Snider v. Morgan

• Decision Date: 30 November 2012
• Docket Number: 1101535.
• Citation: 113 So.3d 643
• Parties: Jeff SNIDER, as administrator of the estate of Thelma June Smith Snider, deceased v. Marquita S. MORGAN, as executrix of the estate of Troy Ray Snider, deceased, et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

113 So.3d 643

Jeff SNIDER, as administrator of the estate of Thelma June Smith Snider, deceased

v.Marquita S. MORGAN, as executrix of the estate of Troy Ray Snider, deceased, et al.

1101535.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Nov. 30, 2012.

W. Brad English and Emily A. Jones of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Huntsville, for appellant.

Rodney L. Edmondson and Lea L. Mosley of McLaughlin & Edmondson, LLC, Guntersville, for appellees.

SHAW, Justice.

Jeff Snider (“Jeff”), as administrator of the estate of Thelma June Smith Snider (“Thelma”), deceased, the plaintiff below, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his complaint against Marquita S. Morgan (“Morgan”), both as executrix of the estate of Troy Ray Snider (“Troy”), deceased, and on behalf of the estate of Harold Snider (“Harold”), deceased, and First Bank of Boaz (“First Bank”), the defendants below, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.¹ We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

In October 1998, Thelma, the mother of Troy and Harold and the grandmother of Jeff and Morgan, executed a “General Power of Attorney” naming Troy and Harold her attorneys-in-fact. That document specifically provided that the enumerated powers could be performed by either Troy or Harold and that each was not required “to act in union with the other.” Thelma died intestate on March 13, 2006. Troy died testate in June 2009. In September 2009, Jeff obtained letters of administration naming him administrator of Thelma's estate. In April 2010, Morgan obtained letters testamentary naming her executrix of Troy's estate. Harold died, presumably testate, see infra note 5, in July 2010.

In February 2011, Jeff sued Morgan, as executrix of Troy's estate; Harold's estate; and First Bank. Jeff's complaint alleged that, before Thelma's death, which was purportedly preceded by her declining physical and mental health resulting in her incompetency, Troy and Harold had “seized control of [Thelma's] assets and used them to their own benefit.” The complaint specifically referenced a purported loan of $46,000 to Troy in January 1988 from Thelma and her husband, James F. Snider,² pursuant to which Thelma and James allegedly obtained a mortgage on real property Troy owned. ³ It further alleged that, in May 2002, Harold, acting as Thelma's alleged “attorney-in-fact,” had executed a release recorded in the Marshall County Probate Court acknowledging “full payment” of the accompanying indebtedness, satisfying the mortgage, and releasing Troy from further obligation thereon.⁴ As a result of the foregoing, and because, according to Jeff's complaint, “the Loan had not been repaid” at the time of the aforementioned release, Jeff filed, on behalf of Thelma's estate, a $46,000 claim against Troy's estate, seeking “repayment of the Loan” plus interest as well as the repayment of “other monies wrongfully obtained from Thelma ... by Troy....”

Contending both that Thelma was incompetent at the time the release was executed and that Troy's loan had not been repaid at the time of the release, Jeff's complaint, as subsequently amended, asserted a breach-of-contract claim against Harold's estate (count I), alleging that Harold had breached his contractual duties to Thelma by “us[ing] his purported powers as [Thelma's] purported attorney-in-fact to act contrary to [Thelma's] best interests” and seeking appointment of an administrator ad litem of Harold's estate; ⁵ asserted a breach-of-contract claim against Troy's estate (count II), alleging that Troy breached an express or implied contract to repay the purported loan of $46,000; asserted an unjust-enrichment claim against both Troy's estate and Harold's estate (count III) based on Troy and Harold's alleged knowing acceptance and enjoyment of Thelma's money and assets without compensation to Thelma, “including without limitation,” Troy's alleged wrongful failure to repay the $46,000 loan; asserted a claim labeled “money had and received” against Troy's estate (count IV) based on Troy's alleged “enjoy[ment] of the benefit of the loan without repaying same”; and asserted a claim for declaratory relief (count V),⁶ seeking, among other relief, a declaration voiding the release executed by Harold, restoration of the mortgage, and a declaration of entitlement to full repayment of the outstanding loan balance by Troy's estate, as well as a declaration as to the priority of Thelma's mortgage over the subsequent mortgage of First Bank.

