Snipes v. Davis

• Citation: 127 S.E. 447,131 S.C. 298
• Decision Date: 27 March 1925
• Docket Number: 11729.
• Parties: SNIPES v. DAVIS, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS, ET AL.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

127 S.E. 447

131 S.C. 298

SNIPES v. DAVIS, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS, ET AL.

No. 11729.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 27, 1925

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court, Dillon County; Jas. R Coggeshall, Special Judge.

Action by Mamie Snipes, as administratrix of the estate of C. E Snipes, deceased, against James C. Davis, Director General of Railroads, and another. Verdict for plaintiff, and, from order granting new trial, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed and remanded.

The following is plaintiff's complaint and the portion of the charge referred to in the opinion:

Complaint.

1. That she has heretofore been duly qualified and commissioned by the Judge of Probate for Marlboro county administratrix of the personal estate of her deceased husband, C. E. Snipes and she has duly entered upon the discharge of her duties as such administratrix. That the said C. E. Snipes was killed by the willfulness and negligence of the defendants operating the Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company on or about the 18th day of June, 1918. He left surviving him the plaintiff, his widow, and six children, whose names are as follows: Olivia Kittie May, Coley, Susan, Margaret and Hazel Lee Snipes, and she brings this action for their and her own benefit.

2. That the Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company was at the times hereinafter mentioned, and is now, a railroad corporation organized under the laws of one of the states of the American Union, and prior to the 28th day of December, 1917, was the owner of and operating, maintaining a railroad running from the city of Hamlet, North Carolina, via Clio and Dillon, to Charleston, South Carolina.

3. That the Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company was at the times hereinafter mentioned, and now is, a railroad corporation organized under the laws of the state of Virginia, and prior to the 28th day of December, 1917, was owning, operating maintaining and controlling a railroad in the counties of Marlboro and Dillon, state of South Carolina.

7. That on or about the 18th day of June, 1918, as she is informed and believes, plaintiff's intestate, C. E. Snipes, was standing at the Seaboard depot in the town of Clio, in the county of Marlboro, in the state of South Carolina, engaged in conversation with an employee of said railroad concerning the placing of certain cars. That at that point the said railroad has three tracks, the main track, and a side track on either side thereof. They were standing between the rails of the side track between the main track and the depot. That the depot and a cotton platform are situated along side of, and so near this side track that from necessity, the public and persons having business to transact with said railroad are compelled to pass over and along the track at this point, and have been in the habit of doing so ever since said depot was located and built, with the full knowledge, consent, and acquiescence of the defendants, and, in fact, this is the only place provided by the defendants for passengers to enter and alight from the train; that at this point, the track runs approximately north and south, and the said intestate was standing several yards north of the depot and opposite the platform building. After having finished his conversation in reference to placing cars, he started diagonally across the main track of said railroad going towards his place of business which is located on the west side opposite the depot. That trains coming from the main line of said railroad to said depot on a spur track which leaves the main line a few hundred yards from said depot, and which is built on a curve, and crosses a much-traveled street about one hundred yards before reaching the depot and across another street which is much traveled right at the south end of depot. That along said curve the said railroad had negligently allowed much shrubbery, bushes and trees to grow and remain with other obstructions near the track, which totally obstructed the view of any train approaching from around said curve until the train got within a very short distance of depot; that at this time a freight train was standing on one of the side tracks, and the engine was making noise, such as letting off exhaust, etc., so that it was impossible for the decedent to hear the noise incident to the moving train. That as said intestate was passing across said tracks to his place of business as aforesaid, totally unconscious of any danger, suddenly an engine drawing a train of cars came around the aforementioned curve of said spur track at a rapid and dangerous rate of speed, without blowing whistle or sounding bell or giving any warning whatsoever of its approach, and ran upon the decedent from the rear, struck and knocked him down and dragged him for a considerable distance, cut one leg off, and otherwise bruised and mangled his body to such an extent that, although he was given prompt medical and surgical assistance, he died within 24 hours. That the conduct of said railroad, and the employees, in allowing the view to be obstructed by bushes and trees, and in running said train up to said depot without sounding bell or whistle or giving other warning signal of its approach, was a wanton, willful and reckless disregard of its duties to the public generally, and particularly to this decedent, and amounted to a wanton, reckless and gross negligence, and by reason thereof this plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00). That the decedent, said C. E. Snipes, was a man forty-seven years of age, in perfect physical condition and health, he was a trained and successful business man, with an earning capacity of from five to ten thousand dollars per annum; and had an expectancy of life for approximately twenty-four years, and the plaintiff and her children were totally dependent upon his earnings for their support, maintenance and education; and she alleges that his death has caused her and them the pecuniary loss of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00).

Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against the defendants for the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00), together with the costs and expenses of this action.

C. L. Williams,

T. I. Rogers,

Plaintiff's Attorneys.

Judge's Charge.

Mr. Foreman and Gentlemen of the Jury: The fact that a motion was made for the direction of a verdict this morning and refused, you have nothing to do with that. Matters of law are for the Court, and you have to pass entirely upon the facts. The court has nothing to do with that. I might say again that the law gives to the plaintiff in a case like this six years from the time that a party is killed in which to bring an action, and that any time they may bring it within six years is all right. You have nothing to do with the fact whether she brought it promptly or delayed in bringing her action.

Now, it is alleged and admitted, I believe, that Mr. Snipes, Mr. C. E. Snipes, was killed in June, 1918, by a Seaboard Air Line Railway train at the point that has been designated to you here. The plaintiff alleges that this was done negligently by the officers and agents of the railroad company, and this the defendant denies, and they set up as a defense, as an affirmative defense, contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. In other words, that the deceased was guilty of negligence himself in going on the railroad track in front of the train at the time that he did. That is a question for you to decide. The plaintiff alleges further that the deceased was killed at a public highway, or street, or traveled place. I believe that the allegation is that it was a traveled place, not at a street crossing, or on a public highway, and that the law requires the railroad company on approaching a station to give certain signals which are required by the statute to be given on approaching a railroad crossing or traveled place. And the defendant sets up gross or willful contributory negligence to defeat, on the part of the deceased, to defeat the claim of the plaintiff on this ground. Then the plaintiff alleges the amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled. The defendant, in addition to setting up the defense of contributory negligence and of gross and willful contributory negligence, also denies that they were negligent at all, or that they were responsible, or that the plaintiff is entitled to recover anything.

The Court: (addressing counsel) I believe, Gentlemen, that about states the issues, does it not?

Mr. Rogers: I think so, your Honor.

Mr. Muller: So far as the defendant is concerned, I think so, if the court pleases.

The Court: (addressing jury) Under the common law, Gentlemen, if a railroad company negligently kills a person, why they are responsible for damages for such killing; provided, they do not come in and show some reason which exonerates them from this responsibility.

Now negligence has been defined to be the want of ordinary care. That is, the care which a reasonable man would take under the circumstances. Now, it is alleged in the complaint that the deceased was killed at a traveled place. There is a conflict on that point. I will charge you what I conceive to be a traveled place. The rule, as I understand it, is that to constitute a traveled place, it must not only be a place where persons are accustomed to travel, but it must also be a place where persons have in some way acquired a right to travel. And if you find that for a long term of years the defendant railroad company, or the defendant, Seaboard Air Line Railway Company, recognized the right of the public to cross at the point in question, or through the invitation of the railroad company the public had used the railroad at this point as a crossing, you may find that it was...