Snodderly v. Kansas
Decision Date | 19 November 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 96-4044-SAC.,96-4044-SAC. |
Parties | Brian L. SNODDERLY, Plaintiff, v. The State of KANSAS and Bev Heinrich, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Michael D. Burrichter, Kansas Dept. of Revenue, Topeka, KS, Frank S. Reeb, Johnson County Legal Dept., Johnson County Square, Oathe, KS, M.J. Willoughby, Office of Attorney General, Kansas Judicial Center, for defendant.
Brock R. Snyder, Law Office of Brock R. Snyder, Topeka, KS, for plaintiff.
The plaintiff, Brian L. Snodderly, alleges that he was constructively discharged from his employment in the mail room at the State of Kansas Department of Revenue by a hostile work environment which he attributes to his mental disabilities — an adjustment disorder with anxious mood and passive-aggressive personality — and physical disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiff also asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the tort of outrage.2 The defendants deny liability and challenge this court's jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims.
Parallel State Proceedings:
Shortly before filing this federal case, the plaintiff had filed similar or nearly identical claims in a parallel state proceeding before Franklin R. Theis, Shawnee County, Kansas, district judge. On July 30, 1998, Judge Theis granted summary judgment to the defendants on all the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff has appealed that adverse ruling to the Kansas Court of Appeals. On January 15, 1999, the plaintiff filed his brief in the Kansas Court of Appeals. See Plaintiff's "Notice of Filing of Appellant's Brief in the Court of Appeals for the State of Kansas" (Dk.110). On November 5, 1999, the Kansas Court of Appeals heard oral argument on that appeal.
Pending Motions:
1. Motion for Summary Judgment as to breach of contract claims based upon res judicata and collateral estoppel (Dk.98).
2. Defendant's motion to dismiss (Dk.63).
3. Motion to Dismiss (Dk.113).
4. Notice of Supplemental Authority and Renewed Request for Summary Judgment as to All Claims Based upon Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel (Dk.100).
5. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dk.77).
Motion for Summary Judgment as to breach of contract claims based upon res judicata and collateral estoppel (Dk.98).
In light of the plaintiff's abandonment of his contract based claims, see Plaintiff's "Response to Defendant's Renewed Request for Summary Judgment Based upon Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel" (Dk. 108 at page 1) (plaintiff "concede[s] to surrendering his breach of contract claim" and "his third party beneficiary contract claim.") this motion is denied as moot.
Defendant's motion to dismiss (Dk.63).
In this motion, the defendants move, inter alia3, for dismissal of plaintiff's ADA and state law claims against the State of Kansas and Bev Heinrich in her official capacity based upon Eleventh Amendment immunity. The plaintiff responds, arguing that Congress abrogated state immunity when it enacted the ADA. As to his state law claims, the plaintiff argues that this court has supplemental jurisdiction over these claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because "it would be prejudicial to the plaintiff if he had to maintain two separate suits, one in federal court and one in state court when especially all of the claims arise from the same issues and facts." Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss titled "Reply to Defendants (sic) Motion to Dismiss (Dk. 76 at 13-14)".
Since the time that the defendants' motion to dismiss was filed, the Tenth Circuit has held "that Congress's statutory abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in the ADA was a valid exercise of its Section 5 enforcement powers." Martin v. State of Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 1999). Consequently, this court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff's ADA claims against the State of Kansas. The defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's ADA claims is denied.
This court lacks, however, jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims against the State of Kansas and Bev Heinrich in her official capacity. See Elephant Butte Irrigation District of New Mexico v. Dept. of Interior, 160 F.3d 602, 607 (10th Cir.1998) () (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)) () , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 1255, 143 L.Ed.2d 352 (1999); Ellis v. University of Kansas Medical Center, 163 F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir.1999) () (footnote omitted); Re v. New Vistas, 173 F.3d 864, 1999 WL 178695 (10th Cir.1999) (Table) (), petition for cert. filed July 27, 1999.
Although this court has jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's ADA claims against the State of Kansas, that finding does not establish jurisdiction over the plaintiff's supplemental claims. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 US. 89, 121, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) ( ).
Contrary to the plaintiff's implicit suggestion, § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction) does not abrogate Kansas' Eleventh Amendment immunity. The plaintiff's judicial economy arguments do not change this result:
Congress did not abrogate the states' immunity from suit in federal court in 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the statute codifying the common-law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction; ... the grant of supplemental jurisdiction contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 cannot override Eleventh Amendment immunity.
These conclusions make Plaintiffs' judicial economy and convenience argument irrelevant. "In any case ... such considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State." Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 123, 104 S.Ct. at 920 ( ).
Doran v. Condon, 983 F.Supp. 886, 890-91 (D.Nebraska 1997); see, e.g., Archibeque v. Wylie, 16 F.3d 415, 1994 WL 41272 ( ).
The plaintiff's state law claims against the State of Kansas and against Bev Heinrich in her official capacity are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Notice of Supplemental Authority and Renewed Request for Summary Judgment as to All Claims Based upon Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel (Dk.100)/Motion to Dismiss (Dk.113).
In these motions, the defendants seek dismissal of this case, arguing that because the plaintiff's claims have been rejected by Judge Theis, the plaintiffs claims are barred by res judicata principles. In the alternative, the defendants contend that this federal court action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and its progeny. The defendants contend that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies even though the plaintiff's appeal is still pending before the Kansas Court of Appeals. The defendants argue that the doctrine applies to the plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Bev Heinrich because it is "inextricably intertwined" with the claims actually decided by the state court. Alternatively, Heinrich contends that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs § 1983 claim.
The plaintiff filed a response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment but filed no response to the defendants' motion to dismiss.
In light of Judge Theis' decision granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all of the plaintiffs claims in that case, the defendants move for summary judgment in this case on res judicata and collateral estoppel principles. See "Notice of Supplemental Authority and Renewed Request for Summary Judgment as to All Claims Based upon Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel (Dk.100)." In his response to the defendants' contention that the plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata principles, the plaintiff, inter alia, notes that he has filed an appeal to the Kansas Court of Appeals.
The defendants correctly argue that this court must give a Kansas state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment by the state courts of Kansas. Ryan v. City of Shawnee, 13 F.3d 345, 347 (10th Cir.1993) () (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738).4
However, under Kansas law the pendency of an appeal precludes the application of res judicata principles. See Speer v. Dighton Grain Inc., 229 Kan. 272, Syl. ¶ 1, 624 P.2d 952 (1981) (...
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