Snethen v. State, 64689

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa
Citation308 N.W.2d 11
Docket NumberNo. 64689,64689
PartiesDaniel SNETHEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
Decision Date15 July 1981

James Cleary, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Shirley Ann Steffe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dan Johnston, Polk County Atty., and Carol Ann Nix, Asst. Polk County Atty., for appellee.

Considered by UHLENHOPP, P. J., and HARRIS, McGIVERIN, LARSON, and SCHULTZ, JJ.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

Petitioner Daniel Snethen appeals from the denial of an application for postconviction relief challenging his conviction of first-degree murder. Snethen alleges that the trial court erred in finding that he had not proved his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim is premised on trial counsel's failure to object to rebuttal expert testimony of Dr. Paul Loeffelholz, a psychiatrist who examined Snethen under court order. Snethen contends the testimony was objectionable because it (1) violated the attorney-client privilege and infringed upon his right to assistance of counsel, and (2) violated the physician-patient privilege. We affirm the trial court.

On October 23, 1974, Snethen was indicted by a Polk County Grand Jury for the murder of Timothy Hawbaker. On November 14, 1974, the trial court granted Snethen's application for psychiatric evaluation to determine whether he was competent to stand trial and whether he was insane at the time of his alleged participation in the homicide. Pursuant to court order, Snethen was admitted to the Iowa Security Medical Facility at Oakdale for evaluation. The order required that the court be provided with a written report of such evaluation. In a report made on January 9, 1975, Dr. Loeffelholz expressed the opinion that Snethen was competent to participate in the pending judicial proceedings.

On January 30, 1975, however, a jury found Snethen incompetent to stand trial. Pursuant to section 783.3, The Code 1973, the trial court found that discharge would endanger public peace and safety and ordered Snethen recommitted to the Oakdale facility until such time as he was found competent to stand trial. Snethen remained at Oakdale until Dr. Loeffelholz made a second report to the court, again opining that Snethen was competent to stand trial.

Prior to the scheduled competency trial Snethen filed a motion for a continuance and appointment of an impartial psychiatrist to make an independent evaluation of his competency to stand trial. With the agreement of Snethen's counsel, the trial court ordered an evaluation by Dr. John Garfield, a clinical psychologist. On May 21, 1975, a jury found Snethen competent to stand trial.

Prior to trial Snethen filed notice of his intention to rely on the defense of insanity. The notice listed Dr. Garfield as an expert witness who was intended to be called on Snethen's behalf. The State then filed notice of its intention to call rebuttal witnesses, including Dr. Loeffelholz.

At trial Dr. Garfield testified concerning the insanity defense, concluding that Snethen suffered from a mental disorder described as paranoid delusional beliefs or a psychotic paranoid state. Dr. Loeffelholz, called as a rebuttal witness for the State, disputed Dr. Garfield's opinions and testified as to conversations he had with, and statements made by, Snethen on the two occasions he was committed to the Oakdale facility. Although objections were made to part of Dr. Loeffelholz's testimony, no objections were made on the basis of either the attorney-client or physician-patient privileges.

Snethen was subsequently found guilty of murder in the first degree in violation of sections 690.1-.2, The Code 1973. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by this court in State v. Snethen, 245 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 1976). He later filed a pro se application for postconviction relief, and new counsel was appointed for the postconviction proceeding. Present counsel was thereafter appointed for the purpose of this appeal.

I. General principles. In a postconviction proceeding the petitioner has the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Kellogg v. State, 288 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1980). There is a presumption that counsel is competent, which must be overcome by the petitioner, Sims v. State, 295 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1980); but the ultimate test is whether under the entire record and totality of the circumstances counsel's performance was within the range of normal competency, Hinkle v. State, 290 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Iowa 1980); State v. Massey, 207 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Iowa 1973). "Such circumstances must include an affirmative factual basis demonstrating counsel's inadequacy of representation." Hinkle v. State, 290 N.W.2d at 30.

When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel rests upon a specific act or omission of counsel at trial, as it does in this case, relief will be granted only if it appears that the defendant was prejudiced thereby. See id. at 34. Thus, two conditions must be satisfied before a party will be found to have been denied a fair trial due to inadequacy of counsel: It must be shown that (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted therefrom.

When a postconviction petitioner alleges violation of constitutional rights, as here, we make an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. This is equivalent to a de novo review. Sims v. State, 295 N.W.2d at 422.