Morgan moved to dismiss Jeff's complaint. Specifically, Morgan argued that the breach-of-contract claim against Troy's estate (count II), the unjust-enrichment claim (count III), and the money-had-and-received claim (count IV) were due to be dismissed under the “rule of repose.” See, e.g., American Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Underwood, 886 So.2d 807, 812 (Ala.2004) (“The common-law rule of repose, which is an affirmative defense, ... ‘bars actions that have not been commenced within 20 years from the time they could have been commenced.’ ”). She further contended, among other things, that counts I through IV against Troy's estate and counts I and III against Harold's estate were barred by their respective statutes of limitations. Morgan attached, as an exhibit to her dismissal motion, a copy of the verified claim Jeff had filed in Troy's estate proceedings.

Over Jeff's opposition, and without stating the reasons for its decision, the trial court granted Morgan's dismissal motion, dismissing the claims against Troy's estate and Harold's estate. Jeff subsequently filed a motion asking the trial court to “reconsider” that ruling (hereinafter referred to as a “motion to reconsider”), which the trial court denied, stating:

“The factual allegations [Jeff] makes in his complaint, viewed in a light most favorable to [Jeff], [do] not allege the existence of any promissory note that would have secured the mortgage. It is interesting that the ‘loan’ was to be repaid over a period of 30 years and [Jeff] claims that created a contract that the breach thereof would make the rule of repose inapplicable. Also, he claims the acts complained of would also not be outside the statute of limitations.

“Considering the allegations in a light most favorable to [Jeff], the Court finds the 20 year rule of repose applies to any mortgage, even one secured by a note that provides for payment over a period of 30 years because there is no allegation that there was a payment made within the 20 year period that would toll the rule of repose (and that also assumes the existence of a promissory note, not pled, that provides for such payment terms). The only element to the rule of repose is time.”

Thereafter, First Bank sought and obtained its own dismissal with prejudice from the case in consideration of the fact that it had been named as a party only as a result of its mortgage interest in Troy's real property.

Standard of Review

In their briefs to this Court, the parties disagree as to the applicable standard of review. Morgan and First Bank appear to contend that their motions to dismiss were converted to motions for a summary judgment because matters outside the pleadings were submitted, and the trial court failed to exclude those matters. See Rule 12(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. (“If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56....”). Morgan's motion to dismiss included as an exhibit a copy of the verified statement of claim that Jeff had filed against Troy's estate. Similarly, Jeff's response in opposition to that motion included both the statement of claim and the power of attorney. Nonetheless, the motions to dismiss were not converted to motions for a summary judgment, because the exhibits set out above were specifically referenced in Jeff's complaint and, thus, were not matters outside the pleading. Donoghue v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 838 So.2d 1032, 1035 (Ala.2002) (adopting the rule “precluding conversion when the exhibits in question are referred to in, and are central to, the plaintiff's complaint”). See also Lewis v. First Tuskegee Bank, 964 So.2d 36, 39 n. 1 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (“ ‘[D]ocuments attached to a motion to dismiss are considered a part of the pleadings if those documents were specifically referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to the claim being brought.” ’ (quoting Banks, Finley, White & Co. v. Wright, 864 So.2d 324, 327 (Ala.Civ.App.2001))).

Morgan and First Bank allege that Jeff's motion to reconsider included evidence outside the pleadings, namely an affidavit executed by Jeff's counsel and supporting documentation—including an e-mail communication from Morgan's and First Bank's counsel dated May 11, 2011—aimed at establishing that Troy had made several substantial payments to the nursing home where Thelma resided prior to her death. However, Jeff made no showing that the evidence submitted in support of his motion was newly discovered, that is, that it was discovered after the trial court entered its judgment of dismissal, nor did he offer any other explanation for his delay in filing the supporting documents, which were clearly received by his attorney prior to the hearing on Morgan's dismissal motion and the trial court's dismissal.⁷ The parties present nothing indicating that Jeff could properly use a post-dismissal motion to reconsider to belatedly submit the materials he wished to provide to the trial court in opposition to the dismissal motion; therefore, the trial court could not, and apparently did not, consider the evidence when determining whether facts existed on which Jeff might ultimately prevail. Cf. Moore v. Glover, 501 So.2d 1187, 1189 (Ala.1986) (“[P]laintiff's motion, with its...