Snow v. Ault, No. 00-1459SI
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Writing for the Court | Before Wollman, Chief Judge, McMILLIAN and Richard S. Arnold; Richard S. Arnold |
Citation | 238 F.3d 1033 |
Parties | (8th Cir. 2001) RICK LEE SNOW, APPELLANT, v. JOHN AULT, APPELLEE. . Submitted: |
Docket Number | No. 00-1459SI |
Decision Date | 16 November 2000 |
Page 1033
v.
JOHN AULT, APPELLEE.
Filed: January 9, 2001.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
Page 1034
Before Wollman, Chief Judge, McMILLIAN and Richard S. Arnold, Circuit Judges.
Richard S. Arnold, Circuit Judge.
Rick Lee Snow, an Iowa prisoner, appeals from the District Court's1 order dismissing his habeas petition as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Snow argues that the District Court erred in failing to toll the limitations period under § 2244(d)(2) for the 90 days following the denial of his second motion for post-conviction relief, the period within which he could have petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. We affirm.
I.
On July 31, 1990, Snow's direct criminal appeal affirming his conviction became final. On July 29, 1993, he filed a motion for state post-conviction relief. The motion was denied, and Snow filed an appeal, but on February 23, 1996, he voluntarily dismissed his appeal. On December 23, 1996, he filed a second state post-conviction motion. This motion was summarily dismissed. On August 18, 1998, Snow's appeal from the dismissal was denied as frivolous. On March 15, 1999, he filed the present federal habeas petition. The District Court dismissed Snow's petition as untimely, and granted a certificate of appealability on the timeliness question.
II.
We review the District Court's decision de novo. See Henderson-El v. Maschner, 180 F.3d 984, 985 (8th Cir. 1999). Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), as added by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, establishes a statute of limitations for the filing of habeas petitions by state prisoners. This section, effective April 24, 1996, includes its own tolling provision and provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from . . .
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;2
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Page 1035
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
In Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1187 (1999), this Court held that the running of the statute of limitations for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) is triggered by,
either (i) the conclusion of all direct criminal appeals in the state system, followed by either the completion or denial of certiorari proceedings before the United States Supreme Court; or (ii) if certiorari was not sought, then by the conclusion of all direct criminal appeals in the state system followed by the expiration of the [90 days] allotted for filing a petition for the writ.
The Court based this decision on the "well-established body...
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Abela v. Martin, 00-2430.
...conclusion with respect to petitioners who had not actually sought certiorari review — the scenario presented in Isham. See Snow v. Ault, 238 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir.2001); Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir.2001); Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225, 1227(11th Cir.2000); Ott v. John......
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Freie v. Fayram, C10-2073-MWB
...files an appeal, the date procedendo issues is relevant in calculating the date when the conviction becomes final. See Snow v. Ault, 238 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that the running of the statute of limitations for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) is triggered by: 1) the conclusion......
-
U.S. v. Loudner, CR 92-30016.
...construction call for us to define the statute's terms in harmony with that accepted judicial meaning"); see also, Snow v. Ault, 238 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir.2001) (reaffirming the rule in Smith and holding that the limitations period is not tolled for the 90 days during which certiorari could ha......
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State v. Losh, No. A04-1028.
...of this court affirming denial of postconviction relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000); Minn.Stat. § 590.06 (2004); see also Snow v. Ault, 238 F.3d 1033, 1035-36 (8th Cir.2001) (holding statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petition was not tolled during 90-day period during which ......
-
Abela v. Martin, No. 00-2430.
...conclusion with respect to petitioners who had not actually sought certiorari review — the scenario presented in Isham. See Snow v. Ault, 238 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir.2001); Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir.2001); Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225, 1227(11th Cir.2000); Ott v. John......
-
Freie v. Fayram, No. C10-2073-MWB
...files an appeal, the date procedendo issues is relevant in calculating the date when the conviction becomes final. See Snow v. Ault, 238 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that the running of the statute of limitations for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) is triggered by: 1) the conclusion......
-
State v. Losh, No. A04-1028.
...of this court affirming denial of postconviction relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000); Minn.Stat. § 590.06 (2004); see also Snow v. Ault, 238 F.3d 1033, 1035-36 (8th Cir.2001) (holding statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petition was not tolled during 90-day period during which ......
-
U.S. v. Loudner, No. CR 92-30016.
...construction call for us to define the statute's terms in harmony with that accepted judicial meaning"); see also, Snow v. Ault, 238 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir.2001) (reaffirming the rule in Smith and holding that the limitations period is not tolled for the 90 days during which certiorari could ha......