II. Physician-patient privilege. Snethen asserts that his trial counsel's failure to object to Dr. Loeffelholz's testimony on the basis that it violated the physician-patient privilege constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. In its finding of facts and conclusions of law, the trial court stated:

Wilson made several valid objections during direct examination of Dr. Loeffelholz. None raised a claim of doctor-patient privilege. In this case Wilson stated he did not believe the doctor-patient relationship existed as the Court had ordered evaluation and report....

....

... The entire record has been reviewed and studied in light of Petitioner's contentions. This Court finds Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proof.

We agree with the finding of the trial court.

The physician-patient privilege prohibits a physician from disclosing any confidential communication entrusted to the physician in his or her professional capacity. § 622.10, The Code 1975. Three elements must be established in order for the privilege to be applicable: (1) the relationship of doctor-patient; (2) the acquisition of the information or knowledge during this relationship; and (3) the necessity of the information to enable the physician to treat the patient skillfully. State v. Cole, 295 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa 1980); State v. Nowlin, 244 N.W.2d 596, 602 (Iowa 1976); State v. District Court, 218 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Iowa 1974). We have held that the third requirement of the privilege is lacking in court-ordered evaluations: The communication is not for the purpose of treatment but to evaluate the mental condition for the benefit of the court. State v. Cole, 295 N.W.2d at 33; State v. Nowlin, 244 N.W.2d at 602; State v. Mayhew, 170 N.W.2d 608, 615-16 (Iowa 1969).

Snethen points out, however, that his second confinement at Oakdale was pursuant to a court order following a determination of incompetency to stand trial. He argues that the language of section 783.3, The Code 1973 that "no further proceedings shall be taken under the indictment until his reason is restored" implies a directive for treatment of one found incompetent to stand trial. He thus claims that all three elements are met with respect to the second commitment.

We do not agree that Snethen's second commitment was for the purpose of treatment. The January 30, 1975, court order specifically provided that the sheriff give physical custody of Snethen to the Iowa Security Medical Facility at Oakdale, that he remain in the custody of the facility until found competent to stand trial, and that a written report of such evaluation be provided the court. The order did not provide for treatment. In Cole we stated that the unambiguous provisions of a court order are controlling. See 295 N.W.2d at 33.

We therefore conclude that the third requirement of the privilege the necessity of the information to enable the physician to treat the patient skillfully was lacking, and the physician-patient privilege did not exist with respect to either commitment to Oakdale. Since the physician-patient privilege did not exist, there is no merit in Snethen's contention that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object on that basis.

Snethen nevertheless maintains that Dr. Loeffelholz's testimony should have been objected to on the ground that its admission would be fundamentally unfair. Collins v. Auger, 577 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133, 99 S.Ct. 1057, 59 L.Ed.2d 96 (1979), is cited as authority for this position. In that case Collins was granted a mental evaluation to determine his competency to stand trial. During the course of interviews with a psychiatrist at the Iowa Security Medical Facility at Oakdale Collins confessed that he had committed the crime for which he was charged, and the statements made to the psychiatrist were admitted into evidence at trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that Collins had been denied due process of law because it was fundamentally unfair to allow a court-appointed psychiatrist to testify concerning a defendant's incriminating admissions during a psychiatric evaluation. 1 The court reasoned that a defendant should not be compelled to choose between exercising the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination 2 and the fourteenth amendment due process right to seek available defenses. Id. at 1109-10.

...

To continue reading

Request your trial
96 cases
  • Escobedo v. Lund
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • June 3, 2013
    ...to be applied in judging counsel's actions is whether counsel's performance was within the range of normal competency. Snethen v. State, 308 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Iowa 1981). A presumption exists that counsel is competent. Sims v. State, 295 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1980). “Improvident trial strategy......
  • State v. Effler
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • July 17, 2009
    ...to provide effective assistance to a criminal defendant." State v. Schoelerman, 315 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Iowa 1982); see also Snethen v. State, 308 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Iowa 1981) (holding counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise an issue contrary to established case Effler was not denied effec......
  • Enriquez v. Ludwick, 4:13–cv–00024–RWP
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • April 16, 2018
    ...counsel is ineffective for failing to predict changes in the law which remain unresolved and open to debate. See Snethen v. State , 308 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Iowa 1981) ("Counsel need not be a crystal gazer; it is not necessary to know what the law will become in the future to provide effective as......
  • State v. Carney
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • September 23, 1998
    ...the circumstances counsel's performance was within the range of normal competency.' " Mott, 407 N.W.2d at 582 (quoting Snethen v. State, 308 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Iowa 1981)). The defendant must show (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted. Id. To show counsel w......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT