Snipes v. Camp Mfg. Co.
Decision Date | 25 February 1910 |
Citation | 67 S.E. 27,152 N.C. 42 |
Parties | SNIPES v. CAMP MFG. CO. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Halifax County; O. H. Guion, Judge.
Action by one Snipes against the Camp Manufacturing Company for personal injuries. From a judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Where defendant's, engineer, after stopping the engine, went forward with his fireman to where workmen were repairing a trestle, and then returned to the engine and started it without any warning, whether the fireman was guilty of contributory negligence in sitting on the track just ahead of the engine, conversing with workmen, without noticing the movements of the engineer, was a question for the jury.
The evidence tended to show: That defendant was a manufacturing company, operating a logging road under a charter, etc., and that on June 21, 1907, plaintiff, employed as fireman on defendant's engine, was run over by said engine and seriously injured. That at the time of the occurrence the engine in question had stopped at a trestle which was being repaired, and the engineer and plaintiff, and others of the crew, went forward 15 or 20 feet on the trestle to observe the work and note its progress. Plaintiff sat down on a cross-tie, and he and the engineer were both talking to some of the track force. That while plaintiff was so engaged the engineer went back to his engine, started it without signal or warning of any kind, and moved the same upon the plaintiff before he was able to arise or escape, and causing the injuries complained of. The track was straight, and the position of plaintiff at the time being in full view or readily observable.
The plaintiff, a witness in his own behalf, among other things testified as follows:
At the close of plaintiff's evidence, on motion, plaintiff was nonsuited by order of court, and excepted and appealed.
E. L. Travis, Claude Kitchin, and Geo. Green, for appellant.
W. E. Daniel and B. B. Winborne, for appellee.
The court is of opinion that on the facts and circumstances as now presented there was a duty imposed upon the defendant's engineer to give a signal or some adequate warning before starting the engine, and that on the ordinary issues in actions of this character, and under various decisions of this court applicable to the case, if these facts and circumstances are accepted by the jury, the verdict as to defendant's negligence should be resolved against the company. Farris' Case, 151 N.C. 483, 66 S.E. 457; Ray's Case, 141 N.C. 84, 53 S.E. 622; Smith's Case, 132 N.C. 819, 44 S.E. 663, essentially qualifying, if it does not expressly overrule, this same case as it appears in 130 N.C. 344, 42 S.E. 139.
And the court is further of opinion that on the facts in evidence, if established, the ordinary inferences permissible where one goes on a railroad track do not obtain here, and that it was not a negligent act on part of plaintiff in going forward on the track, nor in taking the position described in the testimony. So far as these facts now disclose, the only engine whose approach was to be apprehended, and the one which caused the injury, was then at rest, and the entire crew, including the engineer himself, had gone forward to observe the men engaged in repairing the trestle and note the progress of the work; and the only conduct, if any, which could be imputed to plaintiff for negligence on this evidence, was in not getting up from his position when he saw the engineer leave the trestle and return to his engine. Whether, under all the facts and circumstances as they may be received by the jury, this was negligence on part of plaintiff, and the...
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