Snider Int'l Corp. v. Town of Forest Heights

Decision Date29 November 2012
Docket NumberCivil No. JFM–12–1248.
PartiesSNIDER INTERNATIONAL CORP., et al., v. TOWN OF FOREST HEIGHTS, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

James S. Liskow, Christopher R. Dunn, Decaro Doran Siciliano Gallagher and Deblasis LLP, Bowie, MD, Stephen Howard Ring, Stephen H. Ring PC, Gaithersburg, MD, for Snider International Corp., et al.

Kevin Bock Karpinski, Karpinski, Colaresi & Karp, P.A., Baltimore, MD, Sandra D. Lee, for Town of Forest Heights, et al.

MEMORANDUM

J. FREDERICK MOTZ, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Snider International Corporation, Mark Cranford, Stan Derwin Brown, and Al Goyburu bring this putative class action against two Maryland towns: the Town of Forest Heights and the Town of Riverdale Park. 1 Plaintiffs assert numerous claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of their constitutional right to due process of law. The claims pertain to traffic citations issued by defendants for violations of section 21–809 of the Maryland Transportation Article, which authorizes counties and municipalities throughout Maryland to establish automated speed monitoring systems, commonly known as speed cameras. Pending before this court are two motions. On June 29, 2012, defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. (ECF No. 23.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief and a cross-motion for partial judgment on the pleadings on July 27, 2012. (ECF No. 30.) On August 13, 2012, defendants filed their reply, which included their response to plaintiffs' cross-motion. (ECF No. 34.) Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a sur-reply on August 17, 2012, and attached their proposed sur-reply to that motion. (ECF No. 35.) Defendants opposed that motion on September 4, 2012. (ECF No. 36.) Before this court ruled on the motion for leave to file a surreply, plaintiffs filed a supplemental memorandum on September 12, 2012. (ECF No. 38.) The motion for leave was granted on September 25, 2012, and plaintiffs re-filed their sur-reply. (ECF Nos. 39, 40.) No oral argument is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. Defendants' motion is granted and plaintiffs' cross-motion is denied for the reasons below.

BACKGROUND

Following a two-year pilot program in Montgomery County, the state of Maryland enacted legislation in 2009 that authorized the statewide use of automated speed monitoring systems. SeeMd.Code Ann., Transp. §§ 21–809, 21–810. 2 These systems use various forms of technology to monitor the speed at which vehicles travel on public roads. Automated cameras record the license plates of vehicles traveling at least twelve miles per hour above the posted speed limit. Maryland law authorizes counties and municipal corporations to impose civil penalties for infractions that occur in certain areas, including highway work zones and school zones.3See§ 21–809(b)(1).

The District Court of Maryland (District Court), a state court of limited jurisdiction, is responsible for prescribing a uniform citation form for infractions, which are punishable by a civil penalty not to exceed forty dollars. § 21–809(c). The citation form must include certain information, including the identity of the vehicle's owner, the time and location of the violation, and notice of the alleged violator's right to contest liability in the District Court. § 21–809(d); see alsoMd.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 4–401(13) (vesting the District Court with exclusive original civil jurisdiction over claims under section 21–809). The citations also state, in bold letters, that payment of the civil penalty constitutes an admission of liability, and the form further provides that failure to pay the civil penalty or to contest the citation in a timely manner may result in suspension or non-renewal of the vehicle's registration. ( See Mot. Dismiss Ex. B & Ex. C; Md.Code Ann., Transp. § 21–809(d)(1)(xi).)

A citation recipient who elects to contest liability and stand trial must notify the issuing agency of that election at least five days before the payment due date shown on the citation. Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 7–302(e)(1). When a citation recipient appears at trial, the citation is admissible to prove the fact of the violation and need not be corroborated or authenticated by the speed monitoring system operator responsible for that individual system. Md.Code Ann., Transp. § 21–809(e)(1). The citation recipient nevertheless is entitled to summon a speed monitoring system operator to appear and testify at trial, provided that the request is made at least twenty days before the trial date. § 21–809(e)(2). At trial the government must submit into evidence “a certificate of training, issued to the ‘speed monitoring system operator’ upon completion of training; a daily log showing that the speed monitoring system operator performed successfully a self-test prior to producing a recorded image; and, a signed certificate of calibration, issued annually by an independent calibration laboratory.” Baker v. Montgomery Cnty., 427 Md. 691, 50 A.3d 1112, 1116 (2012) (citing § 21–809(b)(2)(4), (e)(1)). The District Court may consider as a defense any “issues and evidence” that it deems pertinent, including evidence that the citation recipient did not own, control, or operate the vehicle at the time of the alleged violation. § 21–809(f)(1).

Between March and December 2011, plaintiffs allegedly received fifty-five citations issued by defendants for speed monitoring system infractions in various school zones. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Some plaintiffs paid their citations upon receipt.4 Other plaintiffs refused to pay the citations yet elected not to contest liability in the District Court. And a third group of plaintiffs challenged the citations in the District Court, lost, and refused to pay. The District Court has entered default judgments against all plaintiffs who have not paid the citations.

Plaintiffs filed this putative class action on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated individuals on April 24, 2012. The complaint identifies four classes of individuals: 5 (1) persons who were issued citations by the Town of Forest Heights and who paid the civil penalties associated with those citations (the “Forest Heights Paid Class”); (2) persons who were issued citations by the Town of Forest Heights and against whom default judgments were entered after they failed to pay the civil penalties associated with those citations (the “Forest Heights Default Class”); (3) persons who were issued citations by the Town of Riverdale Park and who paid the civil penalties associated with those citations (the “Riverdale Park Paid Class”); and (4) persons who were issued citations by the Town of Riverdale Park and against whom default judgments were entered after they failed to pay the civil penalties associated with those citations (the “Riverdale Park Default Class”). ( See Compl. ¶ 25.)

The complaint alleges numerous claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of plaintiffs' rights under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights in the Maryland Constitution.6 In counts one through four, plaintiffs allege that the citations issued by defendants did not include information required by section 21–809 of the Maryland Transportation Article. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 38–57.) Specifically, plaintiffs contend that section 21–809(e) requires speed monitoring system citations to include a sworn certificate notifying recipients of the requirements imposed on defendants by section 21–809(b) and expressly affirming that each of those requirements has been satisfied. Plaintiffs maintain that the exclusion of this information amounts to a denial of due process. In counts five through eight, plaintiffs allege that their due process rights were violated when defendants sought to enter the citations into evidence at trial despite the deficiencies described in counts one through four. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 58–77.) In counts nine through twelve, plaintiffs allege that their due process rights were violated when defendants secured judgments against them without satisfying their burden of establishing each element of the violation at trial. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 78–97.) Because the District Court entered judgments against plaintiffs on the basis of inadmissible or deficient evidence, plaintiffs allege, the judgments were invalid and defendants failed to establish plaintiffs' liability. In counts thirteen through sixteen, plaintiffs allege that their due process rights were violated because the citations were electronically signed and thus were not sworn affidavits. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 98–117.) And finally, in counts seventeen through twenty, plaintiffs allege that their due process rights were violated when defendants served the citations via first class mail. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 118–137.)

Plaintiffs ask this court to declare that each of the allegations above constituted a deprivation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. (Compl. at 52.) Plaintiffs further seek damages commensurate with the total amount of the citations issued to them by defendants as well as plaintiffs' costs in the District Court. (Compl. at 52–53.) Finally, plaintiffs pray for attorneys' fees, costs, pre- and post-judgment interest, and all other remedies that equitably and reasonably flow from defendants' deprivations of plaintiffs' due process rights. (Compl. at 53.)

STANDARD

Defendants have moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. 7When a court considers matters outside the pleadings, ordinarily “the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56,” and [a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). But a court deciding a motion to dismiss “may consider documents attached to the complaint, as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Sec'y of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • Brown v. Transurban USA, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • November 2, 2015
    ... ... at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, ... Snider Int'l Corp. v. Town of Forest Heights, Md., 739 ... ...
  • Mua v. Maryland
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • February 15, 2017
    ... ... Bell Atl ... Corp ... v ... Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). To ... Town of Gilbert , Ariz ., ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct ... claim resolved by the prior judgment.'" Snider Int'l Corp ... v ... Town of Forest Heights , 906 ... ...
  • Samuel v. Hogan
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • March 9, 2018
    ... ... R. Civ. P. 8, Bell Atlantic Corp ... v ... Twombly , 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and ... Jersey Heights Neighborhood Assoc ... v ... Glendening , 174 F.3d ... and an opportunity to be heard." Page 20 Snider Int'l Corp ... v ... Town of Forest Heights , Md ... ...
  • Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., Civil Action No. 09-290
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • January 14, 2014
    ... ... Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). If ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT