Snodgrass v. Snodgrass
| Decision Date | 02 April 1912 |
| Parties | SNODGRASS v. SNODGRASS. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Chancery Court, Jackson County; W. H. Simpson Chancellor.
Bill by John A. Snodgrass, as administrator of Ann C. Snodgrass deceased, against Eliza A. Snodgrass, as administratrix of Nathaniel H. Snodgrass, deceased. From a decree overruling demurrers to the bill, defendant appeals. Reversed, rendered and remanded.
John B Tally and Virgil Bouldin, both of Scottsboro, for appellant.
W. H. Norwood, of Scottsboro, for appellee.
The bill in this case is filed by the appellee against the appellant, and this appeal is from the decree of the chancery court, overruling the demurrers to the bill.
The allegations of the bill are, in substance, that John A. Snodgrass died intestate April 4, 1880; that a final settlement of his estate was made by his administrators February 9, 1889; that after the death of said John Snodgrass and of his widow, in 1880 and 1882, respectively, William E., John T., Ann C., and Nathaniel Snodgrass lived together on the old homestead of their father, said John Snodgrass; that William E., being the oldest of the family, at the request of the others took charge of the management and control of all the property belonging to said parties, receiving cotton, corn, horses, mules, lumber, choses in action, etc., the property of said estate, including also rents of the lands, for which he never accounted, and so continued until December 15, 1886, when he resigned said agency, and Nathaniel H. Snodgrass, at the request of the other parties, assumed the general agency and trusteeship for said John T. and Ann C. Snodgrass, and he and said John T. and Ann C. lived together in the family residence, owned by them as tenants in common, until July 25, 1904, when said Ann C. died, and after that said Nathaniel and John T. continued so to reside, until the death of said Nathaniel H., which occurred November 24, 1910; that said Nathaniel has never accounted for any of the rents or property received by him, but has used the same for his own personal benefit. Various sums are specially mentioned as having been collected by said Nathaniel during the years 1881 and 1882.
It is also alleged that soon after the death of said John Snodgrass said William E., John T., and Ann Snodgrass furnished money for the erection of a steam sawmill and gristmill on said lands, and said William E. and Nathaniel successively operated the same, using the proceeds individually and never accounting for the same.
The prayers of the bill are that said Eliza A. Snodgrass, as administratrix of the estate of Nathaniel H. Snodgrass, be required to account, that a reference be had to ascertain the amounts received by said Nathaniel H. Snodgrass, the amount of personal property converted by him to his own use while acting as such agent, to charge him up with the rental value of the undivided interests during the time the lands were held by him, to credit him with proper payments, etc., and that a decree be rendered thereon, etc. In other words, this is a bill to require an accounting by the administrator of an agent or trustee, whose agency or trusteeship commenced in 1886, since which time no act is alleged in recognition of said agency or trusteeship.
As a matter of public policy, and for the repose of society, it has long been the settled policy of this state, as of others that antiquated demands will not be considered by the courts, and that, without regard to any statute of limitations, there must be a time beyond which human transactions will not be inquired into. It is settled that, after a period of 20 years, without any payment, settlement, or other recognition of liability, mortgages and liens will be presumed to...
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