Snipes v. McAndrew

• Decision Date: 11 January 1984
• Docket Number: No. 22050,22050
• Citation: 280 S.C. 320,313 S.E.2d 294
• Parties: , 16 Ed. Law Rep. 970 Ralph O. SNIPES, Respondent, v. Gordon L. McANDREW, as Superintendent of Richland County School District # 1; Sam E. McGregor as Chairman of Richland County School District # 1 Board of Trustees; William E. Bowman, Lynda L. Smolen, Albert L. Heyward, III, Alma W. Bryd, Isaac E. McGraw and Barbara A. Scott as members of the Richland County School District # 1 Board of Trustees; and Richland County School District # 1, Appellants. J. Alvin SHAW, Respondent, v. Gordon L. McANDREW, as Superintendent of Richland County School District # 1; Sam E. McGregor as Chairman of Richland County School District # 1 Board of Trustees; William E. Bowman, Lynda L. Smolen, Albert L. Heyward, III, Alma W. Bryd, Isaac E. McGraw and Barbara A. Scott as members of the Richland County School District # 1 Board of Trustees; and Richland County School District # 1, Appellants. . Heard
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 294

313 S.E.2d 294

280 S.C. 320, 16 Ed. Law Rep. 970

Ralph O. SNIPES, Respondent, v.Gordon L. McANDREW, as Superintendent of Richland County

School District # 1; Sam E. McGregor as Chairman of

Richland County School District # 1 Board of Trustees;

William E. Bowman, Lynda L. Smolen, Albert L. Heyward, III,

Alma W. Bryd, Isaac E. McGraw and Barbara A. Scott as

members of the Richland County School District # 1 Board of

Trustees; and Richland County School District # 1, Appellants.

J. Alvin SHAW, Respondent, v.Gordon L. McANDREW, as Superintendent of Richland County

School District # 1; Sam E. McGregor as Chairman of

Richland County School District # 1 Board of Trustees;

William E. Bowman, Lynda L. Smolen, Albert L. Heyward, III,

Alma W. Bryd, Isaac E. McGraw and Barbara A. Scott as

members of the Richland County School District # 1 Board of

Trustees; and Richland County School District # 1, Appellants.

No. 22050.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Jan. 11, 1984.

Decided Feb. 29, 1984.

Jean H. Toal of Belser, Baker, Barwick, Toal & Bender, Columbia, for respondent Shaw.

Kellum W. Allen of Kirkland, Taylor, Moore & Allen, West Columbia, for respondent Snipes.

Kenneth L. Childs and David T. Duff, of Childs and Duff, Columbia, for appellants.

Randall T. Bell and M. Elizabeth Crum, of McNair, Glenn, Konduros, Corley, Singletary, Porter & Dibble, and George C. Leventis, Columbia, of the South Carolina School Boards Association of Columbia, amicus curiae on behalf of the South Carolina School Boards Association.

GREGORY, Justice:

AppellantsGordon McAndrew, as Superintendent of Richland County School District # 1, the Richland County School Board of Trustees, and Richland County School District # 1 (District # 1) appeal from an order of the circuit court requiring them to reinstate respondentsRalph O. Snipes and J. Alvin Shaw as principals.We reverse.

Snipes had been a principal at Alcorn Middle School for approximately ten years when he was notified that he would be reassigned to a position as assistant principal in District # 1 for the next school year, 1981-82.Shaw had been a principal at John P. Thomas Elementary School for approximately fifteen years when he was notified that he would be reassigned to another certificated position in District # 1 for the next school year, 1981-82.

Respondents brought separate actions seeking an order enjoining appellants from reassigning them without affording them an opportunity to be heard, and reinstating them as principals pending a hearing on the merits.

A circuit judge issued an order enjoining appellants from filling all the principalships in District # 1 so as to preserve vacant at least two principalships pending a hearing on the merits.The Chief Justice of this Court superseded the order provided respondents were maintained pendente lite in the salary status they would have occupied had they not been reassigned.¹

After a hearing on the merits, another circuit judge reversed appellants' reassignments of respondents and ordered that respondents be reinstated as principals.This Court superseded the order of the circuit court, continuing in effect the previous supersedeas pending disposition of the appeal.

On appeal, appellants first argue respondents were merely reassigned, not dismissed or nonrenewed, and thus were not entitled to a full, adversarial hearing.Respondents argue they were actually dismissed or nonrenewed as principals and, thus, upon dismissal or nonrenewal, were entitled to a full, adversarial hearing as provided in the Teacher Employment and Dismissal Act (the Act), S.C.Code Ann. § 59-25-460(1976 and Cum.Supp.1983).²

Section 59-1-130 of the Code defines "teacher" as "any person who is employed either full-time or part-time by any school district either to teach or to supervise teaching."Principals, as supervisors of teachers, fit within the definition of "teacher" and would be protected by the Act.

A close reading of the Act reveals no distinction between administrative or supervisory personnel and teachers."Where a principal is protected by the tenure statute only from dismissal as a teacher, a principal may properly be demoted to the position of a teacher."78 C.J.S.Schools and School Districts§ 205(1952).³

It is well established that in statutory construction, words of a statute are to be given their plain meaning.See cases collected in17 West's South Carolina Digest, Statutes, KeyNo. 181(1).The Act provides for a full, adversarial hearing when a teacher is dismissed or nonrenewed. §§ 59-25-420,59-25-430,59-25-460 of the Code.Nowhere does it provide for a full, adversarial hearing when a teacher is merely transferred, reassigned, or demoted.We are of the opinion that policy decisions concerning where an employee will best serve the school district are better left to school officials, not the courts.Unless the legislature decides to require full, adversarial hearings for teachers upon their transfer, reassignment, or demotion to another certificated position, this Court will not require such a hearing.

Next, appellants argue the circuit judge erred in finding appellants' actions in reassigning respondents without a full hearing were subject to and violative of the due process requirements of the "Evaluation System for Principals"[the plan], which was devised by District # 1 in 1980.

The evidence presented at the hearing established that the plan, which provided for a three year principal's professional growth plan, was not operative for the 1980-81 school year, the year in which respondents were notified...