report to the board, claimed as fees allowed him by law, for redeeming county orders, at the rate of two and a half per cent., the sum of $ 142 and 95 cents. At the June session of the board for the year 1852, Snelson, in his report made the like claim for redeeming county orders during the preceding year, for the sum of $ 195 and 93 cents. In the year 1853 the like claim was made by the treasurer for the sum of $ 355. These sums were respectively allowed to Snelson by the board of commissioners, and paid to him; and this suit was brought to recover them back, with the interest thereon. These sums were allowed to the treasurer by the commissioners, and paid to him, under the belief, on the part of the board (we copy from the bill of exceptions), "that they were authorized by law, to wit: R. S. 1843, § 90, p. 195, to allow to said Snelson, as treasurer as aforesaid, two and one half per cent. on the amount of county orders redeemed by him as such treasurer." It appears that the funds provided for the redemption of county orders, during the years named, were the funds collected on the tax duplicate for the said years respectively. Upon the money being demanded of Snelson, before the commencement of this suit, he refused to pay, remarking that the commissioners bad allowed it to him, and that it had been received by him in good faith, supposing and believing that the law allowed it to him, and that he would not refund until the law compelled him to. There is no pretense that more was allowed than the specified per centum on the county orders actually redeemed by the treasurer. The plaintiff recovered the several amounts so allowed, and paid to Snelson, together with the interest thereon.

The question arises whether, on these facts, the action can be maintained.

The provisions of the statute of 1843, in respect to the legality of the allowance in question, are perhaps somewhat ambiguous; but it was settled by this Court in the case of Woollen v. The Board of Commissioners of Jefferson County, 4 Ind. 331, that the treasurer was not entitled to the specified per centum for redeeming county orders, where redeemed with the revenue collected on the tax duplicate, the Court remarking: "We do not consider it very clear upon the language of those sections, and hence must endeavor, if possible, to ascertain the intention of the Legislature from other legitimate sources, to aid us in resolving the doubt left by their language." The case above mentioned settles the proposition that the treasurer was not legally entitled to the per centum thus paid him for redeeming county orders; but while it does this, it also shows that the statutes were of doubtful construction in the opinion of this Court, and tends to show, what otherwise sufficiently appears, that the commissioners and the treasurer were acting in good faith, and were honestly mistaken upon a doubtful question of law.

The money, to recover back which this suit is brought, was voluntarily paid, upon a mistake of law, and without fraud or mistake of fact; and in ordinary cases, in transactions between individuals, money thus paid can not be recovered back. Many authorities might be cited upon this point, a few of which are the following. Downs v. Donnelly, 5 Ind. 496; Supervisors of Onondaga v. Briggs, 2 Denio 26; The New York and Harlem Railroad Co. v. Marsh, 12 N.Y. 308; Bateman on Commercial Law, § 15.

If this principle is applicable to the case at bar, it is decisive against the recovery, and nothing further is necessary to be said or considered, in order to a determination of the cause. But it is insisted that as the allowance and payment by the board of commissioners were not authorized by law, their acts in the premises were without authority and beyond their jurisdiction, and consequently not binding upon the county. This makes it necessary for us to determine whether the acts of the commissioners in the premises were within the scope of their authority, or otherwise. At the time when the first two allowances were made, the Statutes of 1843 were in force, but the Revised Statutes of 1852 had taken effect when the last allowance was made. Perhaps, however, there is no material difference in the statutes, in respect to the powers conferred upon the board of commissioners.

The board of...