Snook v. Wood

• Decision Date: 12 July 1996
• Docket Number: 95-36150,Nos. 95-36089,s. 95-36089
• Parties: 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5187, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,826, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8388 Donald M. SNOOK, Petitioner-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. Tana WOOD, Superintendent, Washington State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 605

89 F.3d 605

96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5187, 96 Daily Journal

D.A.R. 10,826,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8388

Donald M. SNOOK, Petitioner-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. Tana WOOD, Superintendent, Washington State Penitentiary,

Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 95-36089, 95-36150.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 3, 1996.

Decided July 12, 1996.

John J. Samson, Assistant Attorney General, Olympia, Washington, for respondent-appellant-cross-appellee.

George A. Critchlow and David Parker, University Legal Assistance, Spokane, Washington, for petitioner-appellee-cross-appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington; Justin L. Quackenbush, Senior District Judge, Presiding.

Before: BROWNING, WRIGHT and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge T.G. NELSON; Special Concurrence by Judge WRIGHT.

T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

OVERVIEW

Tana Wood, Superintendent, Washington State Penitentiary ("State"), appeals the district court's partial grant of habeas corpus relief to Washington State prisoner Donald M. Snook ("Snook"), who challenges his 1977 murder conviction and life sentence.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2243, and we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1975, while incarcerated for taking a motor vehicle without permission, Snook was charged with first-degree murder of a fellow inmate. A jury convicted Snook, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum sentence of twenty years.

While serving his sentence, in January 1977, Snook allegedly killed another inmate. In February 1977, Snook was charged with first-degree aggravated murder under Washington's 1975 mandatory death penalty statute, RCW 9A.32.046.

In June 1977, prior to Snook's second murder trial, the Governor of Washington signed into law Substituted House Bill No. 615, effective immediately, which changed the procedures for imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder under the 1975 statute. This new law did not apply retroactively.

Because Snook committed his crime under the 1975 statute, and because that statute had not been declared invalid, the trial court tried, convicted and sentenced Snook under the 1975 mandatory death penalty statute. Consequently, Snook was sentenced to death. However, pursuant to the savings clause within the 1975 statute, the court also imposed an alternative sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, which was to become effective in the event Snook's death sentence was held unconstitutional.

Snook immediately appealed his death sentence. Donald Schacht and John Knowlton, Snook's trial attorneys, were appointed as counsel for Snook on appeal. In November of 1977, Schacht withdrew as Snook's counsel because of a possible conflict of interest. Soon thereafter, Knowlton also withdrew for the same reason.

Upon the discharge of Schacht and Knowlton, the Walla Walla Superior Court appointed Madison Jones to represent Snook. A short time later, Snook discharged Jones.

On September 13, 1978, Snook moved in the superior court to compel direct access to the prison law library. Snook's motion and supporting documents stated that Snook was appealing pro se. Snook's supporting affidavit stated:

That on August 29, 1978, Appellant requested that his Court appointed Attorney withdraw from his appeal, this attorney, Madison R. Jones. That on August 30, 1978, that Walla Walla Superior Court Judge Honorable James B. Mitchell Snook further stated, "Appellant has chosen to represent himself on his appeal as one of his rights by both the State of Washington's Constitution and the Constitution of the United States of America.... Appellant is definetly [sic] competent enogh [sic] to represent himself as he has done work as a Jailhouse Lawyer for a number of years."

                signed the above order allowing Appellant's attorney to withdraw from his appeal.   By so doing Appellant is now on appeal PRO SE
                

In a letter to the Clerk of the Washington Supreme Court, dated September 17, 1978, Snook informed the court that he had dismissed his attorney, Jones, and that he intended to represent himself. The letter stated:

As of 8/30/78 I became my own PRO SE counsel. Mr. Jones was dismissed as my counsel in the above-entitled cause at my request on 8/30/78 in an ORDER signed by Walla Walla Superior Court Judge James B. Mitchell.

This information I ask please be noted and that in the future that I am recognized as my own counsel on my appeal in which I'll file Appellant, PRO SE.

The letter further stated, "I believe by law I am able to represent myself if I so desire and in this case that is what I want." Snook admits that he typed this letter himself.

On October 11, 1978, Gust Haugen, the Administrator of the Walla Walla-Columbia County Legal Defense Association, filed an affidavit based upon his telephone conversations with Snook. In the affidavit, Haugen stated, "Snook informed your affiant that he believes that he is fully qualified to act as his own attorney in matters relating to his appeal from a conviction of murder in the first degree."

On October 12, 1978, Snook signed an affidavit indicating that he desired to represent himself:

That your affiant dismissed Madison R. Jones as his attorney in your affiant's appeals and desires to represent himself in any further appeal proceeding. That your affiant is aware that pursuant to Criminal Rules for Superior Court CrR 3.1(b)(2) your affiant is entitled to counsel for purposes of appeal. That your affiant hereby knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives his right to have appointed counsel representing him for purposes of appellate review in the above cause and henceforth will represent himself in all matters relating to his appeal.

On October 30, 1978, Stephen E. Llewellyn, the attorney for the Walla Walla-Columbia County Legal Defense Association, wrote a letter to the Clerk of the Washington Supreme Court. In his letter, Llewellyn wrote that when he provided the name of James Barrett to represent Snook in his appeal, Snook informed him that "he [did] not want appointed counsel to represent him for purposes of appeal and that he would resist any attempt to appoint counsel for him."

It does not appear that there was ever a state court hearing on the issue of Snook's request to waive his right to be represented by counsel on appeal.

On January 5, 1979, the Washington Supreme Court ruled the mandatory death penalty provision of the 1975 statute unconstitutional. State v. Green, 91 Wash.2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979). On January 10, 1979, Snook filed a pro se motion with the Washington Supreme Court to vacate his sentence.

In June 1979, the Washington Supreme Court vacated Snook's death sentence. The court, however, determined that resentencing was not necessary because an alternative sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole had already been imposed. In re Snook, 67 Wash.App. 714, 840 P.2d 207 (1992). The court transferred Snook's appeal to the Washington Court of Appeals for further proceedings. Snook then voluntarily withdrew his direct appeal because he feared that the death sentence could be reimposed under the rule set forth in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977).

Between 1980 and the filing of the present petition in the district court in 1993, Snook filed four personal restraint petitions in state court and two habeas petitions in federal court. All were denied or dismissed.

In September 1993, Snook filed the present habeas corpus petition, and later, the district court appointed counsel to assist Snook. Through counsel, Snook filed a memorandum of law in support of his petition for habeas corpus, raising two issues: (1) The trial court incorrectly sentenced Snook under the 1975 statute; and (2) Snook did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel or assert his right to self representation on appeal.

By an Order filed on April 20, 1995, the district court found that Snook was sentenced to death without the required constitutional safeguards. Nonetheless, the court held that because the Washington Supreme Court vacated Snook's death sentence and reduced the sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under the saving clause of the 1975 statute, Snook's sentence was constitutional.

With regard to the waiver of counsel on appeal issue, the district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Snook knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel on direct appeal. On October 6, 1995, the district court issued a written order stating:

[U]nder the applicable law, there has been no showing at all of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of Petitioner's right to the assistance of counsel on appeal of his aggravated murder conviction. No one ever talked to Snook, a 24 or 25 year-old man, with a limited education, with psychological problems, and who had been sentenced to death, about the dangers and potential consequences of self-representation. Snook did not have the background and experience in legal matters in 1977-80 to represent himself in a capital appeal of all appealable issues in this case.

The court concluded that Snook had "been denied his due process rights under the United States Constitution by being denied his right to effective assistance of counsel in appealing his capital first-degree aggravated murder conviction to the Washington Court of Appeals." Thus, the court granted in part Snook's petition for writ of habeas corpus, ordering the Washington courts to reinstate Snook's right to appeal with the assistance of counsel.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

The decision whether to grant or deny a petition for habeas corpus is reviewed de novo. Calderon v. Prunty, 59 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir.1995). The district court's findings of fact are reviewed under the